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American SOCIOLOGICAL Review

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RURAL SOCIOLOGY

Official Journal of the Rural Sociological Society

Managing Editor: C. HORACE HAMILTON

North Carolina State College, Raleigh, North Carolina

Volume 9

June, 1944

Number 2

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American SOCILOGICAL Review

August
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Volume 9
Number 4

The Official Journal of the American Sociological Society



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SOCIOLOGICAL ELEMENTS IN ECONOMIC RESTRICTIONISM*

C. ARNOLD ANDERSON
Iowa State College

MODERN SOCIETY possesses the technology and the resources to supply its members with a steadily rising level of material living and personal services. The desirability of these goals is almost universally accepted throughout the western world; it is believed that their fulfillment is assured if only we can solve the particular problem of depressions. Nevertheless the pull and tug over distribution of the national income, and the multiplication of restrictions associated with this conflict, choke off a large part of the potential production. Not only are private interests engaged in building retaining walls around their particular spheres of action; the governments of every nation, with the approval of their citizens, are steadily introducing one policy after another whose effects must be to limit the output of the economic system.

It is quite generally concluded that this perverse behavior arises out of ignorance, and that if people were shown their errors they would insist upon a freer economic system. Others attribute the restrictions to the influence of vested interests that bribe the legislators, browbeat the administrators, and beguile the voters. It is the purpose of this paper to explore some of the factors *other than ignorance or economic calculation*

which may contribute to the explanation of the growing importance of restrictionist actions and policies.

Restrictionism Defined. Restrictionism refers to two major kinds of behavior, each closely tied in with the other. A restrictionist policy is (1) a policy designed to prevent outsiders from joining insiders on equal terms; or (2) an agreement (whether formal or tacit) to limit production.¹ In the first sense, restrictionism is essentially an attempt to exclude competition, and it is the foundation for effective restrictive action of the second type.²

* Journal Paper No. J1182 of the Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station, Ames, Iowa. Project No. 795. Presented to the Thirty-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society, New York, December 5, 1943.

¹Defined in the language of economics, the second type of restrictionism would arise, e.g., whenever rival business firms refrained from aggressive price competition, i.e., whenever individual firms take into account the reactions of rivals to their policies, and restrict outputs accordingly.

²We are talking about those actions whose purposes and motivation are clearly restrictive, ignoring policies that have incidentally restrictive effects. Thus we exclude the whole category of government social welfare policies, such as child labor laws, because their purpose is protection of the excluded group rather than benefit to insiders.

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TABLE 1. TYPES OF RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES AND THE ECONOMIC GROUPS FAVORING THEM³

	Big Business	Little Business	Professions	Agriculture	Organized Labor	Unorganized Labor	General Public	Consumers
I. Domestic								
A. Legal								
1. Franchises (e.g. radio, utilities, peddlers' licenses)	x	x					x	x
2. Patents and copyrights	x	x	x				x	x
3. Prescribed standards				x	x		x	x
a. Of products (e.g. pure food laws, building codes)	x	x		x	x		x	x
b. Of labor (e.g. plumbers' certificates, barber licenses)		x		x			x	x
c. Of professions (e.g. doctors)		x	x	x			x	x
4. Taxes (e.g. chain store, oleomargarine)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
5. Market and production quotas (e.g. milk sheds, AAA)				x	x		x	
6. Legal protection of trade marks	x	x	x				x	
7. Internal migration restrictions (e.g. settlement and vagrancy laws)				x	x	x	x	x
8. Zoning laws							x	
B. Non-legal (or illegal)								
1. Bottleneck control and exploitation in business								
a. Transportation (e.g. rail rebates, oil pipelines)	x							
b. Central market and terminal facilities (e.g. meat exchange, citrus fruit coop.)	x		x					
c. Labor (exclusive agreements with employer) (e.g. coal mining, building industry)	x	x			x			
d. Exclusive ownership of raw materials (e.g. bauxite, quarries)	x	x		x				
e. Credit (e.g. aluminum co.) and power (aluminum co.)	x	x						
2. Exclusive patent pools, tying contracts, and other organized exploitations of patent rights								
a. To exclude competitors (e.g. radio, shoe machinery)	x							
b. To resist technical changes (e.g. telephones)	x							
3. Market sharing								
a. Output and sales agreements (e.g. coal quotas, cement, butter)	x	x	x	x				
b. Labor					x	x	x	x
1) Inter-union job jurisdiction agreements					x	x	x	x
2) Share work by short hours					x	x	x	x
4. Control of entry to trade or profession								
a. Closed shop and closed union (via entrance fees, apprenticeship, limits on number of members)			x	x	x		x	x
b. Standards of professional competence			x	x	x			
5. Use of advertising to exclude newcomers								
a. Aggressive and extensive advertising (e.g. tobacco, Bayer aspirin)	x							
b. Group advertising of standards (e.g. plumbing equipment, bedding, union label)	x	x	x	x	x			
6. Threats of cutthroat competition of new entrants	x	x						
7. Direct labor action against technical change (strikes, sabotage, shop conditions)					x	x		
8. Discrimination against minorities and non-local people								
a. Jobs	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
b. Patronage (business)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
c. Social hostility	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

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TABLE I (Continued)

General Public	Consumers		Big Business	Little Business	Professions	Agriculture	Organized Labor	Unorganized Labor	General Public	Consumers
II. Foreign										
x	x	A. Legal								
x	x	1. Immigration laws	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
x	x	2. Tariffs, taxes, quotas on imports	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
x	x	3. Quarantines				x	x	x	x	x
x	x	B. Non-legal (or illegal)				x	x	x	x	x
x	x	1. Boycotts	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
x	x	2. Cartel divisions of territory	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
x	x	3. Discrimination against foreigners within this country (jobs, patronage, social non-acceptance)		x	x	x	x	x	x	x

The accompanying table³ provides a rough map of restrictive actions and designates the sectors of the population that may be expected actively to conceive or support them. A glance over this table shows that there is usually more than one segment of the population interested in maintaining restrictions of any given kind, though any one specific restriction would generally command the support of a few people only. The public is, however, an active supporter of many restrictions, even of some which work against what that same public regards as its welfare.

Thesis of This Paper. In the early 19th century western civilization moved rapidly toward an individualistic society in which the economic institution was quite visibly the most dynamic source of social change. It is our thesis that the factors inhibiting the fruition of this tendency and fostering private and public policies of a restrictionist type have their core in the desire for security

³This table is incomplete but it does provide a list-of-types of restrictive practices for ready reference. The checks indicating active support of a particular type of restrictive practice imply that a sector of the population supports that restriction from a rational vocational standpoint. The column "general public" gives an estimate of how popular votes would line up. The column for consumers includes only cases in which a restriction would be rationally favored as contributing more than it limits consumer welfare. Checks have been omitted where members of a particular economic category would no doubt support the given type of restrictionism were its application on their behalf feasible.

and stability and the desire for power and status. (These are taken as given, avoiding the question as to their psychological or cultural source.) The restrictive channels through which these desires found expression were determined by lines of common economic interest and by pre-existing and emerging sociologically significant group structures and identifications of in-group versus out-group. Invention in the realm of organization has played a part. The distortion of the theory of liberal economics into a defense of the middle classes supported business restrictionism. Underlying the importance in restrictive action of the drives for security and power, and facilitating the crystallization of group cleavages through which these drives found expression, was the growth of romanticism—including the craving for group esprit, anti-personality, and anti-rationality.

ECONOMIC LIBERALISM VS. LAISSEZ FAIRE

The early advocates of economic liberalism assumed a particular institutional framework. Property was to be held in individual hands as the reward for productivity and the incentive to greater efficiency. Productive resources were to be fluid, no artificial checks or political favors keeping capital or labor or management from being used where they would be most productive. All decisions —what to purchase, where to work, what to manufacture, where to invest, how to operate the firm—were to be made with knowl-

edge of alternative opportunities; those decisions were to be individually arrived at and uncoerced.* Whenever there were departures from any of these assumptions, public policy should remove the disparities. Economic liberalism was not the same thing as laissez faire, although those arguing an extreme laissez faire position claimed its support.

Various groups found distinctive and compelling reasons to use the license implied in the vulgarization of economic liberalism to build restrictive walls. The favored property owners and enterprisers believed an owner should have a free hand to operate his business as he saw fit; from his efforts would come progress, rising levels of living, and economic survival of those most fit to keep the competitive system functioning. In viewing these accomplishments as vindications of the new economic system many facts were overlooked: that only the employer had a wide range of opportunity for advancement under the social and educational conditions of the time, that there would be advantages in combining to increase profits, that ownership facilitated the accumulation of power and encouraged unfair competition and the exploitation of unorganized labor as well as of populations in new areas dependent upon capitalist centers.

Out of this immunity of business from social control arose counteracting efforts on the part of agrarian countries and labor groups. Many sectors of the population learned the value of collaborative action, as they also learned and improved the techniques for joint action. Such aggregations of decision-making units were incompatible with free competition. It would be a mistake to interpret these protective associations as principally class structures, for some of the most conspicuous and effective collaboration cut vertically through the population uniting whole industries or geographical sections against others.

*This independence of decision-making is an assumption that arises out of an atomistic picture of the structure of the economy—one in which all economic units are small and there are many of every kind. F. H. Knight, *The Ethics of Competition*, 47-57, New York, 1935.

In recent decades the ideology of our economic system has departed significantly from the old combination of liberalism with a policy of *laissez faire*. Balance of power economics has been replacing competitive economics and the automatic operation of "natural economic law." The idea of planning and the search for stability and security have replaced the focus on gain and progress through risk taking.

DESIRSES FOR SECURITY AND STABILITY

The importance of the desires for security and stability, and the particular manifestations of these desires vary with the economic and social setting and the shifting roles of different sectors of the population in economic and political life.

Attitudes Among Business Men. The members of the rising middle class early found themselves in a situation with large opportunities despite persisting prejudices against business. They quickly gained the kind of security they wanted—not stability but assurance that they could have an unhampered scope for enterprise. Their kind of quest for security was anti-restrictionist.

As business men have become recognized as the key group in society, their conceptions of security and stability have changed. Stability has come to mean the persistence of a position attained; avoidance of risk has displaced venturesomeness; and restrictionism has become the means to these ends. Once adventure ceases to be in itself a value, the appeals of risk-dodging measures tend to become preponderant. Big business protects itself through elaborate devices such as quota and territorial agreements, pooling of patents for the benefit of insiders, etc. Concepts of "business ethics" have been dovetailed into some of these programs; it is often regarded as "unethical" for one of a group of firms aggressively to seek more than its accustomed share of the market.

The small business man seeks security through localized economic restrictionism in an effort to seal his world off from the intrusion of little understood forces from outside the familiar universe of life. The emphasis on profit and impersonal production as-

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sociated with big business threaten the community values dear to many small merchants. Provincialism among the general public is a foundation for support of this locally focused restrictionism.

Restrictionism centering on security, whether by big or small business, receives support from a public that no longer has faith in the competitive mechanism as the method of economic regulation in a *laissez faire* setting. Business men have in many cases succeeded in obtaining government intervention to support restrictionism as a presumed means toward greater stability of the total economy, toward the preventing of severe general deflation. Deflation has become the great "bogey" of the modern age, to be avoided in each particular instance, whether or not this is a rational way of avoiding deflation in general.⁵

Attitudes Among Workers. Despite the assumption of fluidity of economic resources in the doctrines of economic liberalism, there were few opportunities open to the laboring classes during early decades of the industrial revolution. Although general levels of income rose, income for the individual was uncertain; the new industrial workers suffered extreme insecurity, for there was no longer the protection inherent in the mutual obligations of a landed society. Laboring men knew little of the doctrines of economic liberalism. They took for granted an inferior station, and at this date there was therefore little striving for power or status among unskilled laborers. They could not implement their desire for security in the absence of either facilities for organized action or effective political democracy.

Skilled workers were in a position quite different from either the new enterprisers or the new urban labor populations, for while

many of the old crafts persisted, a dynamic economy constantly threatened their positions. Progress for society was not progress for them. Their status and security depended on maintaining as stable a society as possible.

The profit element in wages has been very generally overlooked. It was easy a century ago to assume that laborers receive what they need to live and reproduce, and in later thinking to assume that they would get what they contributed economically. These interpretations have been strengthened by invidious class notions of personal worth. But when a worker "invests" in the acquiring of a skill he is taking a chance with regard to future income that is quite clearly tied into the same economic uncertainties that give rise to profits and losses on capital investments. If a man guesses right with regard to the future lucrativeness of particular skills, his wages will be high, and vice versa.

Avoidance of risk expressed through restrictive action on the part of labor has been much more personal and humanitarian in motive than has analogous action on the part of big business men. The losses of the laborer or small shop keeper are quickly transferred into personal sufferings. Among laboring men today there are two inconsistent ideologies—that the individual is responsible for his own situation, and that the avenues for advancement are largely closed. Increasingly the second ideology has gained over the first as the chances of sliding down the scale have appeared to increase. Hence, restrictive labor actions focus on the maintenance of conventional standards and security in the job. Since regularity of income is preeminently important and there is constant awareness of the need to preserve a margin of safety in incomes, the policy of workers is to safeguard the source of income. The prime ingredient in worker foresight is emphasis upon security, to preserve what one has rather than count upon new gains. Experience has seemed to teach the worker that individual strategy for this protection is not very reliable; collective methods are required.⁶

⁵ E. W. Bakke, *The Unemployed Worker*, Chapter 7, New Haven, 1940; J. W. McConnell, *The*

There is a cumulative relationship between restrictionism and the search for security and stability. Protective measures instituted by an established labor group close the doors to advancement for outsiders. These outsiders seek new ways to break through the retaining walls and new restrictions are raised against them. Each excluded group in turn seeks to establish its bulwarks against the remainder of the population.

Attitudes Among Farmers. Agriculture too has developed collective measures for security. The examples of business and labor have stimulated this effort to offset the hazards of commercialization. Cooperative marketing has enabled farmers to effect some measure of control over markets. And like business men, farmers have turned to government for help. Price floors and production ceilings are by intent guarantees against the more violent fluctuations of prices. Coordination, with government blessing or with government aid, has perhaps gone relatively further in agriculture than in any other large sector of the economy.

DESIRSES FOR POWER AND STATUS

The evolution of a competitive system in a laissez faire setting entails struggles for power and status as well as for security or risk avoidance. In fact, the two are closely related in that the attainment of power and established status increases the possibilities of avoiding risk, and danger of loss of status is an aspect of risk. In our culture power is an end in itself; political or social status are to a high degree associated with wealth and economic control.

Attitudes Among Business Men. When business men were not yet recognized as the dominant element in the economic and social structure they sought increases in their power and status. Today they have already reached and passed the zenith of their position as the dominant class. Meanwhile concepts of economic democracy have gained wide acceptance despite severe limitations on equality of opportunity. Laborers

have been gaining in relative position. Business enterprisers are now on the defensive to maintain their present position of dominance, and struggles for increased power focus on rivalry for individual leadership. Restrictionism contributes to both of these types of power and status achievement.

The relative importance of economic rationalism in modern big business restrictionism can easily be overestimated. A Darwinian conception of selection for success becomes a justification for practices designed to establish firmly positions once attained. Such attainment is interpreted as evidence of the superiority of each individual and of the group of other successful individuals. Business men as a class seek to maintain freedom from any type of interference with the running of their businesses and to stifle growing power among other major groups. At the same time the struggle for increased power frequently focuses on individual competition with other business men. But since the principal means to increased power include collaboration in limiting opportunities for newcomers to compete, the net result tends to be a struggle for leadership positions in joint restrictionist programs.

If the peak in power and status for big industrialists as a group is past, to an even greater extent the small business man is today in a struggle to "hold his own." Status for the small merchant also is identified with the values of individual initiative and progress. Equally important, his status is potential status (opportunity) for large numbers of Americans who may yet get into business for themselves. It is also local in focus. More than any other vocational group, the small business man tends to be identified with his community; he is the spokesman for the values of community life. Small business restrictionism depends in large measure on government action resulting from his pleas to preserve competition against destruction by the forces of concentrated wealth and power, and to preserve local communities against threatened destruction by outsiders.⁷

*Evolution of Social Classes, Chapters 6, 7, 9, Washington, 1942; S. H. Slichter, *Union Policies and Industrial Management*, Washington, 1941.*

⁷ Retailers have proposed one after another the following measures to keep outside merchandisers from taking away part of their market. After the

Attitudes Among Workers. Organized labor stands in a very different position from business in the history of its status and power, and in the forms that these desires take. The rising tide of democracy brought the extension of schooling, the suffrage, and the observance of civil rights for all classes. The status of the ordinary laborer in the community has been rising. Meanwhile, skilled workers have continued on the defensive against the threats from technological change.

Because labor's place in society has been uncertain, unions have conceived their role as in part the validating of the social status of the skilled worker. Collective expressions of status consciousness and self-respect have included identification with the local community, with native against foreign labor, with whites against negroes. Since union actions have typically involved conflicts with employers, union restrictionism is defended by dramatic stories of unfair treatment, labor spying, and exploitation generally. Paradoxically, this class hostility toward employers contributes to the development of restrictions operating primarily against excluded laborers. Many of the most rigid and popular restrictions are jointly operated by employers and workers, as in mutual support of immigration laws and sharing the profits of a local monopoly. For the rank and file of union members status is derived in considerable measure from personal identification with the group. This sense of belonging and recognition is enhanced by everything that sets the group in some way apart from those who do not belong.

Civil War local merchants tried to force licenses upon the traveling drummer; later they demanded taxes on department stores according to the number of lines of goods carried. Similar laws aimed at mail order houses were inexpedient, so attempts were made to organize consumer boycotts, and buy-at-home campaigns were popular. Licenses on canvassers were nullified, but the latest move (significantly upheld by novel decisions of the Supreme Court) is chain store taxes. The popularity of these taxes reveals both the antagonism to big business and the local mindedness of small business and of its supporters among the general public. F. E. Melder, *State and Local Barriers to Interstate Commerce in the United States*, 55 f., Univ. of Maine Studies, Ser. 2, No. 43, Orono, 1937.

Exclusiveness in trade union policy is both strengthened and weakened by rivalry for leadership within the labor movement. In the early days of craft predominance, organized labor sought to separate itself from the mass of working men quite as much as to bargain more effectively with employers. Members were protected from an influx of outsiders into their "job territories." Unions encouraged their leaders' efforts to gain "respectability." The stigma of radicalism is always heatedly rejected as the mark of disreputable men, not union members. The new industrial unionism has naturally attacked restrictionism within the field of labor and opened the doors to freer union membership; the closed shop continues to be an important goal, however. It remains to be seen whether industrial unions will in turn begin to set themselves apart, e.g., by excluding negroes; it is almost certain that they will oppose relaxing immigration barriers.

Neither the white collar clerical and service workers nor the unskilled manual workers in this country focus on status or power in collective actions. These are the unorganized workers. White collar workers are the most mobile, vertically, and hence have developed little restrictionism to protect positions which they have considerable expectation of leaving behind them. Manual workers, on the other hand, have limited opportunities for advancement and few foundations on which to build power and status through restrictive practices. The chief exception to this statement about unorganized labor is identification with race, locality, or nation to exclude those who are outsiders from these points of view—and this action is largely spontaneous and political.

Attitudes Among Professionals. The professions are among the most exclusive of vocations, despite their criticisms of the restrictionist practices of labor unions.⁸ The central position of status-consciousness

⁸ Hutt states this emphatically, ". . . some of the most dogmatic of the opponents of trade-unionism are professional men whose own exclusive trades are subject to a protection much more complete and inviolable than that which working class bodies can acquire." *Economists and the Public*, 107, London, 1936.

among professionals gives support to euphemistic interpretations of their behavior and snobbishness toward what they assume to be the materialistic goals of labor groups. The medical profession illustrates many aspects of professional restrictionism. Doctors have great pride of craft; they wish to limit the numbers dispensing a valued service. This brings not merely economic advantage but, probably more important, the continued high repute of individual medical men in their communities. The fact that prestige for a doctor comes not only from his membership in a respected vocation but also from the many personal relationships with local people arising from his profession makes doctors distinctly locally minded people. Restrictionism in the medical profession takes the form not only of standards of entrance but of discriminations in medical schools and in state laws against the influx of outside practitioners, and of racial and other discrimination in contacts for getting started in practice.

Attitudes Among Farmers. Agriculture, along with small business, has often been regarded as the last stronghold of a liberal economic system. One might therefore expect farmers to oppose restrictionism. Actually, they and their organized spokesman are prone to favor restrictionist policies that give a relative advantage to agriculture. These programs not only protect members of an economically erratic occupation against the insecurities of weather and markets; they also express farmers' attitudes about their role in society and the balance of power among big economic groups. Farm leaders cite monopoly in industry as justification for agricultural programs: parity is called the farmers' tariff. Farmers, too, have a high pride of craft and their attitudes have been shared by much of the non-farm population who believe that agriculture not only provides a fundamental economic contribution but also bears a trusteeship for a good society. Extending their ideas of moral heritage and the importance of the rural community to a national level, farmers have supported nationalistic economic restrictions which were in fact against their own economic interest.

GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION IN DOMESTIC RESTRICTIONISM

Once reliance on the automatic resolution of economic conflict via the atomistic competitive economy is lost, government is pressed from two directions to participate in restrictionist policies.

In the earlier period of *laissez faire* non-intervention by government allowed the development of increasingly powerful business units, both as tightly knit organizations and as looser forms of collaboration.⁹ When government finally intervened to protect individuals against economic insecurities, the restrictive patterns already developed by private groups were able to win public support for continued and often increased privilege, or even to become a part of the governmental program. Thus, *laissez faire* policy as a misapplication of the ideas of economic liberalism must bear a considerable share of the responsibility.

At the same time, in a political democracy the state cannot ignore the pleas of the large number of people who are in less advantaged positions and who are seeking some redress of their handicaps through government intervention. Broader concepts of democracy reinforce the protests over the effects of large scale struggles for power by private interests to orient government policy toward the establishment of equality of bargaining power among the various economic sectors of the society.

Government support for restrictionism by one group leads to pleas for a counterbalancing of this action and for equal treatment of other groups. Any restrictively maintained position, validated by law, is a privileged position. Conflicts of interest more and more funnel through the political machinery and become crystallized in vested rights; these privileges acquire a permanence they could not possess under competitive conditions. Groups seek to hold their positions or win better ones not primarily by improving their economic efficiency but by developing more effective political tactics.

* This is true despite the anti-trust program in the United States; never until recently (not even in the trust-busting days) has the anti-trust division had much more than a token staff.

A powerful group can win popular opinion for its restrictionist policies by presenting its case in language that conceals the true tendency of the policies adopted. "The terms 'safeguarding,' 'bounties,' 'favorable trade balance,' 'rationalization,' 'cooperation,' 'planning,' 'coordination,' are examples of the expression of power-thought in the form of euphemisms, of the attempt to convince the popular mind that protection is not protection and monopoly not monopoly. The pleasant tone of the word 'cooperation' has had a woeful influence."¹⁰

Euphemistic language and misdirected attacks on competition derive their potency from the basic factors underlying restrictionism. Appeals to security, to in-out group status, wherever this cuts across the population to include large numbers of people, and the general romantic rebellion against rationalism ensure a favorable reception for restrictionist propaganda. Those who lag in securing government help and who have made less use of direct economic power rest their case in considerable measure on the concept of equality of bargaining power which has come to replace the ethical justifications of liberal economics residing in the marginal productivity theory and the assumption of individualistic equality of opportunity.

Sophistic reasoning and the misuse of half-truths have also helped sell restrictionism to the public; simultaneously with emotional appeals, pseudo-scientific arguments are presented to the modern "man of reason." Examples are the farmers' representation of the AAA as benefiting industrial labor by improving the agricultural market for industrial products, and the attack against chain stores for "taking money out of the local community."

Public toleration or encouragement of restrictionist policies is facilitated also by the apparent inefficiency of the capitalist economic system in the short run. Although it can be demonstrated that despite depressions our economy has multiplied the actual and improved the relative level of living for the ordinary man, most people have a short memory and know little of these gains.

They are mainly conscious of the present maladjustments and of their own insecurities and threats to their power or status. These unpleasant features of the functioning of the economy are usually concentrated in time and place. Maladjustments have the quality of here and now. It is a particular group of workers that is threatened by a new technology; it is a particular group of producers that must face a substitute for its product entering the market. But the beneficiaries of the lower costs or improved products that would flow from the readjustment are many and diffuse, and an uncertain or even unknown prospective gain is less vivid than a definite present threat of loss. Thus it is easy to understand how the public comes to believe that by preventing readjustment at each point in the economic system it is thereby preventing a depression in the system as a whole.¹¹

NATIONAL RESTRICTIONISM

In restrictionism that sets the people of a nation apart from foreigners we find all of the attributes of the economic restrictionism of the modern age. It encompasses desires for status and power as well as for security and stability for the nation and its component individuals and groups. It is a high-powered channeling of these desires through a modern extreme of in-group out-group awareness. Underlying its strength are the new democracy and the inheritance of an old tribalism, both infused with the modern anti-rationalist, anti-impersonal, groupistic romanticism. A discussion of nationalism is a natural climax to a paper on social factors in economic restrictionism.

Interdependence of Domestic and National Restrictionism. Government participation in domestic restrictionism and economic nationalism are cut out of the same piece of cloth.¹² The instigators of nationally restrictive policies are frequently the same people as those who are engaging in

¹⁰ O. Morgenstern, *The Limits of Economics*, 34-36, 43-45, London, 1937.

¹¹ J. B. Condliffe, *Reconstruction of World Trade*, 35-40, 126-28, New York, 1940; L. Baudin, *Free Trade and Peace*, Paris, 1939; C. J. H. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism*, Chapter 6, New York, 1926.

¹² Hutt, *op. cit.*, 93, 132-35.

restriction at home, whether directly or through government assistance. Though economic interests may determine who will be the initiators or the most active supporters of particular national policies, non-economic forces augment the strength of public support for such programs. The close association between internal and external restrictionism is easily illustrated. Limitations on immigration bolster trade unions. The aluminum monopoly is strengthened by penalties on importation of bauxite. International cartelization and internal cartelization are twins, using similar techniques such as restrictive exploitation of patent agreements and territorial division of markets.

Once government becomes arbiter, guardian, and participant in restrictionist action for domestic groups, the interests of the nation-state tend to override the interests of the component individuals or groups. There is a shift from emphasis on "the wealth of nations" to an emphasis on national power. The goal of maximizing economic welfare for all individuals tends to take second place to the elevation of the state. When nationalism enters the economic picture, one of the basic assumptions of liberalism is inevitably destroyed so far as international relations are concerned—that decisions will be made by many small units each independently seeking its own interest.

International Rivalry for Status and Power. The background of America's effort to realize equality among nations is traced by Bonn¹³ to the Declaration of Independence which "became the charter of equal rights, not so much of all individuals within a state as of all nations within the world." Early ideas of the importance of "national self-determination" exaggerated the emphasis on national equality, both in the respect with which a nation is held and in its bargaining-power position. Protective tariffs became the means by which this nation like the self-governing British colonies sought to attain full industrial development and a respected international position. Although they had given up separation by po-

litical revolution, "they relentlessly pressed on with their economic revolt against the mother country. . . . They did not want to remain economic provinces. They aspired to a 'balanced economy,' in which a manufacturing industry would take its place by the side of a prosperous agriculture. They yearned for equality: a nation which bought manufactured goods with its agricultural staple produce represented an inferior type of society. Industry stood for skill, progress, and a higher brand of civilization. . . . In these new countries Free Trade was rural, frequently feudal, and aristocratic; protection was urban, democratic, and egalitarian."

That the anti-free trade movement in the United States was also in large measure an intellectual revolt against foreign, particularly English, ideologies, is clearly indicated by the fact that protectionists like Carey accepted the free trade reasoning within the nation and vigorously opposed trade barriers between the states. Sumner points out that "As we won Texas from Mexico, we enter into free trade with her, but we think that it would be ruinous to trade freely with the rest of the ancient states of Mexico."¹⁴ Other evidence is the penchant for discussing foreign trade not in economic language but in the language of force and power.

The faith of Americans in their superior technical virtuosity is another aspect of the modern ethnocentric focus in economic restrictionism. If we can make it, why buy it? No arguments about relative cost or the bilateral nature of trade are heeded. We are progressive, capable people who have created a great economy; we can do anything. Foreigners are stupid or poor, and cannot compete except by unfair methods. Foreigners have low standards and would drag us down to their deplorable level of living.

Desire for National Security and Stability. In modern times emphasis on national security and stability has intensified. Just as restrictive nationalism aimed at the attain-

¹³ M. J. Bonn, *The Crumbling of Empire*, 121, 234, London, 1938.

¹⁴ W. G. Sumner, *Lectures on the History of Protection in the United States*, 9, 15, New York, 1888.

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ment of national status and power grew on the roots of industrial empire building in the last century, so restrictive nationalism centering on security and stability flourishes in the upheavals of a modern industrial world. The members of a nation seek to insulate themselves from these upheavals by erecting barriers against foreign trade. At the same time, the experience of two world wars within a generation has given national self-sufficiency a new appeal despite efforts of some groups to plan for genuine internationalism in the future. It will be surprising indeed if the American public fails to support tariffs to protect domestic producers of synthetic rubber.

The tribal spirit is strongly expressed in efforts to become fully emancipated from any dependence on foreign nations. Schumpeter has captured this spirit of isolationist Americanism when he says, ". . . the consistent support given by the American people to protectionist policy . . . is accounted for not by any love for or domination by big business, but by a fervent wish to build and keep a world of their own and to be rid of all the vicissitudes of the rest of the world."¹⁵ In such insulation is seen security for a culture and a way of life.

Mass Support for National Restrictionism. If, in Toynbee's phrase, the spirit of nationalism is "a sour ferment of the new wine of democracy in the old bottles of tribalism," nevertheless the initial impact of democratic ideas in England was not inconsistent with genuine economic internationalism. The early economists were cultural nationalists, but they saw no reason why economic relationships should be limited by national boundaries. They were reformers, seeking to bring about a rising level of material living, which they perceived could be assured only by competition between individuals both domestically and internationally. But the texture of political relationships proved tougher than the new international economy.¹⁶

¹⁵ J. A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 54-55, New York, 1942.

¹⁶ C. J. H. Hayes, *Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, 238-47, New York, 1931; A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, I:9-10, IV:141-43, 158-59, 165-84, London, 1934, 1939.

"Parochial sovereignty" absorbed democracy as it had capitalized upon industrialism. For the better part of the nineteenth century expanding trade quite clearly benefited the ordinary man. But this man was becoming a nationalist more rapidly than he was becoming an economic man. His interests were becoming vocal and with the extension of concepts of equality of rights to include the masses and with the spread of popular education, articulate support for programs believed to be in the interests of the whole citizenry gained in strength. The public acquired a vested interest in its standard of living, and democracy perverted by propaganda feeding on ignorance produced restrictionist nationalism.¹⁷ Industry and votes became instruments of state policy, but nationalism was the root sentiment.

The economic history of the past century has contributed in two important ways to the development of mass support for national restrictionism. First, progress in raising scales of living, in combination with the obvious interest of workers in large outputs by the firms for which they work, has encouraged joint action on vertical lines in foreign as in domestic restrictionism. Workers are easily persuaded that they must help protect the sales of domestic firms against the inroads of foreign competition. The fact that the great mass production industries in the United States were built up in a period of high protective tariffs appears to justify this position, despite the fact that freedom of trade in a large home market is a principal reason for such progress. Second, economic depression has heightened the feeling of "job scarcity," and the desire to protect a "job territory" against competition from foreign labor, either directly in immigration or indirectly in the importation of foreign goods. In countries that have taken the lead in social legislation, there is the further incentive of protecting such gains against the threat of destruction by competition with foreign workers not so favored.

Meanwhile, propaganda for national restrictionism has appealed steadily to the

¹⁷ Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Nationalism*, 184-86, 221, 231, London, 1939.

powerful in-group attitudes associated with membership in a nation. Arguments commonly posed for tariffs—i.e., national self-sufficiency, favorable balance of trade, protect home industry, protect high wages and increase employment, insulate the economy from outside disturbances, and protect infant industries—all center on in-group consciousness. And euphemisms take their place beside such rationalizations in the propaganda battery. The masses, who are already more provincial than more educated groups in that they have fewer symbols adequate to portraying the complex and indirect relationships of the international economic order, are highly susceptible to simple emotionally colored symbols pointing toward national restrictionism.

To some extent attitudes among laborers generally have doubtless been influenced by the writings of socialists. Socialism usually is assumed to be international in its emphasis on the common interests of working men of the world. But because of the large role of government in economic life as viewed by the socialists, their thinking in fact becomes restrictionist and nationalist. Hutt describes this position with insight when he says that socialists "did not strive to obtain greater freedom for competitive capitalism. On the contrary, they thought they saw in it the villain of the piece. They half imagined a sort of previous golden age which the new system had disturbed. Under the pressure of competition, they believed, the earnings of the workers were driven towards subsistence level."¹⁸

Both the evidence of history and the statistics of public opinion polls reveal the fallacy of theories attributing national conflicts to industrial imperialists; democratization has favored economic nationalism: ". . . the masses in all national states . . . appear to be almost completely oblivious of international affairs and quite suspicious of the very word 'internationalism.'"¹⁹ Thus, for

example, Stagner found a correlation of "patriotic" attitudes with preference for high tariffs and other isolationist beliefs. Willingness to favor high tariffs increased with age, declined with education, and was more common among the lower occupational groups. Similarly, the lower income and educational levels are more pugnacious toward foreign nations.

"The good citizen has tended to be a nationalist and a bad economist." This modern tribalism is, on the ideological plane, another of these ironic effects of 18th century philosophy.²⁰ Peoples seemed to be logical units for undertaking the reform of human society. But the distinctiveness of peoples came to be more impressive than the likenesses among all peoples. Following Rousseau, thought reacted from rational interests as the basis of unity toward emphasis on moral unity. At the same time, negatively, the disinclination for rational deliberation and impersonal processes fostered the stabilization of the developing political organization at the national level. The spirit of nationalism, bolstered by sentiments of tribal and cultural solidarity, geographic unity, and historical tradition, is an antidote to cosmopolitanism and individualism and by the same token the nurturer of economic nationalism.

IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF MODERN RESTRICTIONISM: CONCLUSION

The ideological trends that are woven into the complex design of modern life have roots going back to 18th century humanitarianism and 19th century economic liberalism, modified by the social reshuffling of the industrial revolution and the aggravation of the spirit of nationalism. Economic restrictionism today finds encouragement and justification in contemporary, often inconsistent, versions of these historical developments.

The liberal ethic was born in a philosophic

¹⁸ Hutt, *op. cit.*, 81.

¹⁹ C. J. H. Hayes, *Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, 317; R. Stagner, et al., "A Survey of Public Opinion on the Prevention of War," *J. Soc. Psy.*, 16:109-30, 1942; 12:197-212, 1940;

L. Robbins, *The Economic Causes of War*, New York, 1940; also see the reports of the National Opinion Research Center.

²⁰ C. J. H. Hayes, *Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, 10, 13.

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setting that emphasized natural law, the importance of the individual, and the cultural distinctness of nations. Belief in natural law was associated with the elevation in prestige of the "scientific" mentality as against the romantic. Natural law applied to economic affairs involved inevitability, especially in theories of wage determination. The societal plan propagated by the early liberal economics, even though it focused on the welfare of the individual, appeared impersonal in nature.

By interpreting economic liberalism consistently with their interests, the middle classes were able to broaden the rights of property to include the state creation of holding companies and other corporate forms aiding business restrictionism. Weapons like tying clauses and trade boycotts were legally protected in the name of freedom of contract. At the same time the state was persuaded to outlaw many types of collective labor action and even labor's right to organize on the grounds that unions would damage property by strikes, boycotts, etc., that they would restrict the enterpriser's freedom of management, and that such large bargaining units were inconsistent with the operation of a freely competitive economy.

Meanwhile, the philosophies of romanticism and humanitarianism had been developing parallel to utilitarianism, finding their early expression mainly in literature.²¹ When the economists said, "Things find their level" Coleridge objected that "Persons are not things." Dickens' books attacked not merely the exploitation of the poor but the "spirit of the business man." Rebellion against the materialism, the rationalism, the impersonality of the vulgarized utilitarianism gradually permeated society. The inevitability of economic law was attacked emotionally and questioned rationally on the basis of its effects upon human nature, the growth of power concentrations in economic bargaining, and the periodic depressions.

Concepts of equity through balance of

²¹ E. Neff, *Carlyle and Mill* (2nd ed.), 176-81, New York, 1926; G. Hicks, "The Literary Opposition to Utilitarianism," *Science and Society*, 1: 454-72, 1937.

power have come to the fore; the slogan "equality of bargaining power" has been given a group instead of an individual meaning. The submerged undercurrent of romanticism has borne fruit in the modern day with the enhancement of group consciousness and the personification of the group; emphasis on group self-determination and group status has provided fertile soil for the flowering of nationalism.

These ideological themes are woven in varying patterns throughout the creeds, battle cries, and ethical justifications of each of the main groups in our society.

The big business man harks back to the philosophy of individualism and the laissez faire tradition to defend an unfettered collaboration that benefits the insiders in an industry; yet he calls on the same tradition to attack combination among workers. The "cruel forces of competition" are decried when, in the name of humanitarianism, the business man seeks government sponsorship or participation in domestic restrictions designed to promote stability and to diminish business insecurity. Simultaneously, both spurious rationalism and the romantic spirit of nationalism are called into play to support high protective tariffs.

Small business defends restrictionism in its behalf by a similar, though not an identical, philosophical formula. Like the captain of industry the little business man appeals to the ideology of 19th century liberalism, but whereas the big man lays his emphasis upon laissez faire, the little man argues the importance of small enterprise as the backbone of a competitive economy. Yet at the same time unrestricted competition is regarded as cruel and hard. Romanticism plays a large part in the localism of small business, in its allegiance to the values of community life, in its hostility to things foreign, and in its anti-impersonality.

Whereas business men call upon traditional economic liberalism to support restrictive policies in their behalf, labor denies the reality of the assumptions of that philosophy and attacks the associated notion of inevitability. Applying the reasoning of eco-

nomic liberalism, the spokesmen of labor point out the inconsistency with competitive norms in monopolistic hiring of labor. They also take over the property concept and apply it to the right to work and the right to receive rewards commensurate with investment in training for skilled jobs. Substituted for the theory of marginal productivity, as the explanation of wage determination and as the justification for existing incomes, are labor's concept of a wage commensurate with "the American standard of living" and the bargaining power theory of how wages are determined. Labor thereby challenges the automatic umpiring of economic conflict through competitive processes and enters the realm of balance of power economics.

The concept of balance of power, and its corollary in the ethical connotation of "equality of bargaining power," covers a multitude of restrictions among farmers and laborers. "Equality of bargaining power" is often suggested as a way of reviving the balance of purely competitive processes; but in fact in its modern group connotation it is a denial of the existence of anything approximating competitive norms. It is the rationalistic formulation of concepts of fairness within a framework of group action in economic life.

The romantic counterpart to "equality of bargaining power" in the philosophy of labor restrictionism is the preserving of the integrity of the group and the personal values associated with group status and the mutual interdependence and interplay of personal life within the group. Restrictionism enhances the value of belonging by setting the group in some way apart from others. It protects against the hazards of an impersonal world.²²

"Equality of bargaining power" in a group

²² National Research Council, *Fatigue of Workers*, 14, 75, 85, Washington, 1941.

sense sits strangely in the philosophy of farmers; indeed, the phrase is used much less frequently as applied to agricultural restrictionism than in the case of laborers. It is nonetheless a basis on which farm pressure groups seek government assistance in the operation of restrictive programs on behalf of agriculture. Its romantic counterpart is found in the deeply rooted belief in agriculture as a way of life and the farm population as the backbone of a healthy society. That way of life embraces both the individualism of the utilitarian philosophy and the personal quality of romanticism.

The extension of democracy to all citizens politically and then to economic life has accompanied both the destruction of social equilibrium by industrialism and the simultaneously growing role of humanitarianism in modern thought. Modern democracy, with its revived ideal of equality of personal opportunity, might be expected to carry strong anti-restrictionist portent. But this has not been the case. We have shown the role played by democracy in conjunction with industrialization to make of political and cultural nationalism the restrictive economic nationalism of today. Domestically, economic democracy has failed to provide a strong anti-restrictionist movement because it has been associated with the new anti-rational and groupistic romanticism; it has grown on the doorstep of already established privilege; and it has sought through government help, not only freedom and opportunity, but balance of power.

Today "there is a new age of chivalry . . . It scorns the fustian virtues and painstaking calculations of rational economics. . . . Security rather than abundance, honor rather than profit, State power rather than individual welfare, position and prestige rather than comfort. . . ."²³

²³ Condiffe, *op. cit.*, 128.

ON ERRORS IN SURVEYS

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I. PURPOSE

THREE ARE thirteen different factors that affect the usefulness of surveys. The chief aim of this article is to point out the need for directing effort toward all of them when planning a survey, and the futility of concentrating on only one or two of them. Another aim is to point out the need for theories of bias and variability in response; such theories would correlate the vast amount of experience that is accumulating and would make comparability possible between different methods of collecting data. Biased methods could then be utilized in circumstances where they are more reliable and cheaper, just as biased samples are sometimes used for gains in reliability.

In the planning of a survey, effort should be directed toward the reduction of all of the errors that it is possible to reduce, but the effort should be apportioned with a view to producing the greatest possible usefulness with the funds available. As a matter of fact, consideration of all the errors that will effect the ultimate usefulness of a survey largely determines whether it should be taken at all; and then, when the decision is made to go ahead, the same considerations should form the basis of planning. Burden of response, public relations, and availability of personnel and facilities are also governing factors.

There will also be occasion in this article to point out

- (a) That the errors arising from some of the factors are larger than is commonly supposed;
- (b) The need for wider coverage and integrated research programs in the theoretical and empirical evaluations of some of the errors with the aim of (i) finding ways of reducing them; (ii) discovering the limitations that some of these errors place on the accuracy of a survey;
- (c) That precisions sometimes specified in

the administrative requirements of a proposed survey are altogether unnecessary, and owing to noncompensating errors and biases have not in the past been realized.

- (d) That to eliminate sampling errors by taking a complete count will be a bad investment if other sources of error could be reduced and sufficient reliability attained at less cost;
- (e) That there is a special responsibility in presenting the data of a survey to give an account of all the difficulties of response and collection, in order that errors of interpretation and utilization may be reduced.

II. CLASSIFICATION OF FACTORS AFFECTING THE ULTIMATE USEFULNESS OF A SURVEY

The thirteen factors referred to are not always distinguishable and there are other ways of classifying them, but the following list has been found useful.

1. Variability in response;
2. Differences between different kinds and degrees of canvass;
 - (a) Mail, telephone, telegraph, direct interview;
 - (b) Intensive vs. extensive interviews;
 - (c) Long vs. short schedules;
 - (d) Check block plan vs. response;
 - (e) Correspondence panel and key reporters;
3. Bias and variation arising from the interviewer;
4. Bias of the auspices;
5. Imperfections in the design of the questionnaire and tabulation plans;
 - (a) Lack of clarity in definitions; ambiguity; varying meanings of same word to different groups of people; eliciting an answer liable to misinterpretation;
 - (b) Omitting questions that would be illuminating to the interpretation of other questions;
 - (c) Emotionally toned words; leading questions; limiting response to a pattern;

- (d) Failing to perceive what tabulations would be most significant;
- (e) Encouraging nonresponse through formidable appearance;
- 6. Changes that take place in the universe before tabulations are available;
- 7. Bias arising from nonresponse (including omissions);
- 8. Bias arising from late reports;
- 9. Bias arising from an unrepresentative selection of date for the survey, or of the period covered;
- 10. Bias arising from an unrepresentative selection of respondents;
- 11. Sampling errors and biases;
- 12. Processing errors (coding, editing, calculating, tabulating, tallying, posting and consolidating);
- 13. Errors in interpretation;
 - (a) Bias arising from bad curve fitting; wrong weighting; incorrect adjusting;
 - (b) Misunderstanding the questionnaire; failure to take account of the respondents' difficulties (often through inadequate presentation of data); misunderstanding the method of collection and the nature of the data;
 - (c) Personal bias in interpretation.

The foregoing factors will be ranked in importance one way for one type of survey and another way for another type. Thus, in a survey asking farmers their intentions to plant a certain crop next spring, the date of the survey would be especially important. For a survey of farm income the definition of farm income might easily be the most important factor.

Kendall¹ in a recent paper has stated that respondent bias and questionnaire construction are outstanding problems toward which statistical research must be directed. We ought to find out for example whether estimates of crops always tend to overestimate low yields and under-estimate high ones, and how much. We ought to know the relation between snap judgments and considered judgments, and between long and short questionnaires, and different plans of interview and follow-up. Many biased

methods of eliciting information are cheaper and quicker and show smaller variability than so-called unbiased methods. If the relation between biased and unbiased results were known (predictable), the biased techniques would sometimes be preferable. There is need for workable theories of bias and variability in response just as much as there ever was need for theories of sampling bias and sampling errors. A considerable amount of brilliant work has been done, but some of the best of it remains unpublished and uncoordinated. Scattered measurements of bias and variability here and there are not enough. A thorough-going plan of theoretical and experimental investigation into the nature of bias and variability in response is needed. It should include research into the bias of nonresponse, various ways of constructing questionnaires and writing instructions to respondent and interviewer, selection and training of personnel for interviewing. Such a program would pay dividends in money, not to speak of dividends in scientific self-respect of the statistician. A great deal has already been done, of course, an example being the research reported by Jessen² in the line of memory bias, and an outstanding summary by Gladys L. Palmer³ on differential response in labor-market inquiries. Certain other good examples are cited in Part III, although the aim of this article is not to present a bibliography nor a compendium of experimental results.

The attainment of greater economy and reliability through studies of bias and variability of response will open up new realms of usefulness for the statistician jointly with his colleagues in sociology, marketing, and political science.

III. REMARKS ON THE VARIOUS FACTORS⁴

1. Variability in Response. There are two

¹ M. G. Kendall, "On the future of statistics," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, vol. cv, 1942, pp. 69-91. See pp. 74 and 85 in particular.

² Raymond J. Jessen, "Statistical investigation of a sample survey for obtaining farm facts," *Research Bulletin 304*, Agricultural Experiment Station, Ames, June, 1942, pp. 27-32 in particular.

³ Gladys L. Palmer, "The reliability of response in labor market inquiries." *Technical paper No. 22*, Bureau of the Budget, Washington, July, 1942.

⁴ For convenience, the sections in Part III will be

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kinds of variability in response, different descriptions of the same situation (i) given by the same person at two different times; (ii) given by different persons. Both kinds of error are often much greater than is ordinarily supposed, and both can be controlled to some extent by the drafting of the questionnaire and the training of the interviewers. In a continuing survey the cooperation and education of the respondent may often be fostered so as to decrease the first type. However, it must be recognized that respondents under repeated questioning often change their characteristics.

It might be thought that factual data such as age could be collected with little error, and that only data with looser definition such as employment status and education are subject to wide variation. An extensive study carried out by Gladys L. Palmer,⁵ however, shows that variation in response is indeed large in all these characteristics, and that age is certainly no exception. Yet what property could be more objective? In a canvass of 8,500 people in Philadelphia, after an interval of only eight to 10 days, 10 percent of the ages were different by one year or more when reported by the same respondent in both canvasses (an example of the first kind of variability), and 17 percent of the ages were different by one year or more when reported by different respondents (an example of the second kind of variability).

Another example of the second kind of variability in response is furnished by Katherine D. Wood⁶ who exhibited tables showing the discrepancies between duplicate reports of the occupations of 4500 workers, one report coming from the worker himself or some member of the household, and the other report coming from the worker's em-

ployer. Table 1 in her article shows that when the occupations are broken into only nine major occupational groups, 21.7 percent of the total number of duplicate reports are in disagreement—i.e., fall in a different one of the nine broad groups. Her Table 2 shows that when the classification of occupations is broken down into 233 groups, the difference jumps to 35.5 percent. It would be useful to understand the mechanism by which such variability operates, so that the approximate magnitude of the discrepancies could be allowed for in the interpretation of surveys on occupations.

It should be pointed out that the net effect of variability in reporting is not always as bad as might be surmised. One reason is that many errors can be caught in a careful job of editing. For instance, in processing the reports on the annual production of lumber which are sent into the Census from sawmills, every effort is made to diminish the net effect of variability and carelessness in response. Each report is carefully compared with the previous annual report from that mill. To expert editors who know the lumber business, the respondent's difficulty and the consequent correction of an erroneous report are often obvious. When not obvious, the case may be turned over to the Forest Service which in turn may initiate correspondence or send a local representative to the mill to discover what difficulty if any exists. A second reason is that the poorest reporting on production and sales often occurs in the small establishments, which all told contribute only a small fraction of the total of the annual production or sales. The larger establishments keep records and can make better reports. For a third reason there is an element of randomness in reporting dictated by the accident of circumstance. The weather, time of day, the particular person providing the information, the route followed by the interviewer, and many other factors are accidental in nature and affect the results. As a result, some reports (of age, number of board-feet of wood cut, sales, and stocks) are accidentally higher and others are accidentally lower than they might have been under other cir-

numbered to correspond with the enumeration of factors in Part II.

⁵ Gladys L. Palmer, "Factors in the variability of response in enumerative studies," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, vol. 38, 1943, 143-52.

⁶ Katherine D. Wood, "The statistical adequacy of employers' occupational records," *Social Security Bulletin*, vol. 2, May, 1939, pp. 21-24.

cumstances. This random element is compensating on a probability basis, the net effect being, that the final tabulations may portray distributions that are reasonably independent of the random element of variability and able to serve many useful purposes. Random errors have less chance of cancelling each other if the tabulations are made in fine classes.

It is a mistake, however, to take refuge in the assumption that errors in response are going to cancel each other, and thus to excuse poorly designed questionnaires and inexpert interviewing. Too often the responses possess not merely a random element, but a bias as well. The random element may wash out, but a bias is different; it is not necessarily partially or wholly compensated by another bias in the opposite direction. For instance, in spite of variability in the reporting of age, frequencies showing characteristics of the population by age will usually turn out to be remarkably independent of the random errors in reporting, but will clearly show the downward and upward heaping toward the fives and tens. Likewise, the random errors that occur in taking inventories of canned peas in a number of grocery stores may pretty well cancel each other, leaving only the effect of (a) the downward bias that arises from failures to look in the basement or out-of-the-way places for peas, and (b) the downward or upward bias that arises from the natural tendency to undercount or overcount, whichever it may be.

In view of errors in response, not to speak of the other factors that affect the usefulness of a survey, it is obvious that a complete coverage can not give absolute accuracy. As a matter of fact, absolute accuracy is non-definable and must be replaced by something else. A useful and practical replacement arises from the fact that repeated surveys, whether taken by sample or complete count, will not give identical results for any category, but varying results. In place of the mythical term "absolute accuracy" it is profitable to speak of the tolerance band within which 99 percent of the results for a particular category (age by sex class)

are expected to fall by random variation in repeated surveys. The limits that are allowable will depend on the funds available and the requirements of precision which are dictated by the uses that are to be made of the data.

In this connection I am reminded of a conversation with Mr. Frederick F. Stephan. He was once asked how big a sample would be required to measure within 5 percent the extent of unemployment in the country. This was in 1934 when plans for a sample census of unemployment were being considered. His reply was that even a 100 percent sample could not give 5 percent accuracy because of differing ideas regarding definitions of unemployment and the interpretation of the questions. Even with the elimination of sampling errors, there would remain unsettled differences between various alternative definitions of unemployment. There would remain, moreover, errors of enumeration (variability in response; housewife doesn't know the answer but answers anyhow; some families missed; some refuse; etc.). Before it is profitable to talk of reducing sampling errors to 5 percent, it is necessary to reduce both the variability in response (by sharpening the definition) and the error of enumeration to magnitudes comparable with 5 percent accuracy.

2. Differences between Different Kinds and Degrees of Canvass. Too little is known in regard to the differences in results obtained from mail, telephone, telegraph, and interview canvasses, or the results obtained from different plans of questionnaire.⁷ The problem is not whether differences exist but how great are the differences, and why do they exist, and what effect will they have on the uses that are made of the data? Theory and more extensive empirical evaluations are needed so that comparability can be obtained between different methods, and so that the cheaper methods may have greater utility.

3. Bias and Variation Arising from the In-

⁷ It is important not to confuse (a) the differences in response elicited from different kinds and degrees of canvass, with (b) the different proportions of response that will be obtained.

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terview. In 1914 Rice⁸ in a social study of 2000 destitute men found that the reasons given by them for being down and out carried a strong flavor of the interviewer. Results recorded by a prohibitionist showed a strong tendency for the men that he interviewed to ascribe their sorry existence to drink; those interviewed by a man with socialist leanings showed a strong tendency to blame their plight on industrial causes. Quantitative measures of the interviewer bias in this particular survey turned out to be amazingly large. The men may have been glad to please anyone that showed an interest in them.

Variation attributable to the interviewer arises from many factors: the political, religious, and social beliefs of the interviewer; his economic status, environment, and education. Also, perhaps most interviewers can not help being swayed in the direction of their employers' interests. But how much? What is the effect on the tabulations? Different interviewers will record different descriptions of the same situation and will record different interpretations to identical statements from a respondent. When is a house in need of major repairs? The definitions given to the enumerators in the Census were as definite as possible, yet variability in interpretation must be expected. One interviewer will say yes, and another will say no for the same house. Nevertheless the tabulations of the returns from many interviewers concerning many houses may be satisfactory owing to compensation. Certainly such figures as those produced by the 1940 Census of Housing are valuable in indicating the variation around locally accepted norms.

One source of bias and variability arising from the interviewer has its roots in lack of understanding of the subject and purpose under investigation, without which the interviewer can not evaluate a situation or properly record the respondent's statements.

Part of the variation attributable to the interviewer arises from the different moods

into which different interviewers cast their respondents. The interviewer may make the respondent gay or despairing, garrulous or clamorous. Some interviewers unconsciously cause respondents to take sides with them, some against them. This kind of variability is difficult to distinguish from the error of response.

A small corps of interviewers can be trained to a high level of homogeneity; hence in sample surveys and other partial coverages it is possible to diminish differences between interviewers to a degree not attainable in large scale surveys. In particular, partial coverages repeated at intervals may possess an enhanced degree of comparability from one survey to another.

Training will sometimes introduce biases in a corps of interviewers, depending on how they are trained. A corps of enumerators with less training and greater variability might come nearer to finding out what a social scientist really wishes to know about. Bias produced by training partakes of bias of the auspices (q.v.), and it is sometimes difficult to make the distinction.

4. Bias of the Auspices. Any change in the method of collecting or processing data can be expected to show a change in results. A shift in the sponsoring organization is no exception. Bias of the auspices likely stems from a conscious or unconscious desire on the part of the respondent to take sides for or against the organization sponsoring the survey, but perhaps more to protect his own interests which may vary with the sponsoring agency. Everyone supposes, for instance, that the replies concerning income and work status are different, on the whole, when elicited by an agent of a relief organization than when elicited by a government agency such as the Census, but evidence regarding the exact magnitude of such differences is still far from satisfactory. Bias of the auspices is so well recognized that both government and private organizations have sometimes attempted to hide their identities by contracting and subcontracting the collection of the data, so that the respondents would be unaware of the sponsoring agency.

An integrated research program designed

⁸Stuart A. Rice, "Contagious bias in the interview," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 35, 1929, pp. 420-23.

to give empirical evaluations of this bias in many fields of enquiry and under a variety of conditions is needed for aid in planning and interpreting data.

5. *Imperfections in the Design of the Questionnaire and Tabulation Plans.* Faulty design of the questionnaire can be the cause of considerable bias. Faulty design often arises from lack of knowledge of the subject matter. It is not sufficient merely to elicit answers to questions somehow or other related to the subject. The questions must attack the root of the problem by discovering what are the significant underlying causes (geographic location, economic level, size of family, size of establishment, and the like) so that these causes can be differentiated, qualified, and related to particular classes of the universe. Without some pretty good idea what the analysis is going to show it will be impossible to design the questionnaire so that any useful proportion of these aims will be accomplished. An understanding of the subject is accordingly demanded as one of the qualifications for planning a survey.

Likewise the tabulation program (which really should precede the questionnaire but usually does not) demands enough knowledge of the problem to see what tables are going to be needed and which ones will be significant.

6. *Changes that Take Place in the Universe before Tabulations Are Available.* The conditions that are described by a survey may have changed by the time the tabulations are ready for processing. These changes detract from the utility of the survey. The complete count requires a longer time than a sample for processing—so much longer, in fact, that often because of changes in conditions, it is merely a historical record by the time it is ready. As a basis for action (the only excuse for taking a survey) a sample or a "cut-off" (section 10) will therefore often be more reliable because of the shorter collecting and processing time.

7. *Bias Arising from Nonresponse (Including Omissions).* Nonresponses and omissions may cause serious bias unless they are too few to cause trouble, or unless the user can readjust his weights after demonstrating

that acceptable limits to the bias arising from the nonresponses from various strata can be set without special investigation. A partial coverage offers advantages here also. The follow-up can start sooner, and more expensive and more effective methods can be used, such as telegrams, individual letters, or even personal interviews. Whether a partial coverage or a complete count is used, the bias of the nonresponses if not known should be measured by a small program of interviews, specially designed to measure the differences between the people or establishments that respond and those that do not. A distinct advance in survey technique has been made by my colleagues Messrs. Hansen and Hurwitz in the Census by determining the optimum number of questionnaires to be mailed initially, and the optimum amount of follow-up of nonresponse to be carried out by direct interview for a given allowable cost. The solution will be published eventually, but it has already been written up for use in the 1943 coverage of lumber production (a joint undertaking between the Census, the Forest Service, and the Tennessee Valley Authority).

The volume of nonresponse is often unnecessarily large owing to formidable appearance of the questionnaire. The volume of nonresponse in some subjects is a strong function of the date on which the questionnaire is received, and the date the follow-up letter is received. No attempt can be made here to summarize points of good practice in questionnaire format and timing. A great deal of research has been published, and still more has been done but not yet published.

It is not sufficiently appreciated that a 70 percent response on a complete coverage may yield data that are unusable, whereas a smaller bundle of returns representing 95 percent response on a 10 percent sample may yield results of great reliability. In other words, a carefully controlled small sample may be far preferable to a careless complete count.

8. *Bias Arising from Late Reports.* In any survey, the office processing of the data must commence on a certain date. Reports

bias arising from various strata of investigation. A number of methods can be used, and more methods can be devised. Whether a complete count is used, or not known, a program of measure the cost or establish that do not, technique has determining naires to be carried out by favorable cost.

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coming in after the deadline can not be included in the tabulations. The reports received late may be biased. How much? As with the nonresponses, a sample study may answer the question adequately. Again, a partial coverage offers advantages over a complete count in the control of late reports because effective pressure can be exerted to decrease them.

At first sight it may seem that the nonresponses and omissions must be cousins-german of the late reports, and that both present the same problems. There are differences, however, arising in the causes, among which carelessness and press of other work are common factors. In addition, however, nonresponse and omission are often caused by inability or unwillingness to furnish the data required.

9. *Bias Arising from an Unrepresentative Selection of Date for the Survey, or of the Period Covered.* A single-time coverage of weekly household purchases would hardly be representative during any week in December. A passenger-traffic survey would not be representative near the 4th of July or Labor Day, unless the peak load is to be measured. The choice of date is often a difficult problem, especially when a survey must serve several purposes. One purpose is often served best by one date, and another purpose best by some other date; and one or both must take a loss when both purposes are covered in one survey. Then, too, the urgency of the information often forces a compromise: rather than wait for the most advantageous week in the year it may be wiser from the standpoint of framing a course of action in the immediate future to take the survey at once. Sometimes the seasonal correction is known satisfactorily, in which case data taken at an unrepresentative date can be corrected. During rapid changes the answer may lie in recurring surveys, monthly or quarterly. The dangers of selecting an unrepresentative date are recognized pretty generally, with the result that biases arising from this source are controlled much better than most of the other factors on the list.

10. *Bias Arising from an Unrepresentative Selection of Respondents.* The definition

of the universe to be covered in the survey goes hand in hand with the statement of the purpose of the survey. Unfortunately, however, the universe is sometimes elusive. Too frequently no accurate and up-to-date list is available by which the universe can be covered completely or sampled satisfactorily. Various schemes of partial coverage are then often devised, with the hazard of dangerous biases. If there is time, a preliminary survey can be taken to establish a sample list and remove the bias.

Even when a complete list is available, a short-cut to some of the advantages of sampling is often taken by covering only the most important portion of the universe by a plan called the "cut-off," which is accomplished by including only the biggest establishments and "cutting off" the myriads of small ones that all together contribute possibly only 5 or 10 percent of the actual business or inventory that is to be studied. This plan gives a picture of the main part of the business but is biased to an unknown extent by the omission of the smaller establishments, often by misassignment of weights, and also by the changing proportion of large establishments with time. The "cut-off" plan bears resemblance to sampling by giving heavy representation to the biggest establishments and light representation to the smallest ones, but a sample does not go so far as to cut the small ones out entirely; it gives them the proper representation for maximum reliability by drawing a small percentage of them into the sample. Of course, if the list is badly incomplete at the lower end, or if the reporting at the lower end is bad,⁹ the "cut-off" is perhaps as near an approach to sampling as can be devised, or may be even better until more is known about the bias in the reporting at the lower end.

A less satisfactory partial coverage is the "invitation questionnaire," which is obtained by the familiar device used by some business houses (restaurants, air lines, department stores) when they provide their patrons with simple check-box questionnaires en-

⁹ Cf. the quotation from the *Production of Lumber* cited in Part V; particularly the sentence, "Among the smaller mills . . ."

quiring whether this or that item or service is satisfactory, why they bought what they bought, and why they bought it here. The returns show only the extremes in satisfaction and vexation, and at that only from the articulate. Such devices do serve some useful if limited purposes, but if interpreted as representative the results may be disastrous. A small investment in even a very small sample, even though taken at a much higher cost per schedule, will give information really worth while by comparison. The "invitation questionnaire" is justified only in attempts to discover the possible range of response.

It may be interesting to note that in a partial coverage of this kind there will be not only heavy biases present, but also the much lighter chance errors of sampling, for it is through the vagaries of chance that a well satisfied or sorely vexed customer fills in a questionnaire or fails to do so. Some acquaintance coming along at a crucial moment, or the realization that it is almost 2 o'clock, will sidetrack the intention to fill out a questionnaire; while some accidental irritation will induce him to go ahead and fill it out and voice complaints, as he was half-way in the mood to do anyhow.

An unrepresentative choice of respondents often arises as a matter of convenience to the interviewer. He has perhaps been told to talk to 10 people in some age and economic group, so he talks to 10 people close to home who will submit to an interview and in filling his quota introduces a respondent bias that may take on considerable magnitude. It can be eliminated by adopting inflexible rules for selecting the respondents. Such rules may take the form of specific addresses, with designation of a particular member of the family to be interviewed. The same purpose is served by specifying the block and some rule for picking out certain households within it for the interviewers.

11. Sampling Errors and Biases. One often hears objections to sampling because of sampling errors. Such objections can be sustained only if, after consideration of the other inaccuracies, the elimination of sampling errors seems to be a wise investment. Sampling errors have the favorable charac-

teristics of being controllable through the size and design of the sample. It is now possible to lay out sample designs in many types of surveys whereby one can state in advance the width of a band that will contain 99 percent or any other percent of the sampling errors. Sampling errors, even for small samples, are often the least of the errors present.

The next step in the direction of greater reliability of surveys must lie along the line of further research like that called for in Part II. At present, sampling errors are the only errors that are in satisfactory condition so far as theoretical and experimental knowledge is concerned.

12. Processing Errors. A review of the codes assigned on a schedule is oftentimes not a matter of correcting wrong codes, but merely a matter of honest differences of opinion between coder and reviewer. Two coders will often find themselves in disagreement on the correct codes to assign to a response. Two coders working on the same set of schedules are going to turn out two different sets of results; likewise two sections of coders working on the same set of schedules are going to turn out two different sets of results. *A fortiori*, two sections of coders working under slightly different instructions will show still greater differences, even though the two sets of instructions supposedly say the same thing in different words. The two sets of results may however produce distributions so nearly alike that in most problems they would lead to the same action, and that is what counts. Research needs to be carried out to show the extent of the differences to be expected from various shades of wording of instructions for coding, editing, and field work. The conclusion seems inevitable that unless it is merely a matter of transcription (such as 1 for male and 2 for female) it is impossible to define a perfect job of coding except in terms of the distributions produced because there is no way of determining whether the individual codes have been assigned correctly. One can only say that two different sets of instructions or two different sets of coders produced substantially the same distributions.

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In view of this fact it seems to follow that when the work of a coder or editor or punch operator is uniformly good enough so that his errors are relatively insignificant compared with the other errors (such as variability of response) it is only necessary to perform enough review of his work (preferably by sampling methods) to be assured of the continuity of control.¹⁰ Workers who can not qualify for sample review should be transferred.

Machine and tally errors are often supposed to be negligible or nonexistent but the actual situation is otherwise. These errors can be held at a reasonable minimum, however, by machine controls and other checks, especially with a force of workers in which there are a few key people with seasoned experience.

A sample study or other partial coverage possesses a distinct advantage in the processing for the same reason that it does in the interviewing, viz., the smaller force required to do the work, and the consequent better control that is possible.

13. *Errors in Interpretation.* In any study made for the analysis of causes, preliminary to formulating a course of action for the future, there must be inferences drawn from empirical data. There are bound to be errors of inference, arising from difficulties of interpretation. A familiar example is the picture of a labor situation presented by management, as opposed to the picture presented by labor organizations.

Errors and differences in interpretation sometimes arise from misunderstanding the questionnaire or failure to take into consideration the form of the questions as written on it or as actually used in the interview. Without some recognition of the problems

involved in carrying out the survey both from the standpoint of the collecting agency and the respondent, sizeable errors in interpretation are almost sure to arise. The more important the survey, the more important are the errors of interpretation. For careful interpretation it is necessary to be acquainted with the field work; not just with the instructions which tell how the field work should have been carried out, but with the procedure as actually followed. (See the quotation from *The Production of Lumber* farther on.)

Even with the best of intentions there will be a personal and professional bias in interpretation. This fact is so well known that it would be superfluous to go into the subject here or to point out the magnitude of the differences that can exist purely on the grounds of personal differences in education, experience, and environment.

IV. A WORD ON SAMPLE STUDIES OF COMPLETE RETURNS

There often arises the problem of selecting a sample of reports from files of complete returns, which might be waybills, tax forms, census returns, wage reports, hospital records, relief records, consumers' accounts, or the like. There is sometimes reluctance to adopt sampling methods because of a commendable pride in traditional accuracy. But let us look at the problem in its entirety and see just how far this accuracy goes. If the study were purely for accounting purposes, a complete count with an attempt at perfect processing would be justified or even demanded. It should be borne in mind that the purpose is not accounting, however, unless the action to be taken is with respect to each respondent by reason of the data on his response; an income tax report is an example. Most studies are for purposes of analysis, wherein the ultimate aim is policy and action for the future, not the past. For purposes of analysis, even though the office work such as coding, editing, transcribing, and tabulation were 100 percent perfect there would still remain the errors of response, the bias of nonresponse, late reports, imperfections arising in the tabulation plans,

¹⁰ Two reports dealing with a small amount of research in the frequency of punching errors and the sample review of office processing are contained in papers by the author and colleagues: (1) W. Edwards Deming, Leon Geoffrey, and Benjamin J. Tepping "On errors in card punching," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, vol. 37, pp. 525-536; (2) W. Edwards Deming and Leon Geoffrey "On sample inspection in the processing of census returns," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, vol. 36, pp. 351-360.

bias from an unrepresentative date, changes taking place in the universe before tabulations become available, and errors of interpretation. No 100 percent perfect job of processing a study of waybills, wage reports, or other kinds of returns can eliminate these errors.

V. DESCRIPTION OF ERRORS AND DIFFICULTIES REQUIRED IN PRESENTATION OF DATA¹¹

In the presentation of data the omission of an adequate discussion of all the errors present and the difficulties encountered constitutes a serious defect in the data and is sure to lead to misinterpretation and misuse (error No. 13). It is common in a sample study to point out the sampling errors, as should always be done. There are several ways of doing this. The paragraph below appears in many of the reports published from the *Sixteenth Census* (1940) on the basis of the 5 percent sample.

The statistics based on the sample tabulations are expected to differ somewhat from those which would have been obtained from a complete count of the population. An analysis of the statistics based on the tabulations of the 5 percent sample of the population for items that were obtained also for the total population indicates that in 95 percent of the cases the sample statistics differ from the complete census statistics by less than 5 percent of all numbers of 10,000 or more, by less than 10 percent for numbers between 5,000 and 10,000 and by less than 20 percent for numbers between 2,000 and 5,000. Somewhat larger variation may be expected in numbers below 2,000. Even for these small numbers, however, the majority of the differences between the sample and the complete census statistics are less than 10 percent, although much larger differences occasionally occur.

The statement of a standard deviation or probable error or band of variation in the form of a plus and minus (e.g. 1123 ± 42), along with the number of independent sam-

pling units on which the calculation is based, is a common way of calling attention to the sampling errors.

Unfortunately there is no simple way of indicating the possible magnitudes of the other errors, but it can be done in one way or another. As an example it is a pleasure to cite a few lines from the *Production of Lumber, by States and by Species; 1942* (Bureau of the Census, November 1943), published under the direction of Mr. Maxwell R. Conklin, Chief of the Industry Division.

These statistics are based on a mail canvass, supplemented by a field enumeration conducted by the U. S. Forest Service and the Tennessee Valley Authority. In the field enumeration, Forest Service and TVA representatives interviewed mills that did not respond to the mail canvass, and, in addition, conducted an intensive search for mills. . . . Among the smaller mills, bookkeeping is generally inadequate. Even the total cut for a mill may be an estimate, and the species breakdown for such a mill, particularly in areas of diversified growth, must frequently be estimated by the mill operator or by the enumerator. . . . Difficulties in enumeration because of lack of adequate mill records were overcome in many cases where the mill disposed of its total cut through a concentration yard. In such instances enumerators were able to obtain information for individual mills from the yard operator, particularly in the South and Southeast where concentration yards are an important factor in the distribution of lumber. This approach was not satisfactory, however, when an operator sold his lumber to several different yards in the course of the year, and where the records at the concentration yard did not indicate clearly whether the cut was for 1942 or 1941. . . . Mills engaged solely in remanufacturing, finishing, or otherwise processing lumber were excluded. . . . In a number of cases, the mill reports were in terms of dressed or processed lumber, since many integrated mills, i.e., those both sawing and dressing, were able to report only on a finished basis. The discrepancy, which is of unknown magnitude, is equivalent to the amount of waste in processing. In canvassing integrated mills, however, the cut was counted at only one point in the processing operation, so that no duplication occurred. . . . An ever-present complicating factor in the canvass was the extreme mobility of the smaller mills. . . .

¹¹ Chapter III in Shewhart's *Statistical Method from the Viewpoint of Quality Control*, Graduate School, Department of Agriculture, Washington, 1939, should be read in connection with these remarks.

VI. USEFUL ACCURACY OFTEN ATTAINABLE IN SPITE OF ERRORS

It is not to be inferred from the foregoing material that there are grounds for discouragement or that the situation is entirely hopeless with regard to the attainment of useful accuracy. My point is that the accuracy supposedly required of a proposed survey is frequently exaggerated—is in fact often unattainable—yet the survey when completed turns out to be useful in the sense of helping to provide a rational basis for action. Why? Because both the accuracy and the need for accuracy were overestimated.

Fortunately the errors in a survey are not always additive, as has been pointed out. It should also be remembered that often it is ratios between frequencies that are of interest and not the absolute values of the frequencies themselves. Many of the biases cancel out of the ratios, which are thus determined much more accurately than the absolute frequencies. Similar remarks apply to comparability between results obtained in recurring surveys; the pattern of month to month change is more accurately determined percentagewise than the absolute values of the frequencies involved.

There is no excuse for complacency in the fact that exaggerated claims of accuracy are

often compensated by exaggerated requirements of accuracy.

VII. SAMPLING IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE

In the government service there must be special insistence that a survey, if it is to be carried out at all, produce the greatest possible usefulness for the money expended. The increased use of sampling in government service seen in recent years is in accordance with these demands. The same consideration also demands that sampling facilities operated by and for government agencies be constructed along lines that will minimize not only the errors of sampling but also (in particular) the bias in the selection of respondents. The development of sampling theory for government surveys must continue to keep pace with government requirements of economy and reliability. An obligate symbiotic relationship is necessary in the development of theory and practice, and the government service provides practice on a large enough scale, both in magnitude and variety, to give proper nourishment to the required theory. Private industry and research organizations are of course not bound to the same obligations.

In conclusion it is a pleasure to express appreciation to many friends for helpful suggestions, in particular my colleague Dr. Margaret Gurney of the Bureau of the Budget.

ATTITUDES OF CHILDREN TOWARD SUPPORTING AGED PARENTS*

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War Food Administration

INTRODUCTION

HOW SATISFACTORY it may be for aged parents to live with their children¹ depends in part upon the attitude of the younger generation toward their responsibility for the care of their elders.² Children who did not want to accept the obligation, but who did so anyway, because of family tradition, community opinion, or legal requirement might carry out the role with such little grace or with such manifest ill will as to make the parents aware of not being wanted or as to lead to friction and major conflicts.³

The attitude of children toward taking care of aged parents also has implications for the law of support, for its administration, for public housing for old people, and for the medical care of mentally deficient or bedridden cases. These implications are particularly noteworthy if the assumption is made that there should be or eventually will be a definite relation between what the children want and what the law or its ad-

ministration requires. If children do not believe they should extend home support to their aged parents, then, the question of what substitutes the State should provide becomes pertinent.

Two general hypotheses have been advanced: (1) Catholics and Protestants, urban and rural residents, males and females, college and high-school students, and persons of various ages differ significantly in their attitude with regard to the responsibility of children, and (2) the attitude of children toward giving an aged parent a home varies with the degree of physical or psychological hardship that they would experience in the situation.

THE OPINIONAIRE

Construction. A hybrid instrument was devised by combining several features of the Likert and Thurstone methods. One hundred and sixty items were rated on a five-point scale from "very favorable" to "very unfavorable" by 14 social workers. Only those statements were retained that 10 or more of the judges had put in the same scale position. Sixty-six propositions passed this test. They were given weights from plus two to minus two according to the category in which they had been classified by the judges.

Two preliminary forms with 20 items each were chosen from the 66 propositions. These two forms were so constructed that for every statement of a certain weight and subject matter in one there was a statement of the same weight and subject matter in the other.

They were given to 440 college students, using the Likert method of response. The first of the two forms was also given a second time with the instruction to answer by merely checking those statements with which there was agreement. The score for this type

* Paper No. 2137, Scientific Journal Series, Minnesota Agricultural Experiment Station. Assistance in the preparation of this material was furnished by the personnel of the Work Projects Administration, Official Project No. 265-1-71-236, Sub-project No. 470.

¹ Children of aged parents include persons of adult status.

² For the purpose of this study, persons 65 years of age and over are considered aged. References in this study to parents usually are intended to be limited to aged parents who are in need of assistance. It is estimated that about 30 to 40 percent of aged parents are supported wholly or in part by their children. Usually, support is in the form of the parent or parents living in the home of a child.

³ This statement is one of the important assumptions of this study. It provides a justification of a study of verbal responses apart from whether or not children are consistent in what they say should be done and what they actually do when faced with the problem.

of response was the sum of the algebraic weights of the items that were checked.

Thirty of the 40 statements were found to have satisfactory discriminative value when tested by the Likert criterion. The two different methods of response correlated plus .86. This Pearsonian coefficient, based as it is on a small number of items, was considered sufficiently high to validate the simple-agreement type of response.

From the 30 statements of desired discriminative value, 20 were selected for the final form of the instrument. They were picked to give as well balanced an opinionnaire as possible. Although the procedures used resulted in some tautology, there might be an appearance of greater duplication than is actually the case since the same subject matter may be found in positive and negative form and in both single and double weight.

Reliability. The instrument was given twice to a group of 90 students in sociology at the University of Minnesota. The second administration came three weeks after the first. Anonymity was assured by having the students use numbers known only to themselves instead of names on their opinionnaires. The Pearsonian coefficient on test and retest was plus .874.

Validity. Validity has been largely assumed instead of proved. There are three main questions for which some answer would be desirable: (1) Do students have sufficient direct or indirect experience with the problem to have well-developed attitudes? (2) Does the opinionnaire evoke the true opinions of the students? and (3) Do test scores assist one in predicting the degree of adjustment between the two generations when aged parents are taken into the home of one of the children?

Some fragmentary data were obtained on these questions. A group of 86 students in a beginning sociology class at the University of Minnesota were asked to write an essay on the subject of children supporting aged parents, citing whatever examples they could of their point-of-view. In 72 of the cases, the material was judged by the writer to be substantial and concrete, indicating

sufficient background for the students to have a meaningful opinion on the problem. The essays were classified in five groups, depending on the degree of belief in the responsibility of children. An analysis of the variance of test scores was then made. A probability of less than .001 was obtained that the distribution was due to chance factors. Finally, in a case-history study of 50 families, the writer observed some relation between test scores on the opinionnaire and conflicts between parents and children.⁴

It should be noted that the scope of validity has not been extended to include a relation between test scores and support behavior; that is, between opinion and practice. The case histories of the 50 families indicated that there is not a high correlation between the two.

DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE

The sample was composed of 1,006 college and 318 high-school students. The college students were in attendance during the academic year 1939-1940 at the colleges of St. Thomas and St. Catherine and at the Universities of Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Notre Dame. The high-school group consisted of rural boys from many sections of the state of Minnesota who happened to be members in the summer of 1939 of the annual Farm Camp of the Y.M.C.A. and of seniors of the 1939-1940 class of University High School of Minneapolis and of Jackson High School, Jackson, Minnesota.

About 200 of the college sample were students who attended summer classes in 1939 at the Universities of Wisconsin and Minnesota. These persons were considerably older than the others, ranging in age from 22 to 45 years. The other college students were from 16 to 22 years, with an average age of a little more than 19 years. The high-school students were between 16 and 19 years, with an average of 17 years.

In the college group there was an approximately equal number of Catholics and

⁴For an analysis of these conflicts, see Robert M. Dinkel, "Parent-Child Conflict in Minnesota Families," *American Sociological Review*, August, 1943, pp. 412-19.

Protestants; also included were 24 persons of the Jewish faith and 50 persons who stated that they had no religion. The high-school students were predominantly Protestant; there being five of such affiliation to every Catholic.

The sex distribution was well balanced for the sample as a whole. Among the rural residents, however, there were two females to every male in the college group and just the reverse ratio in the high-school group.

GROUP DIFFERENCES

One of the hypotheses is that Catholics and Protestants, urban and rural residents, males and females, college and high-school students, and persons of various ages differ significantly in their attitude toward the responsibility of children for the support of aged parents. The influence of these factors upon the opinion of students was determined by comparing average scores. Four factors were held constant while ascertaining the influence of the fifth by the method of subgrouping. For example, the score of 17 year-old Protestant males in their senior year of high school who had lived all of their life in rural territory was compared with that of 17 year-old Protestant females in their senior year of high school who had also lived all of their life in rural territory in order to determine in part the influence of sex upon student opinion.⁵

Religious Affiliation. Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant families are commonly supposed to differ in their degree of solidarity, traditionalism, authoritarianism, and related characteristics. These traits are probably correlated with opinion regarding family responsibility. Support of aged parents is, in fact, a form of family solidarity. That parents should be respected and assisted when in need is a provision of the traditional code of Christianity and Judaism. Finally, the more authoritarian the family system, the more the elders or patriarchs would be respected and provided for in case of need. Therefore, some association between

religious affiliation and opinion regarding the obligation of children to give support is a reasonable hypothesis.

The order according to test score of the religious groups of the sample was Catholics, Jews, Protestants, and persons who professed having no religion. Catholics adhered most strongly and the persons of no religion the least to the belief that children should give support. The expected order was broken by the fact that the Jews instead of having the most favorable opinion toward the obligation of children had an average score between that of the Catholics and Protestants.

Differences between Catholic and Protestant college students in the extent of their acceptance of the individual statements of the opinionnaire were large, averaging 17 percent and having a standard deviation of less than three percent. Differences between these two groups in average score (the algebraic sum of the weights of the statements agreed with) were tested by the standard error of the mean to determine their significance. Critical ratios for the four sex-residence sub-groups shown in table 1 range between 2.1 and 9.3 with only one being less than 4.0. Clearly, these ratios indicate differences that are not due to chance.

An analysis of the Catholic sample showed gradations of opinion among the students of different institutions that attest further to the existence of a definite association between religion and opinion. Women students at St. Catherine had a higher average score than the men at Notre Dame and St. Thomas. The Catholics in attendance at Minnesota and Wisconsin universities had an average score that was intermediate between that of the other Catholics and that of the Protestants at these two schools. That the students of St. Catherine should believe most strongly in the responsibility of children is believed to result from its imposing strict discipline and having the most rigid indoctrination of Catholic principles. That the Catholics at the state universities should have the lowest average score for persons of this faith follows from the secular character of these schools. In their cases, there is probably operating both a selective process

⁵ Only some of the comparisons made have been selected for presentation in table form in the following pages.

TABLE 1. OPINIONAIRE SCORES AND CRITICAL RATIOS FOR CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT COLLEGE STUDENTS ACCORDING TO SEX AND RESIDENCE⁶

Sub-Group	Number		Average Score*		Difference Between Averages	Critical Ratio
	Cath.	Prot.	Cath.	Prot.		
Male—urban	214	77	5.06	1.01	4.05	4.8
Female—urban	114	137	6.38	-.93	7.31	9.3
Male—rural	32	26	7.09	3.69	3.40	2.1
Female—rural	40	78	7.33	1.44	5.89	4.2

* The opinionaire has a theoretical range of 31 points, from minus 15 to plus 16.

that tends to attract Catholic students of weak religious belief in greater proportion than those of strong belief and a training process that modifies their original attitudes.

Residence. One of the widely used source books in the field of rural sociology states that the rural family is more integrated and has greater solidarity than the urban family. According to the authors, the bonds which hold the rural family together are quantitatively more numerous and qualitatively more intense than those holding the urban family together. From these and other distinctions that are drawn, the reader would infer that rural persons believe to a much greater de-

gree than urban people that children should support aged and needy parents.⁷

In testing this hypothesis, residence was classified as rural or urban according to place of birth. This classification was found to be equivalent to predominant or continuous residence in rural or urban territory. About 70 percent of the college and nearly 100 percent of the high-school students had from birth continuous residence in one or the other type of place. Of the remaining 30 percent of the college students, 22 percent had lived from 75 to 95 percent of their years in the same type of place as that in which they had been born.

As shown in Table 2, rural residents uniformly had higher average scores than urban

* Results for the high-school students have not been presented, because the number of Catholics in this part of the sample is very small. It should be noted, nevertheless, that the Catholic and Protestant high-school students differ in average score by only two and a half points.

⁷ Sorokin, Zimmerman, and Galpin—*Systematic Sourcebook in Rural Sociology*, Volume 2, Chapter X, "The Family as the Basic Institution," pp. 3-41.

TABLE 2. OPINIONAIRE SCORES AND CRITICAL RATIOS FOR RURAL AND URBAN RESIDENTS ACCORDING TO SEX, RELIGION, AND EDUCATIONAL STATUS

Sub-Group	Number		Average Score		Difference Between Averages	Critical Ratio
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural		
College Students						
Male—Catholic	214	32	5.06	7.09	2.03	1.9
Female—Catholic	114	40	6.38	7.33	.95	0.8
Male—Protestant	77	26	1.01	3.69	2.68	1.8
Female—Protestant	137	78	-.93	1.44	2.37	2.7
High-School Students						
Male—Catholic*	18	22	1.14	8.18	7.04	3.5
Male—Protestant	28	107	-.86	5.62	6.48	4.8
Female—Protestant	33	59	-3.21	3.14	6.35	4.2

* Third-year students added to urban group to obtain a larger number of cases.

residents. Critical ratios for three sub-groups of high-school students were over 3.0 in every case, but for the college students, the ratios were only between 0.8 and 2.7. A single critical ratio of less than three ordinarily is not considered as indicative of a significant difference. When there are several random samples from the same universe, each might have a critical ratio of less than three, but the ratios when combined would be significant. Although the conditions of sampling used in this study do not permit a mathematical determination of the collective influence of these critical ratios, the consistency in the results points to a rural-urban difference in student opinion that is not due to chance factors.

The differences, nevertheless, between the rural and urban residents in the college sample are not nearly the size one would expect from the description of the rural family that has been referred to above. Through an analysis of the replies to individual statements of the opinonaire, it was found, for example, that on the average the two residence groups differed only about five percent in the extent to which they agreed with the propositions.

Probably the true situation is that the two residence groups are not so different in their opinion as suggested by the authors that have been cited nor so similar as indicated by the test results. It is likely that these authors had in mind the rural societies of the past before the spread of modern means of communication and transportation. The opinions of college students, on the other hand, may not be representative of persons living in rural areas. The students usually are members of families belonging to the upper economic strata of rural society. By attending college, these individuals may have their opinions modified by mixing with persons from cities and by being in a social and intellectual atmosphere that tends to give higher prestige to urban values.

In making comparisons of test scores, furthermore, the several groups of the rural population were combined as if they were homogeneous in attitude. Recent studies, however, have indicated that village residents

may be more similar in values to the urban than to the farm population. By not having given separate treatment to at least these two groups of rural people, the present analysis may have obscured sizeable differences between farmers and city residents in their opinion on the responsibility of children.

Age and Education. Social, as distinct from biological aging, was thought to be associated with test score. This type of aging does not take place year by year, but is more a matter of advancing from one social role or group to another. The age at which this is done is not fixed and uniform, but is only approximate. In age, therefore, the members of each group are not mutually exclusive.

Three age groups were recognized in the sample: (1) the high-school group, ranging between 16 and 19 years, but concentrated largely in the 17 year-old category; (2) the regular college group, ranging between 16 and 22, but with the great majority being either 18 or 19 years old; and (3) the summer-session adults, who were between 23 and 45 years of age.

An analysis of the test scores within each of the groups confirmed the validity of the classification. The variation according to year of age was slight within the first two and irregular within the third. The small number of cases in the third plus the high degree of heterogeneity in their social and economic characteristics made it impracticable to attempt to account for their fluctuations in score. These cases, therefore, have not been used in the major comparisons of this study.

The factors of age and education are just about inseparable in comparing college and high-school students. The important fact, however, may not be two years of age nor two years of schooling *per se*, but that in going from one level to the other the students enter a different social group in membership and in values. The membership is different, because a process of selection takes place. Students with less than average intelligence or whose parents are in the lower economic strata, or who have little

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drive toward achievement tend to drop out in greater proportion than those who are at the other end of the distribution of these factors. Although it is difficult to characterize the values of the collegiate group since they vary so much from place to place and from one segment to another within the population of the same school, it may be held with some degree of fairness that they include a larger than average measure of sophistication, class consciousness, and irresponsibility.

The expected difference in opinion between the two groups, however, was not found in the sample. Differences in test score were small and irregular.⁸ While rural college students had lower average scores than rural high-school pupils, the relation was just the reverse for the urban groups. This negative finding may have been obtained for one or more of the following reasons: (1) no significant relationship exists; (2) additional factors would have to be controlled to demonstrate the correctness of the hypothesis; (3) the sample is not representative of the student groups tested; and (4) the true relationship is that indicated by the results and requires a different and more complex interpretation than the one that has been suggested.

Sex. Assuming that students either have insight into their future roles or are early conditioned according to them, more women than men students were expected to believe that children should support aged parents. This hypothesis followed from the fact that women usually are more dependent than men upon the family for economic security. One of the reasons for this greater vulnerability of women is that the care of children often makes it impossible for them to accept employment. When not tied down with this burden, women tend to experience greater difficulty than the other sex in obtaining a suitable position, because they have had less occupational training, because ordinarily they are discriminated against by employers in the recruiting of new workers, and because from early years they normally accu-

mulate fewer years of job experience and job rights. In realization of these disabilities, a woman should be inclined to look to the family for the protection she often cannot earn for herself. A woman, furthermore, should find easier the acceptance of the status of dependency, since there is likely to be less reproach cast upon her than would be cast upon a man for failure to be self-supporting.

But the data do not bear out the hypothesis. Sometimes the males had a higher and sometimes a lower average score.⁹ Critical ratios were all between one-half and two-and-a-half. This lack of association may, of course, be due to an error in assuming that student opinion has been molded in accordance with future economic role as has been suggested above. Another explanation of the absence of a significant difference in opinion may be that some of the social factors in the situation balance the economic considerations. Two of these factors may in particular account for such a balance. First, women may experience greater trouble in adjusting to a common residence with children, because accustomed to being mistress of the household instead of having to take orders from a daughter or daughter-in-law. In the case of men, on the other hand, there is not a similar opportunity for their role to come into conflict with that of the son or son-in-law, except possibly in the farm family. Second, women may acquire greater insight than men into the difficulties of the two generations living together. This discernment may result from the fact that women spend more of their time in the home and in interaction with other family members than is common in the case of men.

Summary. Religious affiliation and place of residence determine in part the extent to which students believe that children should support aged parents. Catholics more often than Protestants and rural more than urban residents believe in this obligation. In their acceptance of favorable or rejection of unfavorable statements, Catholics and Protestants differed on the average about 17 per-

⁸The reader who is interested in the details may get them by re-arranging the data of Table 2.

⁹Again, a re-ordering of the facts of Table 2 will yield the details.

cent while rural and urban residents differed only about five percent. The factors of age, educational level, and sex, however, were not found to be related significantly to test score.

REPLIES OF COLLEGE STUDENTS TO INDIVIDUAL STATEMENTS

The second general hypothesis of the study is that the attitude of children toward supporting an aged parent in their home depends upon the degree of physical and psychological hardship that would be experienced in the situation. This hypothesis has been tested by using the responses of the

ship. The data are broken down by religious affiliation and residence since these two factors have been found to be significantly related to opinion.

Six of the 20 statements of the instrument are general in the sense that they do not specify either home care or financial aid as the method of giving support and make no mention of any difficulties that might be present in the situation. Two of these six statements, one positive and one negative, have been chosen as representative of this type of situation. The percentage of the college students agreeing with each of these two statements is shown in table 3.

TABLE 3. PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS BY RELIGION AND RESIDENCE AGREEING WITH SEVERAL GENERAL STATEMENTS OF OBLIGATION OF CHILDREN TO SUPPORT PARENTS

Statement	Protestant		Catholic	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
We should look to children to support aged parents	49	53	74	71
Aged parents should understand they have to stand on their own feet without help from children	20	13	9	4

sample of college students to selected items of the opinionaire.

Several factors were controlled through verbal instructions in the administration of this instrument to the students. They were told to assume: (1) the children while able to give support would suffer a moderate degree of financial sacrifice by so doing; (2) if the children did not extend help, the parents would probably be able to get old age assistance, which would meet their subsistence needs although it would not provide them with the comforts to which they had been accustomed; and (3) the parents were in reasonably good mental and physical health, being neither senile nor bedridden.

The opinionaire statements described various degrees of difficulty that would be present in taking an aged parent into one's home. Although the items are not finely graded, they are able to indicate the range in the percentage of students accepting or rejecting the obligation of children to give support as the circumstances vary from what might be considered normal to extreme hard-

The statement that we should look to children to support aged parents puts the responsibility of the younger generation in the simplest of terms. No complications of unusual personality characteristics of the parents or unpleasant consequences to the home life of the children are introduced into the situation. About half of the Protestants and about three-fourths of the Catholics agreed with this statement.

An unequivocal rejection of the responsibility of children is made in the statement that aged parents should understand that they have to stand on their own feet without help from children. This idiomatic language puts the denial of an obligation in blunt terms that are almost harsh in their flat finality. There is scarcely any room for misunderstanding the attitude of a person who would so express himself. From four to 20 percent of the college students agreed with this proposition.

Now see how these percentages change as different degrees of hardship are mentioned as part of the situation. From the remaining

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14 statements, 11 were chosen for this analysis. They all refer to the specific method of helping parents by taking them into one's home. The first five presented below in Table 4 are positive in the sense that agreement with them indicates a favorable attitude toward assisting parents.

The statement that children should overlook the trouble that aged parents might cause in the home only suggests that there might be trouble. Since there is usually some friction in the interaction of family members, the situation is almost one that expresses no

ing adjective, "any," led many students to refuse to accept the proposition.

The next three statements represent situations involving a great deal of hardship to the children. If parents interfere a lot in family affairs, if they are very crabby or critical, or if they are extremely jealous busybodies, they probably would endanger the happiness of their offspring. These three propositions were agreed with to about the same extent. From 19 to 33 percent of the students checked the one that had the lowest acceptance rate of the three. It is likely

TABLE 4. PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS CHECKING EACH OF FIVE POSITIVE-SPECIFIC STATEMENTS ACCORDING TO RELIGION AND RESIDENCE

Statement	Protestant		Catholic	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Children should overlook the trouble that aged parents might cause in the home	43	50	69	68
Children should put up with any inconvenience in their family life in order to help aged parents	23	31	44	48
Children should give a home even to aged parents who interfere a lot in family affairs	20	24	44	46
No matter how crabby, critical, and interfering aged parents are, children should give them a home	17	22	42	40
Children should be willing to give a home to an aged parent who is an extremely jealous busybody	16	19	33	33

more than the normal degree of unpleasantness associated with taking parents into one's home. From 43 to 69 percent of the students agreed with this proposition. Since about the same percentage agreed with the general statement that we should look to children for the support of parents, the specific condition of the possibility of trouble does not greatly change the extent to which students believe in the obligation of the younger generation.

The second item in the group of five, that children should put up with any inconvenience in their family life in order to help aged parents, was agreed with by 23 to 48 percent of the students. The word, "inconvenience," suggests more a moderate degree of annoyance than a serious hardship. Nevertheless, from 20 to 25 percent fewer of the students agreed with this statement than the one just analyzed. Possibly, the qualify-

likely that these percentages indicate the minimum who believed that there should be responsibility for parents when the degree of difficulty was within limits that would be considered reasonable.

Thus, the belief of the college students in the responsibility of children dropped 30 to 40 percent as the circumstances varied from those that might be considered approximately normal to those of extreme hardship. The high point was reached when 49 to 74 percent agreed that children should give support. The low point showed only from 16 to 33 percent continuing in this opinion.

The extent to which students reject the obligation of children also varies considerably with the particular circumstances of extending help. The negative statement which was the least agreed with was that aged parents should understand they have to stand on their own feet without help from

children. As shown in Table 3, only four to 20 percent of the students checked their agreement with this item. That these percentages can be materially increased by reference to specific difficulties is demonstrated by the responses to the six statements described in Table 5.

The four conditions of the parents getting in the way, being unpleasant, being a nuisance, and being quarrelsome did not change substantially the percentage of students in agreement with the general negative statement that has been said to have

children. This appears to be the upper limit of student rejection of this obligation of the offspring when the circumstances are within reason.

Summary. The hypothesis of this section has been that student opinion on the subject of children supporting parents varies according to the degree of hardship present in the situation. This hypothesis has been confirmed for the sample group. The sensitivity of opinion to this factor has been demonstrated for each of the several sub-groups of college students. The number of students

TABLE 5. PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS CHECKING EACH OF SIX NEGATIVE-SPECIFIC STATEMENTS ACCORDING TO RELIGION AND RESIDENCE

Statement	Protestant		Catholic	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Aged parents who keep getting in the way should not be given a home by their children	21	15	7	3
If aged parents are unpleasant, children should not give them a home	25	16	12	7
If aged parents are a nuisance in the home, children should refuse to take them in	24	23	15	4
Children should not give a home to aged parents who are quarrelsome	34	18	15	10
Aged parents who interfere with family affairs should be put out of your home	45	30	26	21
Children should not take care of aged parents if it makes for squabbling and turmoil all the time	67	64	40	32

been the least agreed with of this type. It would appear, therefore, that when students are of the general opinion that parents should not be supported it is because they believe that their elders would be unpleasant, quarrelsome, etc. How extreme, then, do the difficulties have to be before a significantly greater percentage agrees that children should not have this responsibility?

There is a moderate increase in the extent of agreement with the negative side of the case when the condition is that of the parents interfering in family affairs. Then from 21 to 45 percent of the students believed that the parents should not be given a home. There was a very marked increase in the percentages when taking care of the parents was said to make for squabbling and turmoil all the time. From one to two-thirds of the students were then of the opinion that assistance should not be required of

accepting the responsibility of offspring decreased about 36 percent and the number rejecting such obligation increased about 39 percent as the circumstances changed from those that might be considered normal to those of extreme hardship. Many more students accepted than rejected the obligation of children when the situation did not present unusual difficulties. The division of opinion was about even when the hardship was a severe one. Under extreme circumstances, the balance swung sharply to the side opposed to the support of parents.

IMPLICATIONS

The obligation of children to support aged and needy parents is apparently no longer well established in the mores. This fact has an important bearing upon the psychological security that parents obtain from the family which they rear. In the past, eld-

ers were fairly certain that come what might in the history of their personal relations with their offspring the latter would be willing to give assistance if it were necessary. Now, the children often take into consideration the nature of their personal relations with parents in order to come to a decision as to whether or not to help them. Parents, therefore, cannot be sure of obtaining support no matter how smooth their interaction with children happens to be at a particular time.

This change in family organization would be less significant if the States had universal pension laws as is the case in England. But the means test is still applied in this country so old age assistance is supposed to be given only to those persons whose children cannot afford to take care of them. Furthermore, the application of this test tends to stigmatize the recipient of the assistance to the extent that old people often feel that it is not respectable to take the money. The result is that parents who are in doubt about being helped by their children sometimes are equally uncertain about being able to qualify for assistance from the State or look upon it as an unacceptable alternative.

That the parents have less psychological security than they would have under a system of universal pensions is, of course, not a conclusive argument for changing the support laws of the States. Since the responsibility of children is upheld by more than a majority of the students, it might well be maintained that these laws still have sufficient strength of opinion behind them to justify their retention. However, the data

suggest the desirability of liberalizing their administration. Not only should the financial ability of the children to give support be taken into consideration in deciding whether an individual qualifies for aid, but weight should also be given to the nature of the personal relations between the two generations. Some administrators, more or less on their own responsibility, are already allowing old age assistance instead of pressing the legal obligation of children when to do so would lead to a bad family situation. This approach should be recognized as a valid one and should be adopted more generally.

But more assurance of financial assistance from the State is not enough to replace the loss the old person has probably suffered as a result of the change in family organization. One of his chief fears is often that of becoming physically or mentally infirm and either being an unwanted burden on his children or cast out without being able to get elsewhere the type of care he needs. In the past, families more often accepted the nursing problems that this kind of case involved. Now, they are much less willing to do so. Parents are then left to shift for themselves or are put in institutions that have inadequate facilities. What is necessary to provide for these cases and to eliminate the worry of old people is a State system of properly financed and properly supervised hospitals. One approach to building up adequate care for the bedridden and psychologically deficient cases is the conversion of the county poorhouses into rest homes, clinics, sanatoria, and similar institutions.

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INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL ORIGINS OF NEUROSIS*

ERICH FROMM
New York City

THE HISTORY of science is a history of erroneous statements. Yet these erroneous statements which mark the progress of thought have a particular quality: they are productive. And they are not just *errors* either; they are statements, the truth of which is veiled by misconceptions, is clothed in erroneous and inadequate concepts. They are rational visions which contain the seed of truth, which matures and blossoms in the continuous effort of mankind to arrive at objectively valid knowledge about man and nature. Many profound insights about man and society have first found expression in myths and fairy tales, others in metaphysical speculations, others in scientific assumptions which have proven to be incorrect after one or two generations.

It is not difficult to see why the evolution of human thought proceeds in this way. The aim of any thinking human being is to arrive at the *whole* truth, to understand the *totality* of phenomena which puzzle him. He has only *one* short life and must want to have a vision of the truth about the world in this short span of time. But he could only understand this totality if his life span were identical with that of the human race. It is only in the process of historical evolution that man develops techniques of observation, gains greater objectivity as an observer, collects new data which are necessary to know if one is to understand the *whole*. There is a gap, then, between what even the greatest genius can visualize as the truth, and the limitations of knowledge which depend on the accident of the historical phase he happens to live in. Since we cannot live in suspense, we try to fill out this gap with the material of knowledge at hand, even if this material is lacking in the validity which the essence of the vision may have.

* Presented to the annual meeting of the Eastern Sociological Society, Columbia University, April 22-23, 1944.

Every discovery which has been made and will be made has a long history in which the truth contained in it finds a less and less veiled and distorted expression and approaches more and more adequate formulations. The development of scientific thought is not one in which old statements are discarded as false and replaced by new and correct ones; it is rather a process of continuous *reinterpretation* of older statements, by which their true kernel is freed from distorting elements. The great pioneers of thought, of whom Freud is one, express ideas which determine the progress of scientific thinking for centuries. Often the workers in the field orient themselves in one of two ways: they fail to differentiate between the essential and the accidental, and defend rigidly the whole system of the master, thus blocking the process of reinterpretation and clarification; or they make the same mistake of failing to differentiate between the essential and the accidental, and equally rigidly fight against the old theories and try to replace them by new ones of their own. In both the orthodox and the rebellious rigidity, the constructive evolution of the vision of the master is blocked. The real task, however, is to reinterpret, to sift out, to recognize that certain insights had to be phrased and understood in erroneous concepts because of the limitations of thought peculiar to the historical phase in which they were first formulated. We may feel then that we sometimes understand the author better than he understood himself, but that we are only capable of doing so by the guiding light of his original vision.

This general principle, that the way of scientific progress is *constructive reinterpretation of basic visions* rather than repeating or discarding them, certainly holds true of Freud's theoretical formulations. There is scarcely a discovery of Freud which does not contain fundamental truths and yet which

does not lend itself to an organic development beyond the concepts in which it has been clothed.

A case in point is Freud's theory on the origin of neurosis. I think we still know little of what constitutes a neurosis and less what its origins are. Many physiological, anthropological and sociological data will have to be collected before we can hope to arrive at any conclusive answer. What I shall do is to use Freud's view on the origin of neurosis as an illustration of the general principle which I have discussed, that reinterpretation is the constructive method of scientific progress.

Freud states that the *Oedipus complex* is justifiably regarded as the kernel of neurosis. I believe that this statement is the most fundamental one which can be made about the origin of neurosis, but I think it needs to be qualified and reinterpreted in a frame of reference different from the one Freud had in mind. What Freud meant in his statement was this: because of the sexual desire the little boy, let us say, has for his mother, he becomes the rival of his father, and the neurotic development consists in the failure to cope with the anxiety rooted in this rivalry in a satisfactory way. I believe that Freud touched upon the most elementary root of neurosis in pointing to the conflict between the child and parental authority and the failure of the child to solve this conflict satisfactorily. But I do not think that this conflict is brought about essentially by the sexual rivalry, but that it results from the child's reaction to the pressure of parental authority, the child's fear of it and submission to it. Before I go on elaborating this point, I should like to differentiate between two kinds of authority. One is *objective*, based on the competency of the person in authority to function properly with respect to the task of guidance he has to perform. This kind of authority may be called *rational* authority. In contrast to it is what may be called *irrational* authority, which is based on the power which the authority has over those subjected to it and on the fear and awe with which the latter reciprocate.

It happens that in most cultures human

relationships are greatly determined by irrational authority. People function in our society as in most societies, on the record of history, by becoming adjusted to their social role at the price of giving up part of their own will, their originality and spontaneity. While every human being represents the whole of mankind with all its potentialities, any functioning society is and has to be primarily interested in its self-preservation. The particular ways in which a society functions are determined by a number of *objective* economic and political factors, which are given at any point of historical development. Societies have to operate within the possibilities and limitations of their particular historical situation. In order that any society may function well, its members must acquire the kind of character which makes them *want* to act in the way they *have* to act as members of the society or of a special class within it. They have to *desire* what objectively is *necessary* for them to do. *Outer force* is to be replaced by *inner compulsion*, and by the particular kind of human energy which is channeled into character traits. As long as mankind has not attained a state of organization in which the interest of the individual and that of society are identical, the aims of society have to be attained at a greater or lesser expense of the freedom and spontaneity of the individual. This aim is performed by the process of child training and education. While education aims at the development of a child's potentialities, it has also the function of reducing his independence and freedom to the level necessary for the existence of that particular society. Although societies differ with regard to the extent to which the child must be impressed by irrational authority, it is always part of the function of child training to have this happen.

The child does not meet society directly at first; it meets it through the medium of his parents, who in their character structure and methods of education represent the social structure, who are the psychological agency of society, as it were. What, then, happens to the child in relationship to his parents? It meets through them the kind of

authority which is prevailing in the particular society in which it lives, and this kind of authority tends to break his will, his spontaneity, his independence. But man is not born to be broken, so the child fights against the authority represented by his parents; he fights for his freedom not only from pressure but also for his freedom to be himself, a full-fledged human being, not an automaton. Some children are more successful than others; most of them are defeated to some extent in their fight for freedom. The ways in which this defeat is brought about are manifold, but whatever they are, the scars left from this defeat in the child's fight against irrational authority are to be found at the bottom of every neurosis. This scar is represented in a syndrome the most important features of which are: the weakening or paralysis of the person's originality and spontaneity; the weakening of the self and the substitution of a pseudo-self, in which the feeling of "I am" is dulled and replaced by the experience of self as the sum total of expectations others have about me; the substitution of autonomy by heteronomy; the fogginess, or, to use Dr. Sullivan's term, the parataxic quality of all interpersonal experiences.

My suggestion that the Oedipus complex be interpreted not as a result of the child's sexual rivalry with the parent of the same sex but as the child's fight with irrational authority represented by the parents does not imply, however, that the sexual factor does not play a significant role, but the emphasis is not on the incestuous wishes of the child and their necessarily tragic outcome, its original sin, but on the parents' prohibitive influence on the normal sexual activity of the child. The child's physical functions—first those of defecation, then his sexual desires and activities—are weighed down by moral considerations. The child is made to feel guilty with regard to these functions, and since the sexual urge is present in every person from childhood on, it becomes a constant source of the feeling of guilt. What is the function of this feeling of guilt? It serves to break the child's will and to drive it into submission. The parents

use it, although unintentionally, as a means to make the child submit. There is nothing more effective in breaking any person than to give him the conviction of wickedness. The more guilty one feels, the more easily one submits because the authority has proven its own power by its right to accuse. What appears as a feeling of guilt, then, is actually the fear of displeasing those of whom one is afraid. This feeling of guilt is the only one which most people experience as a moral problem, while the genuine moral problem, that of realizing one's potentialities, is lost from sight. Guilt is reduced to disobedience and is not felt as that which it is in a genuine moral sense, self-mutilation.

To sum up this point, it may be said that it is the defeat in the fight against authority which constitutes the kernel of the neurosis, and that not the incestuous wish of the child but the stigma connected with sex is one among the factors in breaking down his will. Freud painted a picture of the necessarily *tragic* outcome of a child's most fundamental wishes: his incestuous wishes are bound to fail and force the child into some sort of submission. Have we not reason to assume that this hypothesis expresses in a veiled way Freud's profound pessimism with regard to any basic improvement in man's fate and his belief in the indispensable nature of irrational authority? Yet this attitude is only one part of Freud. He is at the same time the man who said that "from the time of puberty onward the human individual must devote himself to the great task of freeing himself from the parents"; he is the man who devised a therapeutic method the aim of which is the independence and freedom of the individual.

However, defeat in the fight for freedom does not always lead to neurosis. As a matter of fact, if this were the case, we would have to consider the vast majority of people as neurotics. What then are the specific conditions which make for the neurotic outcome of this defeat? There are some conditions which I can only mention: for example, one child may be broken more thoroughly than others, and the conflict between his anxiety

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and his basic human desires may, therefore, be sharper and more unbearable; or the child may have developed a sense of freedom and originality which is greater than that of the average person, and the defeat may thus be more unacceptable. But instead of enumerating other conditions which make for neurosis, I prefer to reverse the question and ask what the conditions are which are responsible for the fact that so many people do *not* become neurotic in spite of the failure in their personal fight for freedom. It seems to be useful at this point to differentiate between two concepts: that of defect and that of neurosis. If a person fails to attain freedom, spontaneity, a genuine experience of self, he may be considered to have a severe defect, provided we assume that freedom and spontaneity are the objective goals to be attained by every human being. If such a goal is not attained by the majority of members of any given society, we deal with the phenomenon of *socially patterned defect*. The individual shares it with many others; he is not aware of it as a defect, and his security is not threatened by the experience of being different, of being an outcast, as it were. What he may have lost in richness and in a genuine feeling of happiness is made up by the security of fitting in with the rest of mankind—*as he knows them*. As a matter of fact, his very defect may have been raised to a virtue by his culture and thus give him an enhanced feeling of achievement. An illustration is the feeling of guilt and anxiety which Calvin's doctrines aroused in men. It may be said that the person who is overwhelmed by a feeling of his own powerlessness and unworthiness, by the unceasing doubt of whether he is saved or condemned to eternal punishment, who is hardly capable of any genuine joy and has made himself into the cog of a machine which he has to serve, has a severe defect. Yet this very defect was culturally patterned; it was looked upon as particularly valuable, and the individual was thus protected from the neurosis which he would have acquired in a culture where the defect would give him a feeling of profound inadequacy and isolation.

Spinoza has formulated the problem of the socially patterned defect very clearly. He says: "Many people are seized by one and the same affect with great consistency. All his senses are so strongly affected by one object that he believes this object to be present even if it is not. If this happens while the person is awake, the person is believed to be insane. . . . But if the *greedy* person thinks only of money and possessions, the *ambitious* one only of fame, one does not think of them as being insane, but only as annoying; generally one has contempt for them. But *factually* greediness, ambition, and so forth are forms of insanity, although usually one does not think of them as 'illness.'" These words were written a few hundred years ago; they still hold true, although the defect has been culturally patterned to such an extent now that it is not generally thought any more to be annoying or contemptuous. Today we come across a person and find that he acts and feels like an automaton; that he never experiences anything which is really his; that he experiences himself entirely as the person he thinks he is supposed to be; that smiles have replaced laughter, meaningless chatter replaced communicative speech; dulled despair has taken the place of genuine pain. Two statements can be made about this person. One is that he suffers from a defect of spontaneity and individuality which may seem incurable. At the same time it may be said that he does not differ essentially from thousands of others who are in the same position. With *most* of them the cultural pattern provided for the defect saves them from the outbreak of neurosis. With *some* the cultural pattern does not function, and the defect appears as a severe neurosis. The fact that in these cases the cultural pattern does not suffice to prevent the outbreak of a manifest neurosis is in most cases to be explained by the particular severity and structure of the individual conflicts. I shall not go into this any further. The point I want to stress is the necessity to proceed from the problem of the *origins of neurosis* to the problem of the *origins of the culturally patterned defect*; to the prob-

lem of the *pathology of normalcy*.

This aim implies that the psychoanalyst is not only concerned with the readjustment of the neurotic individual to his given society. His task must be also to recognize that the individual's ideal of normalcy may contradict the aim of the full realization of himself as a human being. It is the belief of the progressive forces in society

that such a realization is possible, that the interest of society and of the individual need not be antagonistic forever. Psychoanalysis, if it does not lose sight of the human problem, has an important contribution to make in this direction. This contribution by which it transcends the field of a medical specialty was part of the vision which Freud had.

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THE OLD NEW ORLEANS AND THE NEW: A CASE FOR ECOLOGY

H. W. GILMORE

Tulane University

NEW ORLEANS is sufficiently different from the general run of American cities to make it an interesting laboratory for studying ecological principles evolved on the basis of data from other cities. Its topography, on casual observation, appears to be rather similar to that of Chicago or of any number of plains cities. Yet in certain respects its topography is very different, and uniquely, it has been changed fundamentally during the history of the city. In its population history it has shown evidence of the processes of accommodation and assimilation of minority groups characteristic of other cities plus long standing patterns of accommodation of racial groups which assimilated very slowly or not at all. As a result of these complex factors, ecological maps of New Orleans look like a crazy-quilt to sociologists acquainted with the ecology of conventional American cities. Actually, however, the city is not without an ecological pattern and this pattern is not difficult to see once the city's topography and history of ethnic groups are understood.

As was said above, the topography of the city is in some respects typical but in other respects it is unique. The city is located on a strip of land roughly five to seven miles wide between Lake Ponchartrain on the north and the Mississippi River on the south. Though eighty miles from the gulf, this land, like all land in the area, was built up by a long process of sedimentation. Therefore, in contrast to inland areas, the higher land is found along streams or where streams once existed while the lowest land is found farther away from streams. Thus, while the land may appear to be perfectly flat, a contour map shows that the land ranges from fifteen feet above to two feet below mean gulf-level.

The highest land in the city is found along the river and ranges from five to fif-

teen feet above mean gulf-level. Passing north from the river, the altitude declines to two feet below gulf-level. The low area, however, is transversed by "ridges" where bayous are or have been. Thus there is Metairie Ridge, two feet above sea-level running east and west almost parallel with the river and about half way between the river and the lake. There is also a ridge about two feet above gulf-level, running north-south from the end of Bayou St. John to the river, passing the lower end of the French Quarter. We will call this Esplanade Ridge. This ridge divides the city into what may be conceived as two saucers sitting edge to edge, the other edges being formed by Metairie Ridge and the high land along the river. Each saucer is two feet below sea-level at its center and is from two to fifteen feet above sea-level at its periphery. Until relatively modern times the centers of these saucers were swamps and habitation was feasible only along the rims of the saucers. It is in terms, therefore, of the struggle of the nationality groups for residential space around the edges of the saucers that the ecology of the city is to be understood.

CREOLE NEW ORLEANS


New Orleans, of course, was settled by the French. Presumably the particular site was selected because they wanted an inland water route to the gulf coast of the present state of Mississippi where they already had a settlement at Biloxi. Such a route was available through Bayou St. John, Lake Ponchartrain and a series of lakes and bayous which link this lake to the gulf. A short and easy portage between the river and Bayou St. John was provided by Esplanade Ridge which was already in use for this purpose by the Indians when the French explorations and settlement were made. The settlement originated at the junction of Es-

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planade Ridge and the River and as it expanded it did so mostly to the west where the land was higher than it was to the east. This is the area that is now known as the French Quarter.

Like the settlers in most colonies, the early French settlers of New Orleans were

nation. Thus under both France and Spain, there was a tendency for government officials and military personnel sent out to the colony to acquire sizeable land holdings usually without having to purchase them. On these holdings the French established plantations worked with slave labor and



a rather motley lot. They came from various walks of life and various stations in France and probably are not to be considered as coming primarily from any particular social element of the homeland. After a period of frontier hardship, however, they began to be moulded into a quite distinctive and homogeneous group. The French government followed a very liberal policy of land grants to individuals with the result that most of the early settlers became big land holders. This policy was continued by the Spanish government when this territory passed into the hands of that

rapidly attained prosperity on this basis. Most of them, however, continued to live in the city particularly during the winter and if they lived on their plantations at all they did so in the summer. Their city life was based almost as much on slave labor and the labor of free Negroes as was their plantation life. Thus at the time of the Louisiana Purchase there were twice as many Negroes as whites in the city. As time went on these French plantation owners came to refer to themselves as Creoles and they will be so referred to in the remainder of this paper. The term itself does not refer

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This prosperous, land-endowed group, plentifully supplied with colored labor, and gathering in the city for a winter of leisure, made a very favorable situation for an elegant social life. The city being also the colonial capital made this almost inevitable. Such a development seems to have taken place in a large way from 1743 when the great marquis, Pierre Francois de Riguod, Marquis de Vaudreuil, came as governor of Louisiana. He and his wife were accustomed to life in the royal courts of Europe and apparently sought with considerable success to set up a similarly pretentious society in New Orleans. Once established, this pattern was continued by succeeding governors, French and Spanish, with the exception of a brief period under General ("Bloody") O'Reilly who was sent by Spain to suppress a revolt against Spanish rule.

Spanish rule does not seem to have altered the situation in any significant way. The Spanish made no attempt to colonize New Orleans or Louisiana. They did make a half-hearted attempt to teach Spanish in the colony but it attained very indifferent success. For the most part, Spanish officials and military men seem to have found the Creole social life much to their taste and to have been accepted by the Creoles into that social life. Thus they came nearer being assimilated by the Creoles than the reverse. In reality many of them did marry Creoles and others received land grants, established plantations and became part of the Creole aristocracy.

Thus, prior to the Louisiana Purchase, the city was dominated by this Creole landed aristocracy centered around the colonial capital. It was a typical Estate pattern. The emphasis was on inherited wealth in the form of land. There was a law of primogeniture with the surplus sons placed in professions or the government service and stress was laid on social life or leisure time pursuits instead of occupational attainment.

The following description by a French traveler, C. C. Robin, of a reception given in 1803 may give a glimpse of the life of

these Creoles prior to the Louisiana Purchase:

The Louisiana Ladies appeared there with a magnificence that was astonishing in such a colony, and that magnificence could be compared with what is most brilliant in our principal towns in France. The stature of the ladies, generally tall, and their fair complexion, which was set off to advantage by their light dresses adorned with flowers and rich embroideries, gave a fairy-like appearance to these festivities. The last one, especially, astonished me by its magnificence. After the tea, the concert, the dances, the guests descended at midnight into a hall where, on a table of sixty to eighty covers, rose from the midst of rocks the temple of Good Faith, surrounded with columns and surmounted by a dove; underneath was the statue of the allegorical goddess. But further, outside of that hall, the brilliance of the lights attracted the guests under an immense gallery closed by awnings. Forty to fifty dishes, served in different styles, were offered to the choice of four or five hundred guests who were assembled in little groups.¹

In addition to the Creoles and the Negroes, there were other nationality groups in the city prior to the nineteenth century. A number of Germans had come to the Louisiana territory during the John Law boom in the 1720's and after unsuccessful attempts at settlement on the Arkansas River had settled in the vicinity of New Orleans. Also French immigrants came from Santa Domingo as a result of slave uprisings and from France as a result of the French Revolution during the latter part of the eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth century. Most of these groups were unable to get large land grants and hence did not become plantation owners. In large part they seem to have become dairymen and truck gardeners though many of them also became artisans. There were also, of course, some representatives of numerous other nationalities but they can be ignored in an ecological study.

With this information before us, let us

¹ Fortier, Alcie, *History of Louisiana*, New York, 1904, II, p. 240-241. Nellie Warner Price, "Le Spectacle de la Rue St. Pierre," *Louisiana Historical Quarterly* I, p. 218.

try to get a picture of the city at the time of the Louisiana Purchase in 1803. It contained only 8,475 population (census of 1805) and covered a correspondingly small area. The heart of the city was what is now known as the French Quarter, bounded by Canal Street, Rampart Street, Esplanade Avenue and the River. In this area were the government buildings, what business there was and the homes of the Creoles. The slaves were housed on the premises of their owners so far as possible. Since most of the Negroes, whether free or slave, were employed in service around the homes of the Creoles, and hours were long and travel was by foot, the Creoles desired them to live close to their homes. Thus those who could not be quartered on the premises formed a residential fringe around the Creole section. Outside this Negro zone was the immigrant truck gardening and dairying zone, the latter using land which was too swampy for residence or cultivation but usable as pasture. On the high land adjacent to the river and east of the city this trucking zone expanded into a considerable area. Outside of this area were plantations wherever the land was high enough to permit cultivation. Thus there were plantations along Bayou St. John and along the river on both sides of the city.

CREOLE-AMERICAN CONFLICT

Up to the Louisiana Purchase the infiltration of Americans into New Orleans had been small. They came in and out with the shipping and there were some permanent residents but in some degree immigration of Americans had been held back by unfavorable Spanish laws. With the Louisiana Purchase, however, the dam was breached and the tide began to flow. Thus within the five year period from 1805-1810 there was a 125 per cent increase in the white population of the city, and a large part of this increase undoubtedly was American.

These incoming Americans were a sharp contrast to the polished, wealthy Creoles with their elegant social life. While as a group the Americans who came to New

Orleans were perhaps not as crude as the American frontiersman in the open country, certainly they had among them many who were just that crude. In fact the river men who floated down the Mississippi on barges and were known locally as the Kentucks were just as crude and rough and ready as the frontiersmen in any part of the country. Thus in New Orleans, the spreading American frontier ran into a culture which, on a basis of manners and fine appearance at least, was superior to its own; the only case of its kind in American history.

The difference in degree of cultural refinement, however, was not the only difference between the Creoles and the Americans. The Creoles, it will be remembered, laid stress on family tradition, hereditary wealth, leisure and social position. The American, on the other hand, had as his sun god the self-made man. The individual who had been born free and equal, had through his own initiative, industry and thrift gained wealth or success, was the man to be worshiped whether he was the son of a prince, a millionaire, a beggar, a criminal or a simple frontier woodchopper. Thus the two had basically different social philosophies as well as social systems; neither understood the philosophy of the other and neither was much impressed if he did understand. Also the fact that the Creoles were Catholic whereas most of the Americans were Protestant did little to foster mutual affection. Language differences of course increased these tensions, and furthermore, the question which language would be the official language, was an issue of serious moment.

On the basis of their culture, their wealth and their numbers in a more normal situation, the Americans might have been expected to have assumed the role of a minority group but, as usual, New Orleans was not a normal situation. The Americans were representatives of the nation which had just purchased Louisiana and now controlled the government and they were in no psychological mood to be a minority group. Nor was the government in any mood to insist on their playing a minority role. Thus from the beginning, to the tune of much

conflict, overt and covert, with the Creoles, they were forced by the factors of the situation into a position somewhat better than that of a minority group.

The course of events brought a rapid improvement in their situation. The passage of the Louisiana Territory into the hands of the United States ended all barriers to commerce on the Mississippi River and brought a rapid commercial development in New Orleans. The Creoles with their philosophy of hereditary wealth and leisurely social life, had never had much taste for the make or break drive for efficiency characteristic of the commercial world and they did not take to it now. Since most of the tillable land was already held by the Creoles, most of the Americans had little chance of establishing themselves as landlords. In any event, the uncertainties, the big stakes and the competition of the business world, had a natural appeal to the worshipers of the self-made man, and they rapidly took over the competitive area as their special domain.

Thus the port figures for the first six months of 1803 show that the shipping was already largely in American hands even before the Louisiana Purchase. Of the 153 cargo ships entering the Mississippi during that period 93 were American, 58 were Spanish and only 2 were French.² Similarly, Vincent Nolte who visited New Orleans in 1806, three years after the Purchase, informs us that the mercantile system was made up of four or five French establishments founded during the French rule, three Scotch counting-houses, one German concern and eight or ten commission houses lately opened by young American merchants from New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore.³

This near-monopoly on the thriving commerce of the port city rapidly brought prosperity to the Americans and along with it brought a rapid increase in their numbers. With their nationality status thus backed by wealth and numbers, the Americans in-

creasingly challenged the Creoles for the leadership role, culture or no culture, and the struggle between the two groups grew in severity and bitterness.

ECOLOGY OF THE OLD NEW ORLEANS

This struggle made inevitable an ecological separation of the two groups. The first Americans did live and have their business in the French Quarter but the crowded conditions plus the Creole-American struggle brought growing pressure for them to go elsewhere. Being so heavily engaged in commerce, it was imperative that they stay on the high land along the river but the fact that they moved west instead of east of the French Quarter was perhaps the result of the Marigny affair.

About 1822 two Americans, James H. Caldwell and Samuel J. Peters, planning to develop a succession of warehouses and cotton presses and other important enterprises (hotel, gas works and water works, etc.), approached Bernard de Marigny with a proposition to buy the whole of his extensive property along the Elysian Field Section. The Creole was extremely unwilling to deal with the Americans, whom he disliked intensely, but was finally persuaded to do so, for a stipulated sum. When the necessary legal documents had been drawn up to conclude the sale, Mrs. Marigny failed to appear at the notary's office. Her signature was necessary to ratify the sale and Marigny used her absence as an excuse to prevent the sale. Infuriated, Mr. Peters is said to have cried out to the Creole: "I shall live, by God, to see the day when rank grass shall choke up the streets of your old faubourg."

. . . Outraged but not discouraged, the two pioneers transferred their interests above Canal Street. They felt that the Americans would be glad to congregate there since they would be separate from those whom they regarded as their oppressors. With the assistance of other local American capitalists a considerable part of the holdings of Jean Gravier was purchased.⁴

Whether or not this event is a full explanation, at any rate from about this time

² *Annals of Congress, Seventh Congress—Second Session*, Washington, 1851, p. 1525.

³ *Biographical and Historical Memories of Louisiana*, Chicago, 1892, I, p. 30.

⁴ Klein, Selma L., *Social Interaction of the Creoles and Anglo-Americans in New Orleans, 1803-1860*, M.A. Thesis, Department of Sociology, Tulane University, 1940, pp. 35-36.

on an American section did grow rapidly to the west of the French Quarter. Into this section moved both American residents and American business. This movement was particularly rapid in the early 30's and a survey made by a local newspaper in 1834 showed that about three fifths of the "merchants," two fifths of the "retailers" and four fifths of the "brokers" were by that time in the American section.⁵ Thus the city quickly evolved a pattern with the business section around Canal Street as the center, the Creole section to the east and the American residential section to the west of this. Each of these residential areas had Negro slaves living on the premises and a horseshoe shaped fringe of Negro residences around it with the open side of the horseshoe being towards the business section. Outside of this was the trucking-dairying zone.

The strife which produced this residential segregation was manifest in a severe degree in political circles. The Creoles, considering themselves the settlers of Louisiana, felt the government belonged to them, and the Americans, considering that they had purchased Louisiana, felt the government was theirs. The Creoles had been accustomed to use government positions to support their sons who could not inherit land under primogeniture, and the Americans had no inclination to use tax funds to support Creole families. In contrast the Americans wanted the government to build all sorts of facilities which would be of aid to commerce, and the Creoles were not interested in being taxed to bring prosperity to the Americans. These differences were so great that as the two factions attained near equality numerically and financially one government could no longer contain them. Thus in 1836 New Orleans was divided into three municipalities, having one mayor but for all practical purposes having separate governments. In the center was the Creole city bounded on the east by Esplanade Avenue and on the west by Canal Street. To the east of it was the immigrant truck-

gardening city and to the west of the Creole section was the American municipality. In all three cases the river was the southern boundary and the lake was the northern boundary.

This separation of the city into three municipalities practically established Canal Street and Esplanade Avenue as national boundary lines. It became a matter of honor and of loyalty to one's cause to live on the proper side of these streets; those who moved into enemy territory were viewed askance if not actually as deserters. And after more than a century these definitions have by no means disappeared.

With this division the American municipality launched an almost extravagant program of public improvements. Old wharves were improved and new ones were built, streets were paved, public schools were developed and public buildings were constructed. Accompanying this was a growing prosperity and a rapid inflow of white population. Thus the white population in the whole city (three municipalities combined) increased from 21,281 in 1830, to 59,519 in 1840, and 91,431 in 1850. Meanwhile there were no more Negroes in the city at the end of this period than at the beginning.

A significant part of this influx of white population was Irish workmen. The growth in commerce and shipping brought laboring jobs and the public works program of the American municipality meant the need for many workmen. To meet these needs there was virtually no local labor supply. There were not enough free Negroes, slaves were too expensive, and the immigrants were happily employed in their crafts and agricultural pursuits. As a result, outside laborers were brought in and these for the most part were Irish immigrants.

This growth in population with the influx of a new immigrant element brought an expansion and reshuffling of the residential areas in the American section. With their mounting wealth the American elements were in a position to move farther out and build themselves new homes. South was the river, north were the swamps, and to the

⁵ *The Bee*, May 29, 1935.

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east were the business section and Creole land. Their logical move, therefore, was toward the strip of higher land adjacent to the river, and this move they made, developing a pretentious residential section with large homes and spacious grounds. This section has since been known as the Garden District. At the time it was built, it equaled or surpassed anything the Creoles possessed either in the city or on their plantations, and doubtless served to give the Americans a psychological compensation for their lack of "culture" and family background as compared with the Creoles.

This move of the Americans meant that the Negro residential fringe and the truck gardening zone had to be invaded and pushed out farther. It was the beginning of a process which continued up to relatively recent times both in the Creole and American sections. While in both cases the invasion did take place, the succession was not completed, particularly with reference to the Negro residences, for in all of the older sections of the city today there are scattered small groups of Negro residences which are remnants of a once solid Negro residential zone. Also in moving out the Americans deserted their old residences. Since the Irish were working for the Americans, they were not welcomed in other sections of the city, and being laborers, they needed no land to cultivate. Thus they were glad enough to get the discarded residences and New Orleans gave birth to what has since been known as the Irish Channel.

As the city grew, the Creole area, being adjacent to the central business section, tended to deteriorate and this, with a natural increase in Creole population, created pressure for that group to move out also. If the Americans had their fate sealed as to where they might move, so also did the Creoles. To move east meant crossing the national boundary line of Esplanade Avenue and invading the immigrant truck gardening section and this would violate their pride and honor. To the west was Canal Street, the central business section and the unthinkable American section. Their only recourse was to move out Esplanade Ridge to Bayou

St. John, and here today New Orleans has lovely old homes which are a product of this period. The migration process in this area was similar to that in the American section with some significant differences. The invasion process was about the same but the tendency of the Creoles to stay in the French Quarter in spite of deterioration was much greater. Thus there resulted an extraordinarily large number of what in other cities would be called marooned families, and there are in that area today many homes which are still owned and occupied by descendants of the families who originally built them.

Due to administrative and financial difficulties, the three municipalities were recombined into one in 1855, but by that time the ecological pattern was firmly fixed. Esplanade Avenue and Canal Street were made and the Creole section limited to Esplanade Ridge while the American section was confined to its ridge west of the city.

The strips of habitable land on these ridges were rather narrow and any tendency of these residential areas to widen was quickly checked by the swamps or the river. Therefore, expansion could only take place by building farther and farther out along these ridges. Such building, however, meant greater and greater distances from the central business section, and greater distance meant serious inconvenience when travel was by walking, bicycle or horse and buggy. In the American section, where the growth had been the greatest, the distances became so great as practically to reach the toleration point. Thus further expansion was made with a minimum of land and a minimum of added distance. This was done by making the yards inconveniently small and building the houses close together. Economically, of course, this was reflected in very high land values.

The immigrant truck-gardening section to the east of the city seems to have had, by comparison, relatively few growing pains. Being engaged in agriculture, the residents were not densely settled and, as the city developed, the population turned more and more to non-agricultural occupations. There

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was little accretion to this area by migration, and the rate of natural increase was not enough to take up for residential uses the land which was thrown out of cultivation. Thus while other sections were crying for land, this section had land to spare. As a result, land in this section became a quicksand for real estate speculators who knew land but did not know New Orleans. For the same reason there was a plentiful supply of land on that side of town for military uses during the First and Second World Wars.

Thus up to the early part of this century the basic ecological pattern of the city was T-shaped. The T was formed by the intersection of Esplanade Ridge and the ridge running along the river. The French Quarter (original French settlement) was approximately at the intersection of this T. The immigrant truck-gardening area was at the east end of the cross bar and on the west end were the central business section, the Irish Channel and the Garden District (American section), respectively. The newer Creole area was on the leg of the T, Esplanade Ridge, running vertically to the river. All of these were long narrow rectangular shaped areas, strung out along the top of the ridges, flanked on both sides by the swamps or the river. The American section and the Creole area were fringed by horseshoe shaped residential areas for Negroes and outside of these was a truck-gardening and dairying zone. The latter used land which was dry enough to cultivate or pasture but too low for residential use.

THE NEW ECOLOGY

During the present century several developments have been taking place which have been materially altering this ecological pattern. About 1910 the city began to attain success in a long effort at artificial drainage of surface water. The city had early used canals and drainage ditches to hasten the flow of water from the ridges to the swamps. Then in the latter part of the last century it tried canals with windmill powered pumps to drain lower sections. These pumps were found inadequate and in 1903 they

were replaced by electric-powered centrifugal pumps. These were an improvement but still did not have the capacity necessary for a city with the heavy rainfall which New Orleans has. Finally in 1917 a large screw type of electric pump, something like a ship's propeller installed in a large pipe, was developed and this proved adequate to the task. With these pump developments went a gradual improvement in surface and underground drainage facilities. From small beginnings this system was thus expanded until today it has a pumping capacity of $16\frac{1}{2}$ billion gallons per day (24 hours), enough water to cover eighty square miles of land one foot deep. As a result, the water level was gradually lowered until by the 1930's all of the former swamp areas were as effectively drained as the higher areas.

The development of this drainage system ecologically had the effect of changing the topography of the city. In virtually no place in the city is the change of altitude sudden enough that there is any visible difference between high land and low land. With drainage, therefore, the land, for ecological purposes, is perfectly flat and as far as topography is concerned it is all equally desirable for building purposes. Hence the barrier which the swamps had formerly been to residential expansion was now removed and the residential areas began to respond accordingly. The American section most strikingly turned squarely north away from the river and directly toward the center of a former swamp. Thus during the past two decades, census tracts which are in this former swamp area, show population increases of from 700 to 1400 per cent. The Creole section correspondingly, spread out in both directions from the Bayou St. John area, though the population pressure here was not nearly so great as in the American section.

About the time these drainage developments were taking place transportation developments were in process which also had marked effects on the ecological pattern. So far as this city is concerned probably the most important transportation development was the street car. Like other social de-

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velopments, this one cannot be very specifically dated. Horse-drawn cars and steam "dummies," of course, date well back into the past century. The successful electric car was not developed until about 1885 and its effect on the ecology of the city was not very evident until well into the present century. While the street car aided greatly in relieving pressures in the American and Creole sections, probably its most pronounced effect was on the Negro residential fringe. With the street car available it was no longer necessary for the Negroes to live so close to where they worked. In other words, the electric street car made the Negro residential fringe obsolete. As a result, this fringe began to disappear. In its stead, large Negro residential areas began to develop back towards the central business section in the formerly swampy areas between the white residential sections. This concentration has in turn attracted to these areas schools and other facilities for Negroes which are an incentive for more Negroes to move there.

The automobile which had such profound effects on most American cities had a relatively small effect on New Orleans. It augmented the effect of the street car in a number of ways but since it was not commonly used by Negroes and other poor elements in the population, it created no new trends related to these residential areas. The only part of the city where there was sufficient residential pressure to make a demand for residential suburbs was the American side of the city, and here the outlying areas were so swampy that this was impractical. There did develop on the west end of Metairie Ridge over in an adjoining parish a suburb known as Metairie. However, the 1940 census still showed New Orleans as ranking among the lowest cities in the country in the proportion of its population living in the metropolitan area outside the official city.

In general, the drainage system, the street car and the automobile combined, have created a tendency for New Orleans to shift from its former ecological pattern to a zone system similar to that recognized in other

cities. However, this pattern is by no means yet completed and it seems likely it will not soon be completed. Vast areas of the city are still socially taboo to large elements of the population and these do not conform to a symmetrical zone pattern. In addition, on the American side of the city, the drainage did not provide enough land to bring the price of building lots down to what would be considered elsewhere as "reasonable." Therefore, building new homes is still expensive and as a result old ones are not recklessly discarded. Consequently the "nice" old residential areas do not deteriorate except under the greatest of duress. And by the time the natural pressures for deterioration have become sufficiently great these areas have accumulated enough tradition to make them antiques. Thus the French Quarter is now protected by special legislation designed to prevent invasion and deterioration. Under this protection it has actually been undergoing a restoration with middle and upper class Americans moving in. Correspondingly the Garden District has tenaciously remained respectable. The 1940 rent map shows that this district is still one of the high rent areas of the city. Very high order rooming houses are about the only degradation it has yet suffered and to date it has not needed special legislation to protect it. However, should that necessity come, its antiquity is such that it will doubtless be museumized in the legislative halls.

In summary, the ecological pattern of New Orleans up to the present century was primarily the result of its topography. This pattern was set by the ridges and limited by the swamps and the river. In the historical process, sections of these ridges were occupied by the different nationality groups and came to be considered their special domain. Due to the ethnic conflicts and status differences between these nationality groups the social definitions of these areas became very strong and highly emotionalized. As a result of the division of the city into three municipalities in 1836 Canal Street became the accepted boundary line between the American section and the Creole section and

Esplanade Avenue became the dividing line between the Creole area and the immigrant area. With the development of the drainage system during the present century the swamps disappeared and this land became as well drained as the ridges. Therefore, with the land being so nearly flat, today there is no visible difference between the low land and the high. Thus for all practical purposes topography as an ecological factor has disappeared except for outer limits set by the Mississippi River, Lake Ponchartrain and outlying swamps. In this situation the ecological pattern is tending to respond to

modern transportation facilities and develop in the direction of a symmetrical zone pattern. The social definitions of the different areas carried over from the previous era, however, are proving very strong and resistant to change. This resistance is further increased by the fact that suitable land is not available for developing extensive suburbs which would make inevitable the deterioration of the old areas. Therefore, the old areas tend to be preserved and occupied by the same groups as formerly, and wherever necessary protective legislation is provided to facilitate this preservation.

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THE EFFECT OF THE WAR ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE EDUCATIONAL POLICIES COMMISSION

DAVID AND MARY HATCH
Hubbardston, Massachusetts

WITH THE reorganization of American economic and social structure to meet the exigencies of war, it would be logical to assume that an aspect of national life as closely associated with government as is the public school system would be affected.

It would be almost impossible to observe and analyze the changes in philosophy and practice in thousands of public schools all over the United States. Such a survey would be impracticable and would not necessarily add greatly to information which might be gained by reviewing the publications of some authoritative, central, policy-determining group. Although there is no official central authority in education which fixes and controls educational policy in United States, there is a group of prominent educators whose recommendations and opinions are highly influential in forming the policies of American teachers and administrators.

It is assumed, in the analysis that follows, that the Educational Policies Commission is representative of American thought in education, and that it performs a unifying function for the public schools by giving expression to common social and educational ideals.

ORGANIZATION OF THE EDUCATIONAL POLICIES COMMISSION

The Educational Policies Commission was created by joint agreement of the National Education Association and the Department of Superintendence in 1935. The Commission had twenty members in 1943 at the time of the latest publication; among them were the Presidents of Harvard and Cornell. The group is representative in many ways. Its members are drawn from liberal arts colleges and teachers' colleges. Public school teachers, administrators and officers of educational organizations are included,

and the members come from every region of the country. The purpose of the Commission was enunciated by the chairman, Alexander J. Stoddard: "The function of the Educational Policies Commission . . . is the cooperative development of long-term policies for American education and the vigorous promotion of these policies."¹

PURPOSE OF THIS SURVEY

The purpose of this study is to indicate by an analysis of the publications of the Commission whether educational philosophy has been altered by the active participation of the United States in the Second World War, and to what extent this alteration has occurred. The express purpose of the Commission was to determine "long-term" policies for education. Whether the original pronouncements of the Commission have remained unaltered and unmodified during the last ten years will be shown by tracing a few fundamental points of their program throughout the series of publications.

SOCIAL IDEALS OF THE EDUCATIONAL POLICIES COMMISSION

In his analysis of the industrial and militant societies, Spencer pointed out as the salient feature of the industrial society its function of protection of the individual. "Under the industrial regime the citizen's individuality, instead of being sacrificed by the society, has to be defended by the society. Defense of his individuality becomes the society's essential duty."² The primary conditions necessary for the existence of an industrial society are absence of threat of destruction from outside enemies and ab-

¹ Educational Policies Commission, *Planning Educational Progress*, Washington, D.C., National Education Association, 1935, p. 6.

² Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, vol. II, New York, Appleton & Co., 1897, p. 607.

sence of acute internal crisis. Spencer's industrial society with its emphasis upon the freedom of the individual and the maintenance of conditions conducive to his happiness is identical with the ideal democratic society as conceived of in the early publications of the Educational Policies Commission.

The Commission, in its first two publications, sets forth very clearly the principles and practices of the democratic society in the protection and extension of which the schools should assume the leadership. The relationship of the individual to the state, as defined by these publications, is identical with that form of relationship which Spencer describes as existing in the ideal industrial society. "For since, as we see, it is an essential requirement of the industrial type that the individuality of each man shall have the fullest play compatible with the like play of other men's individualities, it (despotic control) is necessarily excluded."¹³

Spencer's statement is almost exactly paraphrased in the early publications of the Educational Policies Commission. "Society can act upon no wiser policy than to allow each of its members the freedom essential to his own capacities; this to be contingent only upon his recognition of the rights of others to the same privileges. No other factor in all history has so impeded progress as have deliberate and unnecessary restraints imposed by powerful institutions upon the freedom of the individual."¹⁴

In order to clarify the ideal relationship of the state which allows each of its members "the freedom essential to his own capacities,"¹⁵ the Commission sets forth the five essential points in this relationship. Although these points merge into one another, they may be used as a convenient scheme for tracing subsequent changes in the attitude of the Commission.

The five key points in the ideal relation-

ship of government to the individual in a democratic society are, according to the Commission: concern for the general welfare, protection of civil liberties, the consent of the governed, the appeal to reason rather than to force, and the pursuit of happiness by the individual. The changing attitude of the Commission on these points illustrates a shift from individual to corporate action with all the accompanying restrictions upon the individual.

CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE GENERAL WELFARE

Spencer pointed out that "absence of a centralized coercive rule, implying as it does, feeble political restraints exercised by the society over its units, is accompanied by a strong sense of individual freedom, and a determination to maintain it."¹⁶ In a society, on the other hand, which is organized for war, the members of the society sacrifice much of their independence of action, and "each member of it, directed or restrained at every turn, has little or no power of conducting his business otherwise than by established routine."

The early publications of the Commission (1936-1939) might be pages out of Spencer's description of the typical industrial society. The difference is that the Commission regards the maintenance of civil liberties and the safe-guarding of the individual as unalterable aspects of democratic government. There is no indication that these characteristics of government may be associated with absence of emergency. The Commission stated without qualification in 1938 that "democratic behavior observes and accords to every individual certain 'inalienable' rights and certain corollary responsibilities."¹⁷ The same publication contains a further exposition of the relationship of the individual to the institutions of government. "Social institutions are convenient systems of relationships among individuals, the

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 608.

¹⁴ Educational Policies Commission, *Purposes of Education in American Democracy*, Washington, D.C., 1938, p. 24.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

¹⁶ Herbert Spencer, *op. cit.*, p. 628.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 598.

¹⁸ Educational Policies Commission, *Purposes of Education in American Democracy*, Washington, D.C., 1938, p. 8.

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lengthened shadows of groups of individual men and women. The State, for example, consists of its members. Destroy all the members and the State is gone; but destroy the State and the members remain. Apart from these individuals the social organization has merely fictional existence. There can be no such thing as the welfare of the State at the expense of or in contrast with the general welfare of the individuals who compose it. Man is not made for institutions. Institutions are made by and for mankind."⁹

A more unequivocal declaration of individualism could hardly be conceived. And again: "The individual must occupy a place of primacy, superior to any institution which he himself has ever devised. . . . Democratic institutions derive their just power through service to the individual."¹⁰

In subsequent publications there is always insistence upon the need for civil liberties and individual freedom. At the same time there is a growing proviso: that civil liberties and individual freedom must at times be abandoned for the sake of immediate expediency. "If in the process of achieving the military and economic objectives and their program the American people should abandon the ways, the values, the ideals of democracy; if they should abolish the civil liberties, embrace a spirit of bigotry and intolerance, engage in the persecution of minorities, force the individual into subjection to the State, and establish a pattern of dictatorship; even if they should do all those things in the name of democracy, they would be achieving the speedy triumph of totalitarianism in the land. This is not to say that after full and free discussion they should not decide to surrender certain rights or privileges for a period in the interest of some general or lasting good. The making of such decisions is always implicit in the democratic process and indeed in all rational action."¹¹

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹¹ Educational Policies Commission, *Education and the Defense of American Democracy*, Washington, D.C., 1940, p. 31.

CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED AND THE APPEAL TO REASON

"Where success in subduing fellow-men is above all things honored, there will arise delight in the forcible exercise of mastery. . . . Facts from various places and times prove that in militant communities the claims to life, liberty, and property are little regarded."¹²

The pacifist philosophy of the thirties is reflected in the writings of the Commission during those years. They rejected the use of force in the direction of domestic or foreign affairs. "Applied in the international sphere, democracy necessarily stands for peace among nations. The resort to aggressive war, declared or undeclared, denies the tenets of democracy. . . . It has been wisely said that there never has been a war between a democracy and an autocracy because the moment war begins, the former will lose its democratic characteristics. Violence, whatever its forms, its agents, or its motives, makes for material destruction, intellectual regimentation, and spiritual and physical impoverishment."¹³

In international affairs the use of force and the resort to war are condemned as leading to "the blind worship of institutions, the suppression of individual rights, the circumvention of representative government."¹⁴

By 1940, however, the Commission has been startled by the "cataclysmic events of recent weeks,"¹⁵ and they advocate defense—the use of force to combat force. A year later they are urging that the "tide of despotism" be turned back "by the organized and disciplined energies and purposes of men who love freedom and are prepared to save this cause 'with the last full measure of devotion.'"¹⁶ The seeming inconsistency

¹² Herbert Spencer, *op. cit.*, p. 504.

¹³ Educational Policies Commission, *Purposes of Education in American Democracy*, Washington, D.C., 1938, p. 30.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

¹⁵ Educational Policies Commission, *Education and the Defense of American Democracy*, Washington, 1940, p. 15.

¹⁶ Educational Policies Commission, *Education of Free Men*, Washington, D.C., 1941, p. 18.

of this with the earlier denunciations of the use of force by a democracy on any occasion whatsoever is explained by these social philosophers of education in a very adroit way. The peaceful method of settling controversy is superior to the method of war. But "as long as there exists in society a party, or in the world a state that rejects the method of peace, democracy must be ready to meet force with force. While always working for a universal acceptance of its faith, it must not neglect its own defenses."¹⁷

EDUCATION AND INDOCTRINATION

The central point of Spencer's contrast between the industrial and the militant societies is the extensive restraint by the latter of the individual in all his social and economic activities: "and this is another way of expressing the truth that the fundamental principle of the militant type is compulsory cooperation."¹⁸ This "compulsory cooperation" is inconsistent with complete freedom of each individual to arrive at his independent decisions in policies of government, to express opinions freely and to act upon them independently. In the militant society there must be concerted action, and to achieve this many individuals must subordinate their wills to the will of the group.

In contrast with the coercion of the militant society is the contractual nature of the industrial society which rests upon the voluntary and informal action of the group. The ideal society as envisioned by the Commission of the thirties rested upon the willing cooperation of a citizenry enlightened by a system of public education. The wise and effective functioning of government depends upon the wise decisions of the general public, and these in turn depend upon the beneficent influence of the real leaders of national thought—the educators. Their duty it is to see that the people are in possession of all the facts and are equipped with the discrimination to make wise choices. "Democratic processes also involve the assent of

the people in matters of social control and the participation of all concerned in arriving at important decisions. This implies that all the people must have access to the facts which will help them to reach a wise decision."¹⁹

The use of propaganda by government is repudiated; and since the majority will always arrive at the right decision if they are given access to all the facts, it is unnecessary to indoctrinate. "The propagandist deliberately refuses to present with all the fairness that human fallibility will permit, the other positions or points of view which enter into competition with his own. He places the interest of his group above all other interests. His temper is dogmatic, not inquiring or reasoning. He puts forward opinions as established facts and closes his mind to new truths incompatible with his ends. If education could perchance endorse any of his designs, it could not proceed in his spirit or follow his methods without violating its trust."²⁰

Two years later (1938), the Commission again condemns the use of propaganda and points to the vitiating effects of indoctrination in Europe. It sharply criticizes the regimentation of thought in Russia, Germany and Italy, and concludes that in these countries "expansion of thought" is not the result of education, but rather "crystallization of opinion around one point."²¹ "These examples (Russia, Germany, and Italy) have their chief value for us in providing a sharp contrast with the objectives of education suitable for a democracy."²²

Without any apparent recognition of a shift in policy, *Education and the Defense of American Democracy* in 1940 is urging the educators of America to "help to achieve national unity by clarifying national goals

¹⁷ Educational Policies Commission, *Purposes of Education in American Democracy*, Washington, D.C., 1938, p. 8.

¹⁸ Educational Policies Commission, *The Unique Function of Education in American Democracy*, Washington, D.C., 1936, p. 99.

¹⁹ Educational Policies Commission, *Purposes of Education in American Democracy*, Washington, D.C., 1938, p. 14.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

¹⁸ Herbert Spencer, *op. cit.*, p. 574.

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and by inculcating loyalties to the values basic to a society of free men."²³

The objectionable word "indoctrinate" is never used in connection with the program of education in loyalties which is now proposed, but rather "inculcate" which means much the same, but has less unfortunate connotations. They continue to clarify the new goals of education: "The young shall be taught to love these values, to struggle to make them prevail in the world, to live and, if need be, to die for them."²⁴

The following year (1941), when the crisis of European war is growing daily more acute, the *Education of Free Men* leaves no doubt as to the inadequacy of presenting the facts and allowing the young to arrive at their own decisions.

"The American people should give as close attention to the moral quality of their educational program as the dictatorial regimes of Europe have given to theirs. . . . More particularly they should fashion an education frankly and systematically designed to give to the rising generation the loyalties, the knowledge, the discipline of free men. In a word, the American public school, through its life and program, should proceed deliberately to foster and strengthen all those physical, intellectual, and moral traits which are the substance of democracy—to incorporate into the behavior of boys and girls and youth the great patterns of democratic living and faith."²⁵

THE ROLE OF AMERICAN EDUCATORS IN POST-WAR EUROPE

As the war progresses favorably for the Allies and unqualified victory can be anticipated, the field of future activity for American educators expands. They must assume the responsibility for the proper education of future generations of Italy and Germany.²⁶

²³ Educational Policies Commission, *Education and the Defense of American Democracy*, Washington, D.C., 1940, p. 7.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

²⁵ Educational Policies Commission, *Education of Free Men*, Washington, D.C., 1941, p. 27.

²⁶ Russia is now omitted from the group of nations needing the guidance of democratic educa-

"We propose nothing less than the systematic and deliberate use of education, on a worldwide basis and plan, to help safeguard the peace and the help extend the democracy for which this Second World War is being fought."²⁷ "The responsibility for taking initiative in this matter clearly rests with the organized teaching profession of the United States. . . . For all these reasons, the role of the United States in the formation of a United Nations educational policy should be one of vigorous, democratic leadership."²⁸

The policy adopted should include the establishment of the American system of free, universal schooling on primary and secondary levels, a program of adult education, and censorship of all texts and teaching materials used by European schools.²⁹ The Commission is convinced that "the whole purpose of the struggle, for us, is changing from a defensive to a creative basis. We intend not only that our free way of life shall survive, but also that it shall spread and flourish."³⁰

CONCLUSIONS

The Educational Policies Commission set as its original purpose the enunciation of long-term goals for education based upon what it conceived to be the permanent and ideal nature of American social and political organization. It considered the general characteristics of our political organization (consent of the governed, appeal to reason, and the supremacy of the individual over institutions) to be unalterable, and the function of education was to strengthen and perpetuate them. That there might be factors of change beyond the control of educators was not admitted as a possibility. Educators were to be the leaders through whose vision the young would be inspired to perpetuate and

tion. Cf. *Purposes of Education in American Democracy*, p. 14.

²⁷ Educational Policies Commission, *Education and the People's Peace*, Washington, D.C., 1943, p. 9.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

advance the social ideals as they perceived them.

Unforeseen events occurred which made pursuit of an uncompromising program of peace and individual liberty by the United States inexpedient. The rapid succession of events leading to our entry into the war was followed by a drastic revision of the philosophy of the Commission. It is true that they still pay lip service to their original "long term goals," but the date of the realization of those goals is indefinitely postponed. For the present the individual must surrender his civil liberties (of course, voluntarily and without coercion) and his personal freedom of action in order to further the corporate efforts toward victory. Independent thought and an attitude of questioning must now be replaced by faith and loyalty to certain predetermined values. When the normal conditions of peace once more permit relaxation of organized effort, then the individual will again occupy a position superior to any institution. His "inalienable rights" will be restored, and he may again devote himself to the interrupted pursuit of happiness.

The question of leadership of educators

in the field of social and political change has been much discussed, especially by educators. "Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order?" implies that they can if they dare. The present instance is evidence to the contrary. The policy of the Commission, which we assume to be acceptable to the great majority of American teachers and administrators, has been changed in the years since 1936 from the individualism of an industrial society to the patriotism and compulsory cooperation of the typical militant society. That changes in the philosophy of the Commission occurred subsequent to steps in the development of international crises indicates that education did not lead in the determination of events or even in the crystallization of public opinion.

To judge from the evidence of the publications of the Commission over the last seven years, education reflects the changes which a society undergoes in transition from organization for peace to organization for war. Organized public education is one aspect of the whole society and it, like other institutions, conforms to major changes which reflect a fluctuating system of values occurring in the society.

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THE ECOLOGY OF POLITICAL PARTIES

A STUDY OF ELECTIONS IN RURAL COMMUNITIES IN SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN,
1918-1932

RUDOLF HEBERLE
Louisiana State University

INTRODUCTION

THE PRESENT paper is based on a study of political movements, parties, and elections in the German region of Schleswig-Holstein which was carried out during the years 1932 to 1934.¹

Since the people's delegates to legislative bodies are elected for definite areas, the ecological approach to the analysis of election results is so to speak suggested by the very nature of the data. (This would not be the case if elections were conducted by occupational or other non-territorial units.) Besides, the political behavior of most people is to a large extent conditioned by the opinions and actions of other persons with whom they live in close proximity, particularly in rural society.

The student of political movements in pre-Nazi Germany had the advantage that a multiple party system lends itself better than a two party system to this kind of analysis, and furthermore that the system of proportional representation favored the organization of political parties around definite social interest groups,² and therefore em-

phasized the correspondence between social classes and political parties. Consequently the party constellation in any area came very close to an expression of the class structure of that area.³

II

Schleswig-Holstein is particularly well suited for an ecological study because it comprises within a small area three distinct subregions which are also characteristic of North Germany in general.

The Marshes along the North sea coast, with their highly commercialized and specialized agriculture, extend towards the Dutch border; the sandy Geest, a family-farm region in the middle of the peninsula, has its continuation south of the Elbe River; and the Eastern Hill zone, with its large estates on loamy soils, is part of the Baltic Hills, which run through large parts of the North German plain east of the Elbe. Schleswig-Holstein thus combines the features of both western and eastern Germany as far as the structure of rural society is concerned.

No wonder, then, that the development of party constellations in the elections to the Reichstag during the period from the First World War to the Nazi counterrevolu-

of 1.5 millions, and each party presented a long list of candidates who had been nominated by party caucuses. The lower places on the list were usually filled with representatives of organized interest groups, often little known to the broader public.

* For the city of Hamburg, this has been shown by a series of maps prepared by Andreas Walther: "Die Oertliche Verteilung der Waehler grosser Parteien im Staedt-Komplex Hamburg auf Grund der Reichstagswahl, Vol. 14, September, 1930," in *Aus Hamburgs Verwaltung und Wirtschaft, Monatsschrift des Statistischen Landesamts*, 8. Jahrgang, No. 6, 1931.

¹ Parts of the study have been published in abbreviated form in *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 5, No. 1 and No. 2, February and May, 1943. The author wishes to repeat his acknowledgment to the Rockefeller Foundation for generous support of this research project.

² The old system of Reichstag elections before 1918 with small election districts and majority elections favored personality choices, brought the candidates into close contact with the constituents and compelled those in the run offs to compromise; the new system under the Constitution of Weimar with large election districts and proportional representation favored choices of an impersonal character: The candidates were unable to maintain close contacts with their constituents because the whole of Schleswig-Holstein was now one election district covering an area of 15,000 qkm. with a population




FIGURE 1. Major Zones and the Nazi Vote in Schleswig-Holstein.

tion is also representative of the course of events in the Reich in general.

If the absolute numbers obtained by the main parties and combinations of parties in Schleswig-Holstein and in the Reich are compared (Figure 2), one finds the same

The shrinking of the middle parties and the radicalization of the counter-revolutionary parties of the Right is even more clearly demonstrated by the percentages of the total vote obtained by the major parties in Schleswig-Holstein. (Table 1.)

TABLE 1. PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL VALID VOTE OBTAINED BY SPECIFIED PARTIES IN SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN

	1919	1921	1924 I	1924 II	1928	1930	1932
NSDAP	—	—	7.4*	2.7**	4.0	27.0	51.0
Landvolk	—	—	—	—	0.3	3.8	0.0
DNVP	7.7	20.5	31.0	33.0	23.0	6.1	6.5
DVP	7.8	18.4	12.1	14.6	13.7	7.3	1.4
Zentrum	1.0	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.2
Landespartei	7.2	3.8	0.7	—	—	—	—
DDP	27.2	9.4	8.1	8.7	5.7	4.7	1.4
Other Parties	0.0	0.7	4.6	2.9	9.0	9.7	1.6
Socialists							
SPD	45.7	37.3	24.9	30.3	35.3	29.8	26.2
USPD	3.4	3.0	—	—	—	—	—
KPD	—	6.1	10.2	6.7	7.9	10.6	10.7

* Deutsch-Voelkische Freiheitspartei.

** National-Socialistische Freiheitspartei.

constancy of the Socialist or Labor⁴ vote, the same cyclical rise and fall of the Conservative vote; however, in Schleswig-Holstein the increase of the Nazi vote starts earlier, and the decline of the combined vote of the middle parties is much steeper.

* The abbreviations and short designations used for political parties are as follows.

NSDAP: Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (National Socialist German Labor Party) or "Nazis."

DNVP: Deutschnationale Volkspartei (German National Peoples Party) or "Conservatives."

DVP: Deutsche Volkspartei (German Peoples Party) or "Right Liberals."

DDP: Deutsche Demokratische Partei (German Democratic Party) or "Democrats"; this party later on changed its name to Staatspartei.

SPD: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Socialdemocratic Party of Germany) or "Social-democrats."

USPD: Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Independent Socialdemocratic Party of Germany).

KPD: Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of Germany) or "Communists."

The last three parties are also referred to in the text as "Labor" or "Socialist" or "Marxist" parties.

For a brief survey of political parties in Germany see: S. Neumann, article "Political Parties—Germany" in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*.

During the final struggle for power, Schleswig-Holstein became the most outstanding scene of Nazi election victories: in 1930 the NSDAP reached here its highest percentage, 27 percent of the total vote, and in July, 1932, Schleswig-Holstein was the only election district in which the NSDAP gained an absolute majority. The sudden success of the NSDAP came as a surprise to most observers at the time.⁵

A comparison of the election results by rural and urban areas for the entire period shows clearly that the decline of loyalty to the Democratic regime was much more pronounced in the rural areas than in the urban communities. (Table 2.)

* In a previous paper I have described how the strong support, which the new democratic regime received in Schleswig-Holstein about the time of the constitutional assembly in Weimar and during the first democratic Reichstag, crumbled and gave way to an attitude of opposition, especially among the rural people, leading first to the ascendancy of the Conservatives and finally to Nazi domination in many rural communities. See R. Heberle, "The Political Movements among the Rural People in Schleswig-Holstein 1918 to 1932," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 5, No. 1 and No. 2, February and May, 1943, pp. 3-26 and 115-141.

While in 1919 those parties which more or less supported the new regime⁶ obtained 88.2 percent of the urban and 87.9 percent of the rural vote, the support of the Democratic regime had declined by 1932 to about

gained almost a two-thirds majority—63.8 percent—in the rural communities.

An analysis of the voting strength of all parties during the period shows a stronger shift among the rural voters toward the




FIGURE 2. Party-Groups in Schleswig-Holstein and the Reich, 1919 to 1932.
Number of votes obtained

36.9 percent in the cities and 21.2 percent in the rural communities.

The Nazis, while in the urban communities reaching only 44.8 percent even in 1932,

"radical" parties of the right than among the urban voters. This becomes even more apparent if election results in single communities are considered: it was only in rural communities that the Nazis in 1932 reached from 70 percent to 100 percent of the votes cast,

*That is: DVP, Landespartei, DDP, and SPD.

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and there were numerous such rural communities. On the whole, the smaller the villages, the higher were the Nazi percentages. This inverse correlation between community size and Nazi vote is explained partly in terms of socio-economic structure of the smaller communities—the smaller, the more "rural" and the more agricultural—partly by the greater pressure of social control in a small community. Exceptions were found in

the Geest. Towards East and West the percentages decline; they are particularly low in the eastern area of large estates.⁸ The distribution of the election results for the two Marxist parties (SPD and KPD) would show a complementary picture: These parties obtained largest percentages in the Marshes and in the Eastern Hill zone, and low results on the Geest. Industrial villages and working class communities on the outskirts

TABLE 2. ELECTIONS TO THE GERMAN REICHSTAG IN ELECTION DISTRICT NO. 13, SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN, 1919 TO JULY, 1932, BY URBAN AND RURAL COMMUNITIES. PERCENT OF TOTAL VALID VOTE

	Total	NSDAP	Land-volk	DNVP	DVP	Landes-partei	DDP	Center and Minor Parties	SPD	USPD	KPD
Urban											
1919	100	—	—	5.4	8.6	0.4	28.3	1.4	50.9	5.0	—
1920/21	100	—	—	16.2	19.6	1.2	10.5	1.9	39.8	3.2	7.6
1924 I	100	7.8	—	25.6	12.0	—	8.6	6.2	26.9	0.9	12.0
1924 II	100	2.9	—	27.8	14.5	—	9.2	3.9	32.8	0.4	8.5
1928	100	3.5	0.0	19.1	13.6	—	6.2	9.3	38.5	—	9.8
1930	100	23.2	0.6	5.3	8.4	—	5.7	8.7	33.1	—	13.1
1932	100	44.8	—	5.2	—	—	—	7.0	29.9	—	13.1
Rural											
1919	100	—	—	10.7	6.7	16.4	25.8	0.3	39.0	1.1	—
1920/21	100	—	—	28.6	16.1	8.6	7.3	0.6	33.0	2.6	3.2
1924 I	100	6.4	—	42.1	12.2	—	7.1	3.1	21.1	1.3	6.7
1924 II	100	2.3	—	43.4	14.9	—	7.8	2.4	25.4	0.5	3.3
1928	100	5.4	1.0	32.3	13.9	—	4.4	11.6	27.6	—	3.8
1930	100	35.1	10.7	7.9	4.8	—	2.5	11.1	22.8	—	5.1
1932	100	63.8	—	9.2	—	—	—	2.6	18.6	—	5.8

some very small communities consisting of estates.⁷

The distinctiveness of rural subregions in Schleswig-Holstein permits a comparative analysis of election data which can lead to an adequate insight into the factors that contributed to the change in party adherence among the rural people.

If the percentages of the total vote obtained by the NSDAP in 1932 in each rural community were plotted on a map, we would find that the great majority of communities where the Nazis obtained more than 75 percent of the vote were located on

of the larger cities like Kiel, Neumuenster, Itzehoe show low Nazi and high Socialist and Communist percentages.

On the other hand, the Conservatives (DNVP), who were already very weak, in this election obtained relatively high percentages in communities in the Marshes and in the Eastern Hill zone, while their score was generally low on the Geest. Curiously enough, it was on the Geest that in 1919 the liberal parties, that is, the DDP and the Schleswig-Holsteinische Landespartei, had obtained the highest percentages in rural communities.

⁷ Lack of space prevents presentation of the statistical evidence.

*The data were obtained from the *Statistische Reichsamt*.

For certain selected Kreise,⁹ representing sectors of each of the major zones, an analysis by sub-regions has been carried out.

Throughout the entire period, the Socialist parties have been comparatively strong in

weaker on the Geest. The Conservatives on the other hand, have been in most elections strongest in the Hill zone in the East and weakest on the Geest, while they had intermediate successes in the Marshes. (Table 3.)

TABLE 3. ELECTIONS TO THE REICHSTAG IN SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN COMMUNITIES WITH UNDER 2,000 POPULATION (RURAL COMMUNITIES), IN SELECTED MINOR CIVIL DIVISIONS (KREISE), BY MAJOR SUBREGIONS, 1919 TO 1932. PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTE

	Total	NSDAP	Land-volk	DNVP	DVP	Landes-partei	DDP	Other Parties (non-Soc.)	SPD	USPD	KPD
Marsh											
1919	100	—	—	7.6	9.0	8.2	29.3	—	45.9	—	—
1921	100	—	—	29.0	20.1	5.0	6.4	0.1	27.6	6.4	5.4
1924 I	100	6.4	—	40.6	10.4	—	9.3	5.8	19.0	1.3	7.2
1924 II	100	3.1	—	41.4	11.5	—	11.5	3.4	24.7	—	4.4
1928	100	7.9	0.5	29.6	9.3	—	4.6	15.4	27.6	—	5.1
1930	100	41.2	7.0	5.3	3.1	—	2.8	6.8	25.5	—	8.3
1932 I	100	61.6	—	6.2	—	—	—	4.0	19.4	—	8.8
Geest											
1919	100	—	—	3.9	4.7	38.4	21.8	0.1	31.1	—	—
1921	100	—	—	25.3	13.0	27.5	5.7	0.9	22.1	3.5	2.0
1924 I	100	9.4	—	47.3	11.7	—	6.7	6.9	14.1	0.5	3.4
1924 II	100	2.4	—	49.9	18.1	—	8.6	3.3	16.1	—	1.6
1928	100	15.9	1.1	24.3	14.0	—	3.6	21.7	17.5	—	1.9
1930	100	45.9	14.2	3.7	3.7	—	3.0	11.6	14.7	—	3.2
1932 I	100	78.7	—	3.8	—	—	—	4.5	9.7	—	3.3
Hill Zone											
1919	100	—	—	15.8	6.3	14.3	21.7	0.3	39.6	2.0	—
1921	100	—	—	28.2	15.6	6.2	7.8	0.4	34.6	4.9	2.3
1924 I	100	5.5	—	38.7	13.7	—	6.7	2.8	24.0	1.0	7.6
1924 II	100	1.9	—	40.9	15.7	—	6.9	2.0	29.2	—	3.4
1928	100	2.0	0.4	32.7	15.0	—	4.3	10.0	32.6	—	3.0
1930	100	24.3	10.4	10.9	6.1	—	5.2	10.4	27.8	—	4.9
1932	100	57.1	—	10.0	—	—	—	4.9	21.4	—	6.6

Marsh = Eiderstedt, North and South Dithmarschen.

Geest = Kreis Rendsburg, Flensburg, Schleswig, North and South Dithmarschen.

Hill Zone = Flensburg, Schleswig, Eckernfoerde, Ploen, Oldenburg, Landesteil Luebeck (of freestate of Oldenburg).

The underlined civil divisions are as a whole apportioned to the subregion, the others in part.

Some communities on the edge of Marsh and Geest and in the Marshes along the Eider River have been disregarded.

the Marshes and the Eastern Hill zone, whereas they have been considerably

⁹These are: Schleswig, Flensburg, Eckernfoerde, Ploen, Oldenburg, Oldenburgischer Landesteil Luebeck, Rendsburg, Eiderstedt, Norder-und Sueder-dithmarschen. (For those underlined, community data were used in order to make division by major zone possible. The other Kreise were assigned in toto to their respective zones.)

The Nazis, with the exception of the election of December, 1924, when they did not even obtain 5 percent in any region, were strongest on the Geest and weakest in the Eastern Hill zone, with the Marshes in intermediate position.

The Liberal parties show less consistency, but in the first two elections—the only ones in which they commanded very significant

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proportions of the rural vote—they were very considerably stronger on the Geest than in the two other regions.

It seems then that the Geest has passed through a cycle from 65 percent Liberals in 1919, to 50 percent Conservatives in 1924 and almost 80 percent Nazi in 1932. Variations in the other two zones were not so great.

III

We shall now consider the development in each of the three major zones separately.

A. *The Marshes* are the most commercialized agricultural region in Schleswig-Holstein. The coastal lowlands of Dithmarschen and Eiderstedt especially have a tradition of more than two centuries of commercial farming. Grazing of beef cattle, first for the English and later for domestic markets, production of wheat and cabbage, raising of sugar beets and fattening of hogs, constitute the main branches of farming in these areas. Capital investment and demands for production credits are comparatively high, while labor cost is a lesser element, at least in Eiderstedt. Labor relations in the coastal marshes have long since been known for their contractual character and for their lack of community spirit.

The deep cleavage between rich and poor, between farmer and cottager or laborer, is emphasized by the settlement pattern: the farmers live on single farmsteads with spacious buildings in the midst of their fields and pastures; the poor, the working class people live in villages and in small line-settlements along the sea dikes and the edge of the Geest.

Similar conditions are found in the Elbmarsches; but farming here is more diversified, and the wealthy farmers are perhaps more tradition-bound than those in Eiderstedt and Dithmarschen. However, the segregation of the rural social classes and the dependence on markets are the same.

Dithmarschen and Eiderstedt have a unique political tradition: here the ancient liberties of Germanic freeholders had been preserved until the 16th century, and even when these farmer republics were absorbed

into the Danish state, they retained a full measure of self government,¹⁰ until the annexation by Prussia reduced them to the status of minor civil divisions.

The particular nature of Marsh farming, which requires little continuous work on the part of the farm owners, made the latter available for public offices, and even permitted some of them to practice the legal profession or to engage in business activities. Thus the wealthy among the farmers constitute an old political ruling class.

Dithmarschen, however, is not entirely Marsh; about half of its area lies on the Geest. The Geest people were until recently much poorer than the Marsh farmers and did not play any leading role in the public life of the region. Economically, the two parts are closely interrelated, because the Geest farmers raise the cattle which are bought by the Marsh farmers for fattening on their rich pastures.

Before 1918 the rich Marsh farmers were traditionally attached to the *Nationalliberale* or to the *Freikonservative* party, while the smaller farmers, the middle classes in the small towns and also the working class people adhered to the *Freisinnige* or Progressive Party.

The elections for the national constitutional assembly in 1919 resulted in a very strong majority in favor of the new regime; in the rural Marsh communities of Eiderstedt and Dithmarschen 83.4 percent of the vote was cast for the DDP, Landespartei, SPD and USPD. About half of these went to the two Marxist parties, a clear indication of the intensity of class cleavage.

While the Marxist parties held their strength fairly well from 1920 on (receiving between 30 percent and 37 percent of the votes in the rural communities of the Marsh areas in Eiderstedt and Dithmarschen together, and between 34 percent and 44 percent in the Marshes of Dithmarschen alone) the Liberal parties declined sharply and gave way to the Conservatives, who in

¹⁰ This was conditioned by the necessity of raising and administering funds for building and maintenance of sea dikes and also by the reclamation of new land from the sea.

turn lost the top rank to the Nazis.

The decline of the Liberal parties in the rural Marsh communities of Dithmarschen and Eiderstedt from 46.5 percent of the vote in 1919 to 9.2 percent in 1930 signifies a complete change in the political attitude of the Marsh farmers.

TABLE 4. RADICALIZATION OF "MIDDLE CLASS" PARTIES IN RURAL COMMUNITIES OF DITHMARSCHEN BY SUBREGIONS

	Of 100 Middle Class Party Votes Were Cast for NSDAP		Of 100 Votes Were Cast for Middle Class Parties	
	Marsh	Geest	Marsh	Geest
1924 I	10.2	7.0	69.4	84.9
1924 II	5.5	3.6	68.7	85.8
1928	16.1	41.1	63.3	82.4
1930	66.5	67.4	63.6	82.0
1932	87.1	92.1	69.0	87.7

An explanation may be attempted in terms of increasing economic insecurity rather than of actual suffering from the agricultural depression. The Marsh farmer has always been inclined to incur great speculative risks: cattle grazing and cabbage farming involve a gambling element—the enormous gains of one year may be cancelled by the losses of the next, sometimes the entire market value of the farm may be earned by a single good crop, while the heavy demand for short term credit may plunge the farmer heavily into debt in the next year.

During the period of cheap bank loans after the First World War, many of the Marsh farmers had incurred heavy debts, and not always for production purposes. When the markets collapsed and credit became difficult to obtain—that is, from 1929 on—these farmers found themselves in a very critical financial situation.

In the Elbmarsches, the decline of horse breeding (because of motorization and reduction of army demands) and of certain rural industries (the raising and processing of willows for basket making) as well as the repeated crises in the hog fattening industry in 1926-27 and 1929-30 accounted among the farmers, large and small, for rising discontent with the existing political

conditions. This paved the way for the Nazis.

B. *The Eastern Hill zone* comprises two different types of subregions: Angeln, the Isle of Fehmarn and the Probstei—which is a group of villages in the northern tip of the Ploen Kreis—are farmers' districts, while the rest is characterized by the prevalence of large estates. These estates dominate especially in the Ploen and Oldenburg Kreise.

Agriculture in the entire region is well diversified, except for Fehmarn, where wheat is the predominating crop. Angeln has an especially well balanced system of family farming, with grain production, dairying, cattle and horse breeding and hog raising well integrated. The social stratification in Angeln was more complex than in the coastal marshes: while the big farmers constituted the leading and ruling class, there was a substantial class of smaller farmers and cottagers, sometimes settled in small communities which are old offshoots of the original villages; finally there was a class of day-laborers and of hired hands. Labor relations were stable, with a residue of patriarchy. In spite of distinct stratification, neighborhood relations were strong and well institutionalized. The class structure of Fehmarn was more like that in the Marshes.

Until 1919 the large estates in East Holstein resembled in social structure those in Mecklenburg and other regions east of the Elbe. However, the concentration of farming operations in the hand of the landlord had not been as far advanced as in those other regions. There existed a cooperation between the main estate, with its cottagers and wage laborers, and the often quite well-to-do tenant farmers in the villages, most of whom had held the same farm through many generations.¹¹ Land reform legislation after 1919 resulted in the transformation of tenants into owners on the former tenant land of the estates and in the resettlement of some of the former cottagers with public

¹¹ Either as *Zeitpaechter* (long term tenants) or *Erbpaechter* (hereditary tenants). These forms of tenancy were the substitutes for serfdom which had been abolished since the end of the 18th Century, that is, much earlier than in Prussia.

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Thus, while the old upper classes of estate owners and big farmers were, thanks to their diversified economy, fairly safe against the vicissitudes of the post-war agricultural cycles, there had come into existence a layer of new proprietors of small, and often too small farms who were committed to fixed interest and annuity payments to public finance institutions—a situation which became quite threatening when agricultural prices began to drop in the late twenties and credit became more difficult to obtain.

Politically, Ostholtstein before 1918 had

tent with the politically obsolete system of tenancy resulted in strong majorities for the Socialist and Democratic parties.

Very soon, however, the Conservatives—the DNPV—became the leading “middle class” party in Ostholtstein, strongly opposed by the combined Marxist parties.

When finally, in 1930 and 1932, the Conservatives gave way to the Nazis, the latter obtained their strongest successes in the farmers’ areas of Ostholtstein and not in the areas of large estates, where both the Marxists and the Conservatives preserved their strength somewhat better.¹³ (See Table 5.)

TABLE 5. ELECTION RESULTS IN RURAL COMMUNITIES IN THE EASTERN HILL ZONE

Type of Community	NSDAP		DNVP		SPD and KPD	
	1932	1930	1932	1930	1932	1930
<i>Estates—prevalent</i>						
Kreis Oldenburg	41.4	16.0	11.0	18.6	45.0	49.6
Kreis Ploen	45.3	18.8	9.8	15.3	42.4	46.5
<i>Farmers' villages</i>						
Isle of Fehmarn	47.0	23.9	8.6	16.7	41.8	44.3
Kreis Oldenburg	52.0	25.5	9.3	19.0	36.4	41.6
Kreis Ploen	52.2	23.9	10.9	16.7	33.9	36.1
Probstei	59.5	38.0	11.8	17.4	26.0	29.7
Kreis Eckernfoerde (mixed)	60.1	22.2	9.2	11.3	28.2	31.4
Angeln (farmers)	70.8	24.6	10.5	7.0	12.5	15.0

been dominated by the owners of estates. These adhered to the Conservative or Freikonservative party, while the Sozialdemocrats and the Progressives competed for the vote of the agricultural laborers, the small farmers and the tenants, and also the lower middle class in the small towns. The control of the landlords over the villages, however, constituted a severe handicap for the democratic parties.

After the revolution of 1918, the discon-

Angeln was before 1918 politically dominated by an upper class of rich and often well educated farmers who, not being quite so conservative as the large landlords, adhered to the Nationalliberale or Freikonservative parties. In 1919 the Landespartei, political creation of the Bauernverein which had many members among the smaller farmers in Angeln, emerged as the leading party with 35.5 percent of the total vote. The DDP was second with 27.9 percent and the DVP obtained 8.0 percent—the three liberal parties together 71.4 percent, or as

¹² Resettlement activity in Schleswig-Holstein was strong; from 1919 to 1935 (that is, chiefly until 1932) more than the acreage which the province was legally required to make available (103.4 per cent) for resettlement purposes was actually made available, and 5,899 new and 1,542 “Anlieger” farms were established. *Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer das Deutsche Reich*, 1936, p. 82.

¹³ While the relative resistance of the landed aristocracy to Nazism is being emphasized here, it should not be forgotten that the Conservative land owners did nothing to prevent the rise to power of the Nazis and that they lent them their support in various ways.

much as the NSDAP scored in 1932. The Marxist parties were weak throughout the entire period but formed a rather firm block of about 3,500 votes.

A firm political tradition, a definite social stratification, and at the same time a well developed agricultural ladder which facilitated social climbing, a well balanced agriculture and a sound farm-credit situation, together with the moderate temper and the religious interests of the Anglian, may account for the tardiness of the region in giving in to the oncoming wave of Nazism. Even in 1933 the party organization was reported to be much weaker in Angeln than in most other sections of Schleswig-Holstein. However, the high degree of political solidarity which distinguishes family farm areas from areas of large estates made it possible for the NSDAP to obtain in Angeln in 1932 the highest percentages of the total vote in the entire Hill zone.

C. Of all three major zones, the *Geest* showed the greatest instability of political opinion.

The *Geest* had been a poor farming area until, about the end of the last century, artificial fertilizer and other improvements in agricultural technology began to increase the productivity of the sandy and moory soils. The tradition of poverty however lingered on, and the standards of living of the rural people were in the period of 1918 to 1932 still decidedly simpler than in the other two regions. Also, the *Geest* farmer was less commercially minded, less given to risky business transactions than the Marsh farmer.

On the other hand, agriculture was not as well balanced on the *Geest* as in Angeln or Ostholtstein; the preponderance of animal husbandry made the *Geest* farmer dependent on the demand, by the grazing farmers in the Marshes, for young cattle (*magervieh*), that is ultimately on the beef cattle market in Hamburg or the Rhineland, and also on the hog market with its well known cycles. This was especially true of the northern *Geest*, while in the South, in the hinterland of the metropolitan cities of Hamburg, Kiel, and Luebeck, milk production and truck farming were more developed and furnished a fairly steady cash

income. Needs for production credit were generally less than in the other zones.

The social structure of the *Geest* villages was less complex than the village structure in the other zones; there were only very few large estates, and since most of the farms are small enough to be operated by the family and a few hired servants and occasional day laborers, there existed in these villages no broad class of agricultural laborers. The few small cottagers were usually accepted as part of the village community. Differences in wealth were not emphasized as status-distinctions. Neighborhood relations were strong, and there was no spatial segregation of rich and poor. Thus, the *Geest* villages presented a much higher degree of community solidarity than any of the other zones.

Until 1918, however, the *Geest* had been lacking political leadership, nor had the *Geest* farmers participated in the rural political leadership of the region which rested with the Marsh farmers or the eastern landlords (*Gutsbesitzer*), none of whom accepted even the well-to-do *Geest* farmer as their social equals. Although the *Geest* people had never known serfdom, there was no old tradition of selfgovernment as in the Marshes. The prevailing political tendency before 1918 had been that typical of the "small" people in Schleswig-Holstein—the progressive liberalism of the *Freisinnige Partei*. About 1918 there emerged on the *Geest* an organization of farmers which later on formed the foundation of the short-lived *Landespartei*—for the first time a movement of *Geest* farmers and led by men of their own group. The ideology of this movement, its relation to and struggle with the Conservatives and its significance for the development of the Nazi movement in Schleswig-Holstein have been discussed elsewhere.¹⁴

It seems very likely that this lack of an old, experienced political leadership, together with the relative absence of class antagonism and class distinctions in the *Geest* villages, accounts for the completeness of political shifts in this zone. The social structure prevented the development of a strong block of Marxist voters in most of the rural

¹⁴ R. Heberle, *op. cit.*

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Geest villages—except in some rural industrial communities, and this weakness of the Marxist parties gave the Nazis a much wider margin than in the other zones.

The strongly developed sense of community solidarity made it easier to swing the vote of an entire village towards a new party, than in the Marshes where a more developed individualism and sharper class distinctions operated as retarding factors. We may then, in conclusion of our regional

pecially sensitive. All of their products are subject to a great elasticity of demand, and all of them are perishable. Their prices are apt to fall as soon as the purchasing power of the urban consumers is reduced. The two slumps in hog prices in 1926-27 and 1929-30 affected particularly the Geest farmers. The year 1930-31 brought the slump in cattle prices which most severely affected Marsh and Geest farmers; in the next year cabbage prices declined, and at the same time the

TABLE 6. SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN*—CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL VALID VOTE OBTAINED IN RURAL COMMUNITIES OF 18 MINOR CIVIL DIVISIONS, AND PERCENTAGES OF ALL GAINFUL WORKERS IN AGRICULTURE** ON FARMS OF SPECIFIED SIZE

Parties and Years of Election	Farm Size Classes			
	Small Farms— 2-20 ha (Kleinbauern)	Large Farms— 20-100 ha (Grossbauern)	Estates and Very Small Farms— 100 or More and Less than 2 ha	
Socialists	1919	-.97	-.43	+.88
SPD, USPD, KPD	1921	-.98	-.45	+.95
	1930	-.92	-.43	+.92
	1932	-.80	-.40	+.83
Democrats and Landespartei	1919	+.89	+.52	-.94
	1921	+.80	+.34	-.77
Conservatives DNVP	1919	-.70	-.34	+.76
	1921	-.19	-.04	+.02
	1930	-.60	-.49	+.61
	1932	-.80	-.40	+.83
Landvolk	1930	+.59	+.26	-.64
NSDAP and Landvolk	1930	+.79	+.45	-.82
NSDAP	1930	+.43	+.26	-.43
	1932	+.85	+.49	-.89

* Province of Schleswig-Holstein and part of Oldenburg.

** Landwirtschaftliche Erwerbstätige.

survey, state tentatively that while the decline of liberalism and the growth of the counter-revolutionary parties were conditioned by the general factor of economic distress, the subregional differentials between the strength of the various parties were primarily determined by the social structure of the communities rather than directly by economic factors.¹⁵

However, the structure of agriculture in Marsh and Geest made these subregions es-

crops in Dithmarschen failed. These developments came on top of the disparity of farm and industrial prices and the tightening of the credit situation which had begun about 1929.

More specifically it may be said that the classes particularly susceptible to Nazism were neither the junkers and big farmers nor the rural proletariat, but rather the small farm proprietors, very much the rural equivalent of the lower middle class which formed the backbone of the NSDAP in the cities.

This hypothesis will now be tested by a

¹⁴ Compare Fig. I.

series of correlations between party strength and socio-economic factors.¹⁶ (See Table 6.)

IV

From the previous discussion it appears that at the end of the period the Conservatives were weakest where the Nazis were strongest and that the Nazis were relatively weak where the Conservatives were strong. On the other hand, the Socialdemocrats and Communists had their greatest rural following where the Conservatives were also strong. This would indicate that, where the actual social conditions in the rural areas came close to the Nazi ideal of "community," the NSDAP obtained a stronger support than in those rural areas where a sharp distinction existed between landlords and laborers. In fact, a correlation of the votes in 1932 by the conservative DNVP and of the combined SPD and KPD respectively in 18 predominantly rural Kreise, after exclusion of towns of 10,000 or more population results in a strong positive coefficient (plus .91). On the other hand, the correlation for the same Kreise between percentages of votes obtained by the NSDAP and by DNVP is negative (minus .89).

We shall now test our tentative assumption that the class structure of the farm population has influenced the election results. If it is true, we should find strong positive correlations between the Conservative and also the Socialist vote and the percentage of agricultural workers gainfully employed on estates and large farms on the one hand, and

¹⁶ During the first years of social unrest among farmers in Schleswig-Holstein, that is, in 1928 and 1929, many observers believed that the Landvolk and Nazi movements in the region were typical debtors' movements. There can be little doubt that a very large proportion of the farmers who voted the Nazi ticket did so because they hoped for a moratorium or a permanent abolition of all debts. Statistical proof of this statement and a measure of the relative importance of indebtedness were however not obtainable because the only reliable data on farm debts were for 1928 and these cannot be classified by major social zones. Correlations between various measures of farm debt and Nazi votes by civil divisions resulted in low coefficients, probably because of the heterogeneity of the debt situation in those civil divisions which comprise both Marsh and Geest areas, or extend from the Hill zone onto the Geest.

on the other hand also strong positive correlations between the Nazi vote and the percentage of workers in agriculture gainfully employed on small and medium farms.¹⁷

Since certain small tenant and cottagers' farms which economically belong to estates or furnish the labor for them are enumerated as separate agricultural enterprises, it seemed advisable to combine the percentages of persons engaged on very small farms with those engaged on the largest size class. Furthermore, only the vote in rural areas of 18 civil divisions was considered.

The results for several elections are presented in Table 6. The findings appear to be quite consistent and in agreement with our assumptions.

It appears that the Nazis had in 1932 really succeeded the former liberal parties, like the Landespartei and Democratic party, as the preferred party among the small farmers (2-20 ha). The larger farmers (20-100 ha) appear to have been less definitely committed to any of the major reactionary or to any of the Liberal parties. However, the low correlation coefficients are partly due to the influence of the Labor vote in large-farm areas.

Very significant is the fact that, in cases where positive correlations are found with the Nazis, the correlations with the Socialist parties are negative, and vice versa. The analysis of the relations between party strength and class structure can also be carried on by comparing data from the occupational statistics with election results. This has been done for 18 Kreise, excluding cities of 10,000 or more population.¹⁸

¹⁷ The percentage of all agricultural workers gainfully occupied on farms of specified size was used rather than the percentage of all farms in specified size classes, because the former indicator has a closer relation to the number of voters.

¹⁸ The use of community election results would have been preferable, but had to be discarded since the occupational data were available for minor civil divisions only. Another serious handicap is the heterogeneity of the socio-economic classes in the occupational statistics. The class of owners, etc., comprises for instance, owners of large estates and small farmers, the poor tradesman, and the rich factory owner. The class of salaried employees comprises managerial and expert technical personnel with high incomes and the salesgirls in ten-cent

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The occupational statistics distinguish between the following major socio-economic classes: (a) owners, proprietors and other persons in directing positions, (b) salaried employees and officials, (c) wage earners, and (d) family members employed in the business or on the farm of the head of the household; the latter class is important as an element of small farm and middle class economy.

Three sets of correlations have been computed for each of the major industrial divisions and a fourth for agriculture alone.

The first set tests the association of political parties with the degree of middle class character of the minor civil divisions as measured by the proportion of proprietors of farms or other business enterprises in the total population. The fourth set, which is computed for agriculture and forestry

TABLE 7. SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN—CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERCENTAGES OF VOTES OBTAINED BY PARTIES IN 18 MINOR CIVIL DIVISIONS (CITIES OF 10,000 OR MORE POPULATION EXCLUDED) WITH PERCENTAGES OF POPULATION IN SPECIFIED SOCIO-ECONOMIC CLASSES (BERUFZUGEHOERIGE) BY MAJOR INDUSTRIAL DIVISIONS

Party	Year	Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery				Industry and Handicraft			Industry, Commerce and Transportation			All Industrial Divisions including Public Services, Domestic Service, etc.		
		Proprietors (a)	a+m	Wage earners (c)	Ratio of all employees b+c/a	a	c	b+c/a	a	c	b+c/a	a	c	b+c/a
Socialists														
SPD, USPD, KPD	1921	-.84	-.88	+.86	+.85	-.68	+.65	+.68	-.70	+.62	+.64	-.93	+.95	+.93
	1932	-.79	-.78	+.77	+.77	-.84	+.82	+.84	-.81	+.69	+.80	-.94	+.88	+.94
Liberals														
DVP, DDP, Landespartei + Center	1921	+.81	+.85	-.77	-.85	+.50	-.48	-.50	+.54	-.53	-.49	+.84	-.86	-.96
Conservatives														
DNVP	1921	-.20	±.00	+.22	+.20	+.23	-.24	-.23	+.15	-.31	-.17	+.08	+.07	+.10
	1924 II	+.40	+.45	-.41	-.39	+.68	-.66	-.68	+.57	-.71	-.59	+.52	-.47	-.52
	1932 I	-.26	-.28	+.31	+.28	+.09	-.08	-.09	+.09	-.15	-.06	+.02	+.12	+.12
Landvolk	1930	+.67	+.69	-.64	-.68	+.58	-.30	-.53	+.49	-.39	-.26	+.74	-.77	-.74
NSDAP	1930	+.37	+.43	-.43	-.40	+.32	-.39	-.31	+.24	-.40	-.67	+.36	-.38	-.64
	1932 I	+.76	+.79	-.78	-.76	+.71	-.69	-.70	+.63	-.53	-.64	+.83	-.79	-.69

Explanation of occupational classifications:

a = proprietors
m = family members employed on farm
c = wage earners

b = salaried employees

$\frac{b+c}{a}$ = ratio of all employees to proprietors

stores if they happen to be paid by the month instead of by the day or week. Domestic servants are classified separately.

The German statistics distinguish between (1) "Erwerbspersonen" or persons in gainful occupations inclusive of unemployed persons and (2) "Berufzugehoerige" or the total number of persons depending on a certain occupation or industry (that is, "Erwerbspersonen" and their dependents not in full time gainful occupations). The text refers to "Berufzugehoerige."

The correlations were computed by Spearman's rank correlation method—

$$6\sum D^2$$

$$Q = 1 - \frac{6\sum D^2}{N(N^2 - 1)}$$

only, is merely a test of the first—the assumption being that the larger the combined proportion of proprietors and family workers in the total population, the more outspoken the lower middle class ("kleinbaeuerliche" or "kleinbuergerliche") character of the Kreis.

The second set tests the association of the party votes with the proportion of wage earners in the total population—it is an indicator of the political attitude of the rural and rural industrial labor class.

The third set was computed as a test of

the second, on the assumption that the larger the proportion of wage earners and salaried employees in relation to the owners, the more distinct would be the working class as the predominating element on the one hand and the class of entrepreneurs on the other, that is, the more concentrated would be agriculture or industry or commerce in large enterprises and therefore the weaker would be the "middle class" of small farmers and small business men.

The results, presented in Table 7, confirm very well the expectations. They show clearly the association of the Nazi strength with the middle classes, and of the strength of the Socialists with the prevalence of the labor class. They also show how the vote of the farmers shifted from the Liberals to the Conservatives and finally in 1932 to the Nazis. The shift of the vote of the proprietor class in industry and commerce and in all industrial divisions together is also strikingly expressed in the strong positive correlations, first in 1921 with the Liberals, then in 1924 and 1930 with the Conservatives, and finally in 1932 with the Nazis.

On the other hand, the steadiness of the correlations between the percentages of wage earners and the parties is also very impressive. It indicates that on the whole labor must have adhered to the Socialist parties. Only the Conservatives at the beginning and at the end of the period seem to have gained some support among agricultural workers, unless the positive correlations (between Conservative votes and percentages of workers) which are very low at any rate, are merely the result of "symbiosis" of agricultural labor with Conservative landlords. This latter assumption seems to be confirmed by the third set of correlations in each industrial division. The larger the ratio of employees (wage and salary earners) to employers, the stronger the Socialist parties and the weaker all others, including the Nazis.

We may then say that the Nazis did not gain much ground among the workers, especially not where large scale enterprises

prevailed, be it in agriculture and forestry or in industry, commerce and transportation. Both among the farmers and the non-agricultural rural population the middle strata (of small farmers and small entrepreneurs), and to some extent also the agricultural workers in family farm areas, have been most susceptible to Nazism, while the landlords and big farmers, as well as the workers on large estates and especially the industrial and commercial wage earners, have been most resistant to the Nazi movement. The change from Liberalism to Nazism, or from support of the democratic regime to support of the opposition, has been most radical just in those middle layers of rural society, which, in the period before 1918 had been strong adherents of progressive Liberalism.

The comparative strength of these middle strata in the rural society of the Geest and their relative weakness and lesser political influence in the two other regions explain very well the regional differences in political behavior observed in the beginning of this discussion. In concluding our analysis at this point we may say that the "ecological" analysis has led us to fairly definite and apparently well supported ideas about the political conduct of the various strata or classes in the rural society of our region. It may seem strange that the lower classes, that is the agricultural workers and other wage earners, held firmly to one of two Socialist parties while the middle and upper strata, especially the supposedly ideal backbone of democracy—the family farmer—swayed from left to right like the reeds in the wind and finally supported a political movement which on the surface was diametrically opposed to their own political tradition.

The contrast in the political conduct of the two classes is largely conditioned by the possession of a firm faith, a political philosophy on the part of the workers and by the loss of faith in all existing political institutions and the development of a political opportunism of fundamentally materialistic nature on the part of the middle classes.

IDEOLOGICAL GROUPS

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MODERN INDUSTRIAL society develops a close correlation between class structure and conflict groups. Social classes are defined by the quantitative attributes of wealth, occupation, and education, the qualitative characteristics of sentiments, attitudes, and values, and the correlatives of social status and distance. The social classes create causes of social conflicts, but they are themselves not able to act, to engage in class struggle, to modify or change the class situation. Activities of this kind are performed by conflict groups, which are the result of considered collective actions of participants. These *purposive* and organized groups depend upon deliberate choice, identification, affiliation and participation of their members, and exist only so long as these actions are forthcoming.

SOCIAL CLASSES AND CONFLICT GROUPS

It is the function of conflict groups to explain and utilize the conflict situation for the benefit of the group. But any situation may be interpreted variously; many kinds of actions may seem to answer the needs and demands of the followers. Consequently, each social class tends to stimulate many conflict groups each of which appeals to the same class comrades and claims to be the only and true representative of the real "class interest." This necessitates a choice between rival conflict groups, creates uncertainty and indifference in the minds of many, and leads to intensified campaigning for the sympathy and allegiance of everyone, even those not belonging to the same social class. Yet, the co-existence of conflict groups prevents any of them from becoming identical with a social class. First, lower classes provide followers for conflict groups of the upper classes, whereas individuals of upper classes join conflict groups of the lower or middle classes, mostly as leaders or financiers. Second, indifference to the functions of the conflict groups, reluctance to accept the

obligations and sacrifices of conflict organizations, or disappointment with the slow development of the movement, its policies or leaders, prevent the full identification of all class fellows with a conflict group. Third, the power of conflict groups or the economic dependence of the lower and middle classes leads to a varying degree of intimidation, creating passive followers. Fourth, other social groups, not originated by the class structure, limit the feeling of class unity and reduce participation in conflict groups. Finally, persons whose class interest is divided because they live not in but at the outer fringe of a class, or between two classes, may be unable to define their class position and thus refrain from any affiliation. In spite of these variations between social classes and conflict groups, each purposive group recruits the majority of its followers from one social class. Both are inseparably interrelated, thrive and fall together, as long as the growth of conflict groups is not suppressed by the state.

Conflict groups differ in type. When greater emphasis is placed upon the quantitative attributes of social classes, such as security of jobs or increase in wealth, we are dealing with *interest* groups. When the qualitative characteristics of social classes are stressed, aiming at the formation of uniform sentiments, attitudes and ideas, we speak of *ideological* groups. Although economic and personal self-interest is present in both groups, interest groups are more common in upper classes, ideological groups more frequent in lower classes. Moreover, countries with powerful upper classes, influencing the sentiments, attitudes and ideas of other classes, develop predominantly interest groups.¹

¹The emphasis upon the pecuniary element in American society, over-stressed by some European observers (e.g., Andre Siegfried, *America Comes of Age*, New York, 1927), is merely one of the many features of a society segmentalized into interest groups.

The reason for this peculiar social structure of conflict groups is obvious. Upper classes take the existing social order for granted, emphasize more the special interest of subgroups within the class, and protect or promote them through deliberate, collective efforts. Lower classes are mostly opposed to the acquisitive society. They develop a new ideology, thereby criticizing the existing and planning for a new social order. Promotion of group interest and of group ideology become the dual functions of lower conflict groups. Middle classes, if engaged in collective efforts, resort to the formation of interest groups in periods of prosperity and to ideological groups in periods of an existential crisis. Consequently, interest and ideological groups are co-existent. They fight each other continuously and cause a serious segmentalization of society. Yet, they also accommodate and recognize each other. They enter into contracts and thereby form an integrated system of conflict groups that springs from and is superimposed upon the class structure of the acquisitive society.²

An ideological group rests upon common class interests and derives a sense of common cause from the class situation that unites its members into a social group.³ The group develops a collective mentality with distinct sentiments and attitudes, a net of associations with comprehensive organizations, and collective actions leading to more or less clearly defined group policies. These group activities, which can briefly be characterized as the ideology, sentiments, attitudes, associations and program of actions, are fused into a peculiar pattern of collective behavior. Through its behavior the

² This term, as used here, is akin to Toennies' *Gesellschaft*, inasmuch as it presents an analysis of an empirical and not a mere logical system of an imaginary society. Toennies has no theory of ideological but only of special-interest groups.

³ Interest groups have no common but merely like interests and do not necessarily develop a common cause leading to a group ideology. Lack of space prevents the discussion of the interest groups in this paper. For a comprehensive treatment of the general problem see R. M. MacIver, *Society: A Textbook of Sociology*, New York, 1937, chapters II and XIII.

group establishes a consensus of opinion among its members, creates a specific jural order regulating the group life,⁴ and provides a social goal that gives meaning to, and directs the actions, of the group and its members. In effect, the ideological group provides a substitute for the missing face-to-face relationship of uprooted masses, supplies an opportunity for collective actions, and gives, through its ideology, a surrogate religion to its followers. In its relation to other conflict and non-conflict groups, however, the ideological group is one of the most disruptive forces that contribute to the disorganization of the acquisitive society.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF IDEOLOGICAL GROUPS

Five attributes of ideological groups are listed here. We do not assert any regularity in the historical development of these characteristics, nor do we presuppose that the group "made up" its collective mind prior to forming associations and engaging in collective actions. We merely assume the historically verifiable fact that all five attributes are present in fully developed ideological groups.⁵

The group ideology⁶ usually comprises four features: a set of theories, a social ideal, slogans, and symbols. The theories contain an explanation of: (1) the existing society (2) the group's role and position within the social order (3) its institutions and procedures and (4) a prediction of the future of society, including the group's ideas and functions in social change. The first two theories on the structure of society and social classes are transformed by the group into

⁴ The general problem of a jural order within divisive groups has been admirably stated in Professor Gurvitch's *Sociology of Law*, New York 1942, chapters III and IV.

⁵ Hence, we follow Spiethoff's method of formulating real types which was derived from Max Weber's method of ideal types. See A. Spiethoff, "Die allgemeine Volkswirtschaftslehre als geschichtliche Theorie," *Schmollers Jahrbücher*, Vol. XI, (No. 6), 1932.

⁶ We prefer the concept group ideology to Mannheim's "total ideology." (Cf. Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, London, 1936, p. 50.) Both terms refer to the whole outlook of a social group.

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axioms. They present an implicit justification of the group's right to live and act. The last two theories on institutions, procedures, and the data underlying predictions are subject to change. They are open for discussion and scrutiny by the theorists of the group. These theorists, belonging to the leadership, study new events and interpretations of academic experts, and incorporate the lessons of new experience into the thinking of the group.⁷ The assimilation of new facts and interpretations thus depends upon the insight of the theorists and the readiness of the group itself to understand the relevance of new events and ideas for its activities. All such ideas are existential⁸ because they are means of interpreting the social reality to the *satisfaction of the group*.

Ideological groups are in opposition, in part or whole, to the social order and resent the role they are compelled to play in society. Hence, the groups develop a vision of an ideal society (glorifying the past or illuminating the future) or present a program for the reform of the prevailing social order. Ideal or reform, if realized, would eliminate injustice or inequality and secure for the group the desired equal or superior status. For the group, the ideal is not merely an image but implies the norms of group behavior. It gives the group its ultimate goal of desires and activities, provides ethical rules for the followers in their relations with each other, stimulates a willingness to labor and sacrifice for the group organizations, creates group unity, and generates enthusiasm for the aims of the group. At the same time, the normative function of the group ideal prevents a contractual arrangement

⁷ Results of academic research play a minor role in the thinking of ideological groups. They usually accept only those studies that fit into the theory of the group or have merely technical significance from its point of view. They do reject comprehensive academic theories because of the differences in: (a) axioms concerning the nature of society; (b) the principles governing the working of society; (c) the rather common divorce of thought from action in academic circles; and (d) the implicit or explicit rejection of ideological groups as the instrument of collective activities.

⁸ In the sense of Professor Parsons, cf., his "Role of Ideas in Social Action," *American Sociological Review*, iii, 1938.

among ideological groups in periods of internal crisis.⁹

Conflict groups develop special symbols of appeal and aggression. These symbols express the ideas and ideals of ideological groups. They provide opportunities for individuals to identify themselves with the group and its collective mind. They are means of unifying the followers into a powerful social group. Some symbols may perform both functions at once, in that they have a different significance for friend and enemy. As a rule, however, evolutionary groups develop more symbols of appeal, and revolutionary groups symbols of aggression. Moreover, symbols of counter-revolutionary groups tend to conceal, of revolutionary groups to reveal, the true nature of their ideas and ideals. Whatever the concrete form of the symbols, they express the innermost desires and visions of the group and manifest the social bond among its followers. The more the symbols mean to them the stronger is the potential power of the group. Conversely, symbols reduced to mere technical regulatives of group conduct are indicative of an actual or potential state of internal disorganization.¹⁰

Social slogans and verbal symbols have the function to inspire affiliation with and participation in the activities of the group. They also popularize the ideas of the group. These ideas demand no study but give all the benefits of individual and group convictions. The social symbolism, if effective, leads to two results: it indoctrinates the followers with the ideal, the axioms, and the principles of the group ideology, and establishes a consensus of opinion as regards the institutions, procedures and the facts underlying predictions. In other words, social symbols are means of translating ideas into mass

⁹ External threats to the existence of all groups usually lead to "national unity" and inter-group compromises among internal enemies. World War II did not create national unity in France because the right and left did not see that Nazi victory would lead to the dissolution of their groups.

¹⁰ Thurman Arnold's interpretation of symbols as "illusions" is correct for interest groups. It does not apply to ideological groups. Cf., *The Symbols of Government*, New York, 1935.

convictions, ideals into group beliefs, individual preferences into a compact group opinion that furnishes the basis for collective actions. At the same time, various group ideologies are pitted against each other; the ensuing intolerance and struggle prevents the formation of a genuine public opinion in the whole political society.¹¹

Group sentiments comprise three kinds of feeling within a group. Fellow feeling develops a sense of solidarity with other members of the group. The we-group feeling generates a sense of loyalty to the organizations and symbols, and devotion to the ideal and ideas, of the group. The our-class feeling stimulates a consciousness of an individual's class status and a sense of belonging to one's social class.¹² These feelings, based upon the common class interest, create a social bond among the members and intensify the group unity. The sentiments toward other groups are less uniform. There is a feeling of aversion toward opposite ideological groups; of rivalry or envy among members of ideological groups based upon the same social class; of indifference or superiority toward non-class groups, and a feeling of disgust or even contempt for interest groups. Finally, there is a group feeling of enmity toward the existing social order, the intensity of which depends upon the type of ideological group. The two kinds of sentiments are co-existing and correlative with each other. As a rule, the antagonistic feelings are more intense and powerful than the sympathetic sentiments of the group, except in periods of suppression or crisis.

Social attitudes of ideological groups are deliberate evaluations of other groups and predispositions for action within the group. Within a group we notice a cordial attitude among the active members, a sacrificial atti-

¹¹ The ideologies thus become "doctrines of intolerance," as Professor MacIver has named and described them. *The Leviathan and the People*, Louisiana State University, 1939.

¹² The role of motivation and suggestibility, leading to affiliation of individuals with conflict groups, does not concern us here. For a valuable discussion of these psychological problems, see Hadley Cantril, *The Psychology of Social Movements*, New York, 1941, Part I.

tude toward the goals and (occasionally) the organizations of the group, and a cooperative attitude toward their own social class and its members. But dissociative attitudes prevail between members of different groups. There is an intransigent attitude toward opposite ideological groups, springing from the enemy relationship among them. An outright competitive attitude prevails among groups based upon the same social class, which may be modified occasionally into a tolerant attitude during periods of joint undertakings. Destructive attitudes are common toward interest groups. The dominant feature, however, is the outspoken militant attitude toward the existing social order. The dissociative attitudes, when translated into actions, lead either to ideological warfare or to contractual arrangements for short periods between similar conflict groups.

Inclusive associations are usually developed by ideological groups. They form organizations for most any kind of activity in which their members are able to engage. Most of them create and maintain political, economic, educational and cultural organizations, some of which may be subdivided into age-groups. For they consider their ideas and ideals applicable anywhere and therefore build organizations in almost any field of activity. Moreover, these groups see themselves as the originators of a future society and try to give to their members new organizational substitutes for the ideal life of the future. If and when they have a chance to seize power, they press the associational life of all the people into the pattern of their own organizations.

The internal structure of the associations varies greatly. An association may be structured according to the unitary, federalist, confederate or dominative principles of organization. Counter-revolutionary movements usually give supreme power to one central organization that dominates the activities of all suborganizations (e.g. Nazi Party). Revolutionary movements achieve unity among their organizations by giving one central organization (e.g. Bolshevik Party under Lenin) the power to define the radius of activity of the sub-organizations

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without dominating them. Evolutionary movements usually adopt the federalist principle of organization where each major kind of organization has equal status and equal chances in formulating the group policies (e.g. German Social Democrats). Quasi-ideological groups often accept the confederate principle where the sub-organizations predominate over the central organization (e.g. British Labor Movement before 1918). In crisis situations the federalist and confederate principles prove inadequate. The self-determination of each organization threatens the uniformity of action by all organizations of the group.¹³ In periods of tranquility, however, even dominative or unitary organizations feel the need for more self-expression of the members. Yet, these groups can accept temporary concessions only; they must disperse or purge their factions in order to retain the original structure of their organizations and the nature of their ideology. In a process of internal struggle the confederate groups tend to disintegrate, the federalist become unitary, and the unitary often adopt the dominative principle of organization (e.g. Bolshevik Movement after Lenin).

All organizations develop a varying degree of specialization between leaders, functionaries, followers, and sympathizers. As a rule, organizations operate efficiently only if the four constituent elements perform their specialized functions properly. A leadership concentrating all power in its hands creates indifference among the functionaries and sympathizers as well as decline in membership of the organizations. This process of shrinkage, endangering the position of leaders, is the best protection against the supposedly inevitable "iron law of oligarchy."¹⁴

¹³ The organizational principles determine the interrelationship among many organizations as well as the rights and duties of the members within each organization. For the sake of simplicity, we neglect here the internal structure of the individual organizations of the group.

¹⁴ R. Michels, *Political Parties*, Engl. tr., New York, 1915. The varying degree of participation, respect, and authority in ideological groups, resulting from specialization, cannot be considered here. We are merely questioning that functional speciali-

It is under conditions of a one-party state only, where membership in the associations of one ideological group is compulsory, that concentration of power does not threaten the position of leaders. Such an oligarchy, however, is not a result of functional specialization but of the monopoly of power springing from the domination of one ideological group over all others.

The programs of action formulated and executed by ideological groups are unlike in their content but similar in their nature. Three kinds of actions are typical, namely, those of the leaders, organized groups, and unaffiliated masses. The actions of the leaders are formulate, expressive, executive, and (in dominative organizations) coercive.¹⁵ These actions may be performed by the same leader or create specialization within the leading circle. Thus, the theorist may formulate the ideas, while the speaker expresses the slogans and admires the symbols and ideals. The administrator executes the group decisions and performs the organizational routine work. The "Party judge" or disciplinary committees impose their decisions upon members who violate the jural order of the group. These efforts of the leaders constitute the program of action for the organized group. The group functions through its active members, especially its functionaries. They act as operators of the organizational "machine," disseminate the ideas and slogans, and direct all other organizational group activities on a local or regional level. The other active members participate in these endeavors and usually contribute to the revenues of the organizations. Moreover, the active members are instrumental in activating the unorganized masses. It is the aim of their efforts to direct the activities of the sympathizers, the unorganized and the indifferent and thereby realize the program of the group. In a democracy, the actions of the leaders, active members, and masses are, or are supposed

zation is the main cause of leadership oligarchy in associations.

¹⁵ Cf. Rainer Schickele, "Society and the Masses," *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, October, 1942.

to be, correlative and interdependent. The labors of the leaders and active members give meaning and direction to the collective action of the masses. In turn, the masses sanction or reject a group's program of action and thereby open or close the avenues to success for ideological groups. Historical evidence, however, indicates that the sanction of the masses can be secured only in periods of existential crisis. One of the social classes, supposedly or actually losing its socio-economic basis, supports an ideological group that promises to be able to accumulate power for the destruction of all its enemies.

The five characteristics of ideological groups are of equal significance for the behavior of the groups. But they do not offer the same degree of participation to all members of the group. Actually a diminishing degree of participation and sphere of mass appeal can easily be detected. Group sentiments have the greatest appeal because they are readily accepted or rejected without much knowledge, will and action. Slogans come next in their dissemination among people. Social attitudes imply identification with the ideology, and affiliation with the organizations. Symbols are accepted by those who are able and willing to identify themselves publicly as members of the group and bear the disapproval of neighbors and enemies. Ideas are accepted and repeated by many sympathizers who shy away from organizational affiliation (e.g. "fellow-travelers"). But there are many members who never acquire an intimate knowledge of the group ideas. The group ideas may be approved covertly or adopted publicly by non-members who thereby enjoy the advantages of group convictions and accept the disadvantages of being in opposition to the social order. The unequal distribution of the group characteristics results from the differences in personal predispositions, abilities, and situational opportunities. Most individuals are unable to incarnate their social group. The few full-members who personify closely the characteristics of the group gain great popularity with leaders, followers and sympathizers. Most ideological groups have a few popular

leaders who are the living symbols of the group for the followers.¹⁶

Ideological groups, then, utilize collective thinking, feeling and attitudes for organized collective actions. The actions are directed toward a fundamental change in social reality. Hence, they are in effect driving forces of social change in our time. The new reality, in turn, leads to a new structure of society which imposes new functions upon the successful ideological group itself and thereby changes its social nature and position. From an opponent to the old it develops into the molder of a new social order.

THE TYPES OF IDEOLOGICAL GROUPS

Ideological groups differ in the concrete content of their group characteristics, the degree of participation of their members in social actions, and the social position of the group in society. They may be classified according to the nature of their ideology or their function in social change. Both classifications are equally valid. The first presupposes relative social stability, the second an existential crisis of society.

In periods of social tranquility we can distinguish, following Professor Lasswell,¹⁷ movements for social emancipation (liberal, socialist, communist), national or racial independence, military, imperialist, racial or fascist supremacy. In periods of an external or internal social crisis, in which a fundamental change in the social or international order is possible or inevitable, some ideological groups function as the destroyer of the old and the builder of the new order. In such situations groups have to take a definite position towards the crisis and proceed to realize their programs of action. Taking the actions as our guide, we can then speak of revo-

¹⁶ This feeling of followers for their favorite leader has to be distinguished from the actual role of such a leader. The sentiment alone furnishes hardly a sufficient factual basis for the theory of a charismatic leadership in Fascist movements, as developed by T. Abel, *Why Hitler Came Into Power* (New York, 1938), p. 181 and Hans Gerth "The Nazi Party: Its Leadership and Composition," *The American Journal of Sociology*, XLV, 1940.

¹⁷ *World Politics and Social Insecurity*, New York, 1935.

lutionary, evolutionary and counter-revolutionary mass movements. The struggle among them creates two types of quasi-ideological groups during the period of transition. The strongest non-class groups are compelled to develop the five characteristics of ideological groups, hoping to survive in the struggle for domination. Divisive groups simulate the adoption of some group characteristics, hoping to return to their original position when the crisis is over. The intensification of the struggle among the ideological groups proper destroys these hopes. The compelled and the simulative groups can merely influence the form of their dissolution. They may "voluntarily" disappear or attach themselves to the ideological group that dominates the situation.¹⁸ The quasi-ideological groups thus are created in and destroyed by the social crisis.

Revolutionary (communist) and evolutionary (democratic socialist) groups present the aspiration of the laboring class for a socialist society. They are a result of the class structure and tend to become a permanent feature of the acquisitive society. Counter-revolutionary (fascist) movements originate with an existential crisis of modern society that endangers or undermines the economic and social position of the rural and urban middle classes.¹⁹ Such a crisis may result from a severe depression, a military defeat, a hyper-inflation, a potential or actual revolution at home or abroad. Hence, counter-revolutionary groups are not limited to post-revolutionary periods, as is implied in the traditional theory,²⁰ but are

typical of transitional phases of modern society. The incidence and intensity of such movements, however, varies according to the depth of the crisis, the available economic reserves of the middle classes, the degree of resistance of the upper and lower classes, and the international position of nations. It is only when the crisis is accompanied by favorable circumstances that a fascist movement becomes "inevitable." But when such a movement is formed, it evolves the five characteristics of fully developed ideological groups and fights for a fascist society.

A fascist movement²¹ fuses features of revolutionary, evolutionary and restorative (or conservative) groups. This fusion explains the hybrid nature of fascist ideology, the quasi-military character of the dominating political party, and the volitionist tinge of its program of action. The fascist ideology includes an ideal of a glorified past, projected into the future. Thus in the Nazi movement, the "Third Reich" was said to be the successor of Imperial Germany and the Roman Empire of the German Nation. This ideal state was conceived as the most perfect expression of the mystic German *Volksgemeinschaft* which in turn derived its strength from the supposed purity, unity and superiority of the Nordic race. This vision of an ideal state, a unified nation, and a pure race provides the social goal for the Nazi movement. It also functioned as a norm of group behavior and as a guide for actions of individual followers. This ideological cover of fascist imperialism aroused great enthusiasm and expressed the aspirations of the middle classes in the formative period of the Nazi movement.

In contrast to revolutionary and evolutionary groups, fascist movements have no theory of the existing society. For fascist leaders are not interested in explaining the nature of a social crisis. They pronounce the crisis to be a conspiracy instigated by

¹⁸ For a description of the process of attachment in the Spanish Civil War see Salvador De Madariaga, *Spain*, New York, 1943, Part II, and Gerald Brenan, *The Spanish Labyrinth*, New York, 1943, chapter viii.

¹⁹ Historically, ideological groups of middle classes were either liberal and/or democratic (e.g. British Free Trade Movement) or anti-capitalist (e.g. American Populist). It is in the phase of a "mature capitalism" only that middle-class opposition against an existential crisis took the form of fascist movements.

²⁰ Cf. Alfred Meusel, "Revolution and Counter-revolution," *Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*, XIII, 367-76.

²¹ Revolutionary and evolutionary movements are too well known to justify discussion. For a recent evaluation of evolutionary movements, see Adolph Sturmthal, *The Tragedy of European Labor*, New York, 1943.

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enemies against the innocent and faithful people. Strangely enough, this conspiracy myth functions as a substitute for a social theory. It names the enemy, presents his list of sins, and defines thereby the role of the social groups in the crisis situation. Institutions and procedures do not have to be explained because they are all "machinations" of the social enemy. Yet, in their formative period, counter-revolutionary groups derive strength from the lack of a social theory. First, the Nazis could be simultaneously all things to all men, and promise to satisfy the mutually exclusive interests of antagonistic groups. Second, the interpretation of social theories as group prejudices enabled the Nazis to incorporate Christian and pagan, romantic and rational ideas into fascist thinking, utilizing them merely as devices to enhance their own power.²² Third, the absence of a social theory reduced the danger of internal theoretical "squabbles" and immunized the followers against discussion and counter-propaganda of enemy groups. Finally, the conspiracy myth personalized the conflict, generated tremendous hatred toward individual members of enemy groups, created the psychological conditions for the waves of fascist terror and supplied the leaders with a wealth of negative symbols and slogans that made their propaganda exceedingly effective. Yet, the initial success was later transformed into a source of weakness, because the Nazis could not develop an ideology that would convince their former enemies and keep the allegiance of their own followers.

A new type of hierarchic association provided the instrument for a small group of fascist leaders to dominate first a counter-revolutionary mass movement²³ and later all

²² The fascist definition of social theory as group prejudice, which can be adopted or fabricated by the fascist leaders at will, precludes any satisfactory doctrinal history of fascist movements and their forerunners.

²³ The traditional identification of mass movements with democracy or radicalism has led many students to misinterpret the counter-revolutionary character of the fascist movements as "democratic" or "revolutionary." See for instance, Sigmund Neumann, *Permanent Revolution*, New York, 1942, chapter I.

social groups in the afflicted countries. Dominant associations constitute a fusion of organizational principles common in modern armies and voluntary associations. The dominating political party comprises a private army and a political machine. The private army provides personal protection for the leaders, prevents or crushes any opposition of factions within the mass movement, terrorizes the non-fascists, and gives "military treatment" to enemy groups. The political machine performs the regular functions of a party. But it also promotes and directs a string of specialized groups, organizing women, youngsters, professionals, etc. These auxiliary organizations are controlled by party leaders and integrated into the party organization, for their headquarters are located at, and functionally identical with, the various departments of the party. With the ascent to power, these integral organizations expand greatly and their leaders constitute the dominating circle within the various affiliated organizations. They comprise all the non-fascists in their various forms of activities which thereby come under direction of the fascist leaders. It is this associational domination that enabled the fascists to organize the middle classes into a counter-revolutionary mass movement and utilize it for creating and maintaining a political monopoly over the state and all classes of society.

The fascist program of action is composed of three plans of activities. First, the control over party, state, army, and public opinion led to a political monopoly of power of the Nazi directorate over the people. This monopoly was achieved through associational domination of the party. It was supplemented by domination of the state administration, the army, the administrations of propaganda and education, the private army, and secret police. In concentrating all instruments of domination, the Nazi directorate was able to immunize its political monopoly against any effective internal opposition and impose the policy of its choice upon the people. Second, the Nazis decided to solve the crisis of the acquisitive society through a policy of external expansion. This

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"solution" springs from the limited opposition of the Nazis to the social order, their peculiar interpretation of the social crisis of our time, and their social ideal of a new German Empire. To establish the empire required a Nazi-dominated international order which could be secured only through war. The chances to win the war depended—internally—upon a modernized mass army, a strategy of mobile warfare, and a war economy in peacetime and—externally—upon a military alliance with friendly powers, and the military weakness and disunity of potential enemies. Preparation for war became thus the policy of the Nazis during the second phase of their existence. Third, the direction of the war required complete domination of the Axis armies by the fascist parties as well as a reorganization of the state and the war economy in order to utilize all human and economic resources for the ruthless prosecution of World War II.

A study of ideological groups proper indicates that they present sociologically the same type of social group. But their characteristics differ greatly in meaning and substance. Popular comparisons of social movements, representing them to be either identical or dissimilar in kind, confuse similarity in formal appearance with the social nature of these conflict groups.

THE SOCIAL ORDER OF POLITICAL MONOPOLIES

Ideological groups are determined to realize their ideal and establish a new economic, political, social and intellectual order. Consequently, social movements are vehicles which destroy old and build new types of societies. The pattern of this type of social change includes the existential crisis, a revolution or counter-revolution, and, if successful, the formation of a communist or fascist society.

The crisis leads to economic and political disorder and ideological disorganization.²⁴ Through ideological warfare the rising social

movement deliberately disintegrates the existing structure of social groups. Divisive groups with a favorable prejudice toward the revolution or counter-revolution become a part of these movements. Unifying groups are transformed into quasi-ideological mass movements and thereby protect themselves against dissolution. Enemy groups of all kinds fight bitterly at all levels of activity and the successful movement destroys them all after seizing the power of the state. The concrete forms of incorporation, transformation, and destruction of other social groups differ markedly in periods of revolution or counter-revolution. The disintegration of the existing structure of social groups, however, is an indispensable pre-condition for the success of both.

In periods of revolution or counter-revolution, ideological warfare and warlike actions are the dominant forms of collective activity. To the usual forms of group and mass actions are added individual and collective terror and organized military campaigns, executed by the private armies of ideological groups. Hence, ideological warfare is fused with warlike activity. Whether such activity takes the form of concealed or of open civil war depends upon the nature of the existential crisis, the possible interference of other states, and the character and strength of the opponents in the struggle for political dominance. Modern history illustrates various connections between social movements and civil war. A counter-revolution by a regular army, aiming at restoration of the old order, engages in open civil war (e.g. Spain). The price of its victory is the partial destruction of the country's culture, followed by starvation. In contrast, fascist movements confined the struggle to concealed civil war. They enjoyed the "neutrality" of the regular army, the support of the prevailing state administration, and the indifference of other states. Moreover, they faced as their main opponents "evolutionary" groups who refused to accept the challenge to civil war. Consequently, fascist terrorism reaped the benefits of a civil war without suffering its destructive effects. Revolutionary movements seem determined to gain

²⁴ Cf. Louis Wirth, "Ideological Aspects of Social Disorganization," *American Sociological Review*, V, 5, 1940.

power through concealed civil war. But the expropriated owners of the means of production and the remnants of the regular army protect the old order with military actions (e.g. in Russia). Evolutionary groups reject any kind of civil war as a means of realizing their ideal. Hence their chances of success are limited to the few historical situations in which war, military defeat, economic and political disorder dispose of the old rulers and leave the "evolutionists" as the only group able to govern the country.

The new serial orders established by revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movements are basically different in nature but similar in their formal characteristics to dominated societies. Both types of societies have in common the features of a dictatorial party, an "ideological state" owned by the party, and a structure of social groups that is devised and dominated by the party-state. The well-planned and directed domination of associations can be observed on four levels of organized activities. A dictator or a directorate of party leaders dominates the party and its private army. These in turn dominate the integral organizations of the movement and thus the social class from which the movement originated. The integral organizations dominate the affiliated organizations and, thereby, the other social classes in society. Finally, in fascist empires the groups of subject or conquered nations are dominated by the various organizations of the victorious fascist party and state. The benefits of this interwoven system of associational domination accrue first of all to the party directorate and its subordinate officials, then to the members of the integral organizations. The members of affiliated organizations have to pay the price of political suppression leading to their personal and political insecurity. In fascist empires the suppressed are partly compensated through the exploitation of the dominated nations. Propertied groups can enrich themselves through innumerable forms of "business transactions," whereas the laboring groups at home are merely somewhat better fed than the people in the dominated nations.

The most important differences between the dominated societies concern the economic, social, political, military, ideological, and international features of the new orders. The communist dictatorship is based upon a state socialist economy. The fascist directorates, in forming their war economies, established a state capitalist economy.²⁵ The class structure of the feudal-capitalist society has been destroyed in Russia, and the differentiation in income and standards of living is merely indicative of a changed composition of the working class. An exception is formed by the party directorate and its entourage of officials who derive economic privileges from their political power, but do not constitute a new social class.²⁶ Fascist society does not destroy the class structure but reduces social classes to merely economic classes. All non-fascist ideological groups are eliminated or driven underground. The interest groups of the upper and middle classes are incorporated into the system of domination; and their activities are closely supervised by the fascist party or state. The interest groups of the laboring class exist in name only (e.g. Labor Front). The compulsory fascist associations in all fields of activities are superimposed upon the class structure and take the place of the former independent and antagonistic conflict groups of the various social classes. It is this uniform system of associations that allows the fascists to assert that they have eliminated all classes whereas they actually were successful in putting them into a straight jacket.²⁷ When fascism is destroyed or disintegrates, as in Italy of 1943, the various economic

²⁵ For the various features of state capitalism see Adolph Grabowsky, *Der Sozialimperialismus als letzte Etappe des Imperialismus*, Basel, 1939; Maxine Y. Sweezy, *The Structure of the Nazi Economy*, New York, 1941; Arthur Schweitzer, "The Role of Foreign Trade in the Nazi War Economy," *Journal of Political Economy*, August, 1943.

²⁶ Cf. A. Yugow, *Russia's Economic Front for War and Peace*, New York, 1942, Chapter XI.

²⁷ The inference that the dissolved conflict groups indicates the elimination of the class structure led the late Professor Emil Lederer to his theory of a fascist "classless society." Cf. *State of the Masses*, New York, 1940.

classes reconstitute their conflict groups and engage in their traditional political, social, economic and ideological activities.

The formal similarity between the dictatorial parties and their dominating associations cannot conceal the basically different political orders in each society. Domination is exerted for different purposes, here for the fascist, there for the communist political system, and promoted and directed by diametrically opposed ideological groups. Moreover, the military features of the new societies differ markedly, in spite of the fact that each army is controlled by the respective dictatorial party. The military leaders of the Red Army are outstanding party members and belong to the inner circle of the party directorate—after the purges had eliminated the generals of the former ruling class. The abolition of the red commissioners in the army was a belated recognition of the fact that the same party directorate wields the economic, political and military instruments of power. The Nazis, too, were able to take over the strategic direction of the German army and the war; in 1942 they appointed SS Generals to the commanding positions in the General Staff. Most of the field commanders, however, are sons of noble or capitalist families. They have been reduced to mere technicians in a modern army, prosecuting the Nazi-determined strategy. Defeat in military campaigns transforms these commanders into class-conscious members of their class. Some desert their armies; others join the "Free Germans" in Russia. Internal disintegration of the fascist regime revives and reactivates the upper classes who in opportune moments usurp the political power and, as in Italy, establish a dictatorship of their own. Such a conservative "dictatorship depends upon a weak" or defeated army; it can survive popular opposition only if permitted and militarily supported by victorious powers.

The ideological differences are insurmountable. A revised Marxism determines the content and form of thought and shapes all phases of education and "public opinion" in Soviet Russia. An imperialism in racial disguise molds public thinking, teaching,

preaching and learning in Nazi Germany. Both societies also differ fundamentally in the nature of their social ideal: a fully developed communist society here; a fascist empire of the "racial elite" there. But the particular historical circumstances of the new orders and their domination by dictatorial parties have had their effects upon the original ideals. The aim of a socialist world (through world revolution) was replaced by one socialist country in a non-socialist world. The resultant consequences for the present order in Soviet Russia have been tremendous, abolishing the principle of equal income, equal opportunities for all, etc. Even the fascist ideal disintegrated under the pressure of imperialist expansion and the privation of war. The racial elite turned out to be the racially mixed leaders of the fascist parties. The social harmony of groups is now recognized by many as a mere disguise for the associational domination of all social classes by the party directorate. The manifold populational, economic and social policies, applying the principle of "racial hierarchy," were either discarded or transformed into means of suppression. The evaporation of their ideal compelled the fascist leaders to turn increasingly to the semi-socialist ideal of the proletarian nation that fights against oppression by foreign capitalist plutocracies.²⁸

Most obvious of all are the international differences. Here the antagonism of the original social movements and the resultant dominated societies leads to open conflict. Ideological warfare culminates in world war between party regimes. These states prepared carefully for this war, built modern mass armies, established war economics in peacetime, and imposed innumerable sacrifices upon their peoples. The real World War II began after the Nazi invasion of Russia. Opponents of comparable military strength and strategy, tactics and fighting efficiency, equipment and manpower met for the final military death-struggle. The Nazi strategy of Blitzkrieg failed. Defense in depth, mass-

²⁸ This change has been described but differently interpreted by Franz L. Neumann, *Bahemoth*, New York, 1942.

ing of matériel, continuous fronts, led again to positional war, modified by the rules of motorized warfare.²⁹ The issue of this struggle between the ideological party regimes can no longer be in doubt: it is the total destruction of the enemy's social order. For the differences between the dominated societies are so great that they cannot exist side by side in the same time and space.

Needless to say the certain defeat of the fascist states could and cannot be obtained through the great achievements of Soviet Russia alone. This will be the common accomplishment of the military coalition between the Anglo-American powers and Soviet Russia. Jointly they will be able to attain the real aim of this war: to destroy the fascist social order. For the military defeat of fascist armies will lead to the internal disintegration of fascist societies. The political monopoly of the party directorates will be destroyed; the mass army will be demilitarized and reduced to a police force; the state capitalist war economy will disintegrate. What will take the place of destroyed fascism is still in doubt because the partners of the victorious coalition can not yet agree upon a political, economic and military treaty for the formation of an international order after the war.

The war will by no means exterminate revolutionary ideological groups or their dominated societies. Soviet Russia, saved from annihilation, will be the strongest

European power. She will have the largest army in the world. The party directorate will ask and receive full credit for victory, and by adopting new functions increase its power and prestige at home. Internationally it will be able to adjust its ideological warfare to the new post-war conditions. Even warlike actions can and may be employed to reap the fruits of ideological warfare and secure desired "peace" objectives. Moreover, the formation of new revolutionary and evolutionary groups in defeated and liberated countries is most likely. They are bound to influence, if not shape, the future of those countries, involving social conflicts, ideological warfare and possibly revolutions.

Whatever one's attitude towards social movements, one cannot escape the conclusion that Americans and Britons have the choice among three possible international policies toward foreign ideological groups or states. They may try to destroy them through ideological and military warfare. They can, of course, ignore, curse, despise and avoid any contact with them, as did the AMGOT in its formative period. Finally, they may accept some form of accommodation with Soviet Russia and the new evolutionary mass movements. Future wars and revolutions will be the risk of the first choice, whereas the second will deprive them of any effective influence in continental Europe and Asia. The third choice alone seems to offer an opportunity for a reasonable compromise with Soviet Russia and for the promotion of democratic movements in the defeated and liberated countries.

²⁹ For an excellent study of the military features of the present war in Russia see Max Werner, *The Great Offensive* New York, 1942.

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DIFFERENTIAL FERTILITY IN COMPLETED OKLAHOMA FARM FAMILIES*

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Studies of differential fertility in the farm population have been quite limited in their scope and equivocal in their results. The present study attempts to overcome these weaknesses by subjecting the fertility of a group of 392 completed, unbroken, native-white, Protestant, Oklahoma farm families to detailed statistical analysis. The results show that differentials exist in relation to socioeconomic status, education, migration and residential background. No significant differences were found between Protestant denominations nor between church member and nonmember families. Despite the existence of differentials none of the rural groups analyzed failed to reproduce itself.

INTRODUCTION

OUR KNOWLEDGE concerning differential fertility in the rural population is largely a by-product of studies of tenure conditions, family living, poverty and related problems.¹ With a few possible exceptions these studies have not been designed to investigate the problem directly and consequently the samples and techniques employed often have been unreliable. Hence, the results have been equivocal and at times contradictory. Further, the range of possible differentials investigated has been very narrow, usually limited only to tenure status or some similar indicator of socioeconomic status.

THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this study is to determine whether there are significant differences in the fertility of completed Oklahoma farm families in relation to certain of their social and economic characteristics. The factors against which fertility is measured include the following: the socioeconomic status of the family, as indicated by tenure status, relief status, wealth status, and scores on

the Farm Family Socioeconomic Status Scale; education of the wife; religion of the family; migration record of the family; and residential background of the husband.

THE SAMPLE

The data upon which the study is based were obtained from a field survey made in 1937-1938 in four Oklahoma counties chosen to represent the rural farm population of the state.² They consist of 392 schedules on farm families in which fertility had been completed as evidenced by the fact that the wife had passed her 45th birthday.³ No cases

* A detailed description of the sampling procedure and the representativeness of the sample is given in Robert T. McMillan, *Migration and Status of Open Country Families in Oklahoma*, O.A.E.S. Bulletin T-19, Stillwater, Oklahoma, 1943, 75-80.

¹ No cases were included in which the wife was over 69 years old. This limit was set partially to control the influence of a possible downward trend in the fertility of farm families over the years. Even with this upper limit the possibility still exists that the results of such a trend would affect the differentials under consideration if older families were to congregate in certain sub-groups since the period included is twenty-five years. For this reason the age distributions in each group and sub-group were examined before the differentials were computed. In all instances the distributions were very closely similar. The mean present age of all of the wives was 54.3 with a standard deviation of 6.0 and in only three sub-groups did the means deviate by more than 1.0 years from the mean for the total group. These were 56.1 for wives of owners, 56.3 for wives with 0-3 years of education, and

* This paper is published as a contribution of the Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station.

² For a comprehensive summary of these studies, see: Frank Lorimer and Frederick Osborn, *Dynamics of Population*, New York, 1934. Other rural and urban studies made since this review was written are cited in footnotes throughout the paper.

are included in which either husband or wife had been previously married or in which the union had been broken before the wife reached age 45. In addition, all families are native-white and Protestant. The schedules were selected on the basis of the above characteristics from a random sample of over 1200 schedules taken in the sample areas and are believed to be representative of families of this type in the state. The schedules contain the age of the husband and wife both at marriage and at present, a complete list of all children born to the union whether living or dead, and numerous other data useful for the purposes of the study.

THE MEASURES OF FERTILITY USED

Since the fertility of a family refers to its actual reproductive performance, no more clear-cut measurement of the fertility of completed families can be gained than that expressed by the number of children born alive to the family. Therefore this was adopted as the principal indicator of fertility for this study.

Some readers will wish to compare further the fertility of the various groups studied in relation to the marital reproductive period. For this reason a simple fertility rate is used throughout the study to supplement the principal measure. This rate is determined by dividing the total number of live births to a given group of families by the total number of years all of the wives in the group were married during the child bearing period (15-44) and multiplying the resulting quotient by 100.⁴

56.5 for the wives of the least migratory group. Since not even these differences were statistically significant, it was believed unnecessary to control the age factor further. Actually the effect of greater control would have been to increase the differentials found not only in these but in most other instances.

⁴ Admittedly this is a rough measure since it ignores periods of infertility brought about by pregnancy and post-puerperal periods of amenorrhea due to lactation. Likewise it does not take into account variations in these periods of infertility which may obtain in the various strata analyzed. For a discussion of these points see Corrado Gini, "On the Measures of Fertility in Women," *Rural Sociology*, 7: March 1942, 84-86.

Throughout the analysis, arithmetic means, standard deviations and standard errors of the means have been calculated for the principal measure. Differences between the groups compared have been determined, along with their standard errors; and statistical tests of the significance of the observed differences have been made.⁵ Therefore, it is possible not only to show the magnitude and direction of differences but to gain an idea of their reliability.

SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS

As was indicated earlier, most of the attention which has been devoted to the study of differential fertility has centered about socioeconomic differentials in urban populations. Until recently the almost universal finding was that the relationship between fertility and socioeconomic status is clearly inverse. In the past few years careful studies in the United States, England and Wales, and Sweden have demonstrated that there are notable exceptions to this generalization, especially in the upper urban socioeconomic strata.⁶ The evidence concerning differentials in the fertility of socioeconomic classes in the rural population of the United States is much less conclusive and is considerably more contradictory than that for the urban population. Frank Lorimer and Frederick Osborn in their excellent review of the evidence up to 1934 concluded that differentials in fertility in rural communities do not exist except in the most backward

⁴ To save space the tests of significance are not presented in the tables. However, in the discussion the significant differences are pointed out. All of the data on which they are based are shown and the computations may be made by anyone interested. The proper formulas and an excellent discussion of the meaning of statistical significance is to be found in Margaret J. Hagood, *Statistics for Sociologists*, New York, 1941, Ch. 17.

⁵ See especially Clyde V. Kiser, *Group Differences in Urban Fertility*, Baltimore, 1942; Frank W. Notestein, "Differential Fertility in the East North Central States," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 16: April 1938, 173-191; John W. Innes, *Class Fertility Trends in England and Wales, 1876-1934*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1938; K. A. Edin and E. P. Hutchinson, *Studies of Differential Fertility in Sweden*, Stockholm Economic Studies, No. 4, London, 1935.

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areas of high fertility.⁷ However, recent studies cast considerable doubt on the present validity of this claim. Clyde V. Kiser, in a study of married rural women in selected counties of Michigan, Missouri, and Georgia, found that fertility was inversely related to socioeconomic status as reflected by the tenure and occupational status of the husband.⁸ C. Horace Hamilton and Marguerite York, also found marked differences in the fertility of rural North Carolina married women classified according to tenure status and relief status.⁹ Again the relation was clearly inverse. Even though these studies are in many ways superior to the earlier researches on the subject, the evidence from them concerning socioeconomic differentials is not completely satisfactory because of the roughness of the measures of socioeconomic status employed.

In the present study both tenure and relief status were used as indicators of socioeconomic status, but the main reliance was put on two other measures. These are wealth status and scores on the Farm Family Socioeconomic Status Scale.¹⁰ Either of these is superior to tenure or relief status in that both are less subject to different interpretations, have narrower ranges of variation within classes, and are considerably more accurate. The scale scores probably give the best estimate possible since the scale

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 92.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, Chapter 8, "Differential Marital Fertility in Selected Rural Areas and Villages of Three States," 194-215.

⁹ "Trends in the Fertility of Married Women of Different Social Groups in Certain Rural Areas of North Carolina," *Rural Sociology*, 2: June 1937, 192-203.

¹⁰ For a detailed discussion of the scale see the writer's, *The Construction and Standardization of a Scale for the Measurement of the Socioeconomic Status of Oklahoma Farm Families*, O.A.E.S. Technical Bulletin No. 9: Stillwater, Oklahoma, 1940. A briefer discussion may be had in the writer's, "A Scale for the Measurement of Farm Family Socioeconomic Status," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, 21: September 1940, 125-137. Norms for the scale are given in the writer's "The Development of a Sociometric Scale," *Sociometry*, 5: August 1942, 279-297, and "The Restandardization of a Sociometric Scale," *Social Forces*, 21: March 1943, 302-311.

was carefully designed and standardized for use on Oklahoma farm families. It has the further advantage that norms have been established in terms of which socioeconomic classes may be treated.

Tenure Status. In the analysis of the relation between tenure status and fertility the three most common tenure groups were used. These are owners, tenants, and croppers—farm laborers. When the analysis is made of the mean number of children born alive to these three groups it is readily apparent that owner families are less fertile than either tenant or cropper-laborer families (see Table 1). The differences in the

TABLE 1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN ALIVE AND FERTILITY RATE ACCORDING TO THE TENURE STATUS OF THE FAMILY

Tenure Status	Number of Cases	Number of Children Born Alive		Fertility Rate
		Mean	S.E.	
Owners	207	4.8	.22	19.8
Tenants	139	5.9	.35	23.6
Croppers-Laborers	43	6.0	.45	23.8

means are respectively 1.1 and 1.2 children. These differences are statistically significant. However, the difference between the two lower groups is small and insignificant. That the differences between the owner and the non-owner groups are not due to the greater marital reproductive period of the lower strata is shown by the mean fertility rate for each of the three groups. Therefore, it may be concluded that the owner groups are significantly less fertile than the non-owner groups in the sample under consideration.¹¹

Relief Status. Data were available concerning the status of all families in relation to several types of public relief programs.

¹¹ These results conform closely to those reported by Kiser, *op. cit.*, 199-206, and Hamilton and York, *op. cit.*, 199-202. They are perhaps even more significant since they are for families which are not only biologically completed but have also reached their most characteristic tenure level.

Therefore it was possible to separate the relief from the nonrelief families. When the mean number of children born alive was computed for the two groups it was found that the relief families had on the average 1.5 more children than non-relief families (see Table 2). This difference is highly sig-

TABLE 2. NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN ALIVE AND FERTILITY RATE ACCORDING TO THE RELIEF STATUS OF THE FAMILY

Relief Status	Number of Cases	Number of Children Born Alive		Fertility Rate
		Mean	S.E.	
Non-Relief	246	4.8	.20	19.8
Relief	145	6.3	.25	24.9

nificant statistically and of course indicates that the dependent group is more fertile. When the fertility rate was used, the difference was still large and in favor of the relief group. Therefore, the conclusion seems justified that relief families in this rural sample are clearly more fertile than non-relief families.¹²

Wealth Status. The schedule contained a complete statement of assets and liabilities for each family. From this the net worth of each family was computed. The families were then divided into thirds according to this figure and the fertility measures were calculated. This gave the results shown in Table 3. It will be noted that each of the successively lower groups has a mean number of children born alive greater than those above it. The differences between the means

of the successive groups are all statistically significant and the same relationship holds true when the fertility rate is employed.

TABLE 3. NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN ALIVE AND FERTILITY RATE ACCORDING TO WEALTH STATUS GROUPS

Wealth Status Group	Number of Cases	Number of Children Born Alive		Fertility Rate
		Mean	S.E.	
Upper Third	128	4.4	.28	19.0
Middle Third	128	5.4	.28	22.2
Lower Third	128	6.2	.25	24.1

This may be taken as further evidence of the existence of socioeconomic differentials in the fertility of the sample studied.

Socioeconomic Status Scale Scores. Scores on the Farm Family Socioeconomic Status Scale were available for all the families included in the study. Following the norms previously established for Oklahoma farm families, all families were classified into one of three status categories: lower third (scores under 139), middle third (scores 139-161), upper third (scores 162-up). The measures employed throughout the study were computed for these groups and the results are given in Table 4. Here it will be

TABLE 4. NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN ALIVE AND FERTILITY RATE ACCORDING TO SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS GROUPS

Socioeconomic Group	Number of Cases	Number of Children Born Alive		Fertility Rate
		Mean	S.E.	
Upper Third	125	4.0	.24	16.7
Middle Third	115	5.5	.32	22.3
Lower Third	150	6.4	.24	25.5

noted that the most marked differences yet observed exist between the status levels. The difference between the upper and lower third in mean number of children born alive is 2.4 in favor of the lower third. That between

¹²This finding is in keeping with that of Hamilton and York for rural North Carolina married women, *op. cit.*, 197-199. It is also congruent with the results of numerous urban studies: see especially, Edgar Sydenstricker and G. St. J. Perrott, "Sickness, Unemployment and Differential Fertility," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 12: April 1934, 126-133; Samuel A. Stouffer, "Fertility of Families on Relief," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 29: September 1934, 295-300; and Frank W. Notestein, "The Fertility of Populations Supported by Public Relief," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 14: January 1936, 37-49.

the middle and upper third is 1.5 while that between the middle and lower third is .9. In both cases the differences are in favor of the lower socioeconomic group. All of the differences are statistically significant and hold for the fertility rate as well. From this analysis the conclusion may be drawn that in this sample socioeconomic status as measured by the Farm Family Socioeconomic Status Scale is inversely related to fertility.

EDUCATION

Several studies of urban groups have shown that education is inversely related to fertility.¹³ For the rural population the evidence is contradictory on this point. N. I. Butt and Lowry Nelson found no significant differences in the fertility of Utah village families of varying educational levels.¹⁴ N. L. Whetten, in a study of rural families in Connecticut, found significant differences in the fertility of parents with varying levels of schooling. But these differences disappeared when religion, occupation, and nativity were held constant.¹⁵ However, Clyde V. Kiser, in his study of differential fertility in the rural population of three states, found significant differences in the fertility of open country native white married women with less than seven grades and those with more than seven grades of schooling.¹⁶

To determine the relation between fertility and education in the Oklahoma sample, the indexes of fertility employed throughout the study were calculated according to highest grade completed in school by the wife.¹⁷

¹³ See especially Kiser, *op. cit.*, 70-110, and Frank W. Notestein and Clyde V. Kiser, "Factors Affecting Variations in Human Fertility," *Social Forces*, 14: October 1935, 32-41. Studies based on college graduates have revealed the same inverse relationship. For a list of these see Lorimer and Osborn, *op. cit.*, 320-325.

¹⁴ "Education and Size of Family," *Journal of Heredity*, 19: July 1928, 327-330.

¹⁵ "Education and Size of Family," *Journal of Heredity*, 24: July 1933, 275-278.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, 206-210.

¹⁷ The analysis was also made according to husband's education and according to the average education of the husband and wife. The results were identical with those for the wife alone. To save space these data are not given in this article; how-

Four broad educational groups were used: below 4 grades, 4-6, 7-9, and 10 and over. The results are shown in Table 5. From this

TABLE 5. NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN ALIVE AND FERTILITY RATE ACCORDING TO THE EDUCATION OF THE WIFE

Highest Grade Completed	Number of Cases	Number of Children Born Alive		Fertility Rate
		Mean	S.E.	
10- up	41	3.7	.47	16.5
7-9	158	5.0	.23	20.2
4-6	132	5.9	.29	23.8
0-3	39	6.9	.40	27.5

table it is clear that differences in fertility exist for the groups studied. The difference in mean number of children born alive between the least educated and the most educated groups is 3.2 children. Moreover, the exceedingly higher educational groups have significantly fewer children than the lower groups, without exception. Exactly the same results are found when the fertility rate is used. From this analysis it must be concluded that the educational achievement of the wife is inversely related to fertility.¹⁸

RELIGION

Several urban studies have shown that Catholic couples are more fertile than Protestants and other religious groups.¹⁹ How-

ever, the writer will be glad to furnish them to anyone who may be interested in examining them.

¹⁸ Why the results should have been different from the Whetten study is not readily apparent since in this sample all families met the same conditions as he set, in that they were all white, native-born, Protestant and had completed the child-bearing period.

¹⁹ See especially: Frank W. Notestein, "Class Differentials in Fertility," *Annals*, 188: November 1936, 26-36; Samuel A. Stouffer, "Trends in Fertility of Catholics and Non-Catholics," *American Journal of Sociology*, 41: September 1935, 143-146; G. K. Robinson, "The Catholic Birth Rate: Further Facts and Implications," *American Journal of Sociology*, 41: May 1936, 757-766; and A. J. Jaffe, "Religious Differentials in the Net Reproduction Rate," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 34: June 1939, 335-342.

ever, these studies reveal no significant differences in the fertility of the various Protestant denominations. To the writer's knowledge no information on these points is available for the rural population. Since the data of this study are limited to Protestant families, only the evidence concerning the relation between religious denomination and fertility can be given.

In Table 6 the fertility measures are

TABLE 6. NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN ALIVE AND FERTILITY RATE ACCORDING TO RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS

Religious Denomination	Number of Cases	Number of Children Born Alive		Fertility Rate
		Mean	S.E.	
Baptist	132	5.7	.26	22.5
Methodist	62	5.1	.42	20.7
Church of Christ	53	5.0	.37	20.1
Misc. Protestant	73	5.0	.40	21.7
Total Protestants	320	5.3	.17	21.5
Non-Members	64	5.7	.42	22.8

shown for the three major Protestant denominations in the sample as well as for all other Protestants, and non-church members. From this table it will be seen that the mean number of children born alive is about the same for all denominations but the Baptists who are the most fertile group. However, the differences between this and other groups are not statistically significant. Moreover, non-church members are not significantly different from Protestant church members in their fertility. The same results obtain when the fertility rate is used. These findings are not surprising and agree with those for similar religious groups in the urban population with the exception that all of the rural religious groups have higher fertility than is characteristic of similar urban families.

MIGRATION

The relation between migration and fertility is one which has not been studied extensively for either rural or urban groups except in the case of immigrants to the

nation and to cities from rural areas.²⁰ However, it would seem that migration and fertility should be related. Certainly it would be expected that rural families with large numbers of children would be relatively immobile as far as long distance migration is concerned. Conversely, large farm families might be expected to be quite migratory in relation to intra-community movement since large families with low economic status would tend to shift about from farm to farm in search of better economic opportunities. Since most rural migration is of this type it may be hypothesized that the relationship between migration and fertility in a rural population would tend to be direct rather than inverse.

A complete record of all changes in residence was available for each family, and the number of years the family had existed as a unit was also known. Thus it was possible to compute Williams' index of migration for each family. This is simply the number of territorial moves made per 100 years of employment.²¹ On the basis of the magnitude of the index, the families were

TABLE 7. NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN ALIVE AND FERTILITY RATE ACCORDING TO MIGRATION GROUPS

Migration Group	Number of Cases	Number of Children Born Alive		Fertility Rate
		Mean	S.E.	
Least Migratory	117	5.1	.28	21.3
Average Migratory	117	4.9	.28	19.8
Most Migratory	116	6.1	.29	24.2

²⁰ For a review of these studies see Lorimer and Osborn, *op. cit.*, 48-54. For later studies see: Harold F. Dorn and Frank Lorimer, "Migration, Reproduction, and Population Readjustment," *Annals*, 188: November 1936, 280-289; Clyde V. Kiser, "Birth Rates Among Rural Migrants in Cities," *Mübank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 16: October 1938, 369-381; and Homer L. Hitt and Reed H. Bradford, "The Relation of Residential Instability to Fertility," *Rural Sociology*, 5: March 1940, 88-92.

²¹ For further elaboration see B. O. Williams, *Occupational Mobility Among Farmers*, S.C.A.E.S. Bulletin 296, Clemson, South Carolina, 1934, 17-18.

ural areas.²⁰ Migration and inly it would s with large relatively im migration is farm families migratory in ement since status would to farm in portunities. this type it relationship in a rural direct rather

ges in resi family, and had existed it was pos t of migra simply the de per 100 asis of the ilies were

ALIVE AND ION GROUPS

	Fertility Rate
3	21.3
3	19.8
5	24.2

See Lorimer studies see: "Migration, movement," *Annals*: Clyde V. migrants in *Quarterly*, 16: Hitt and Residential 5: March

Williams, S.C.A.E.S. 34, 17-18.

divided into three groups, least (index 0-9), average (index 10-19) and most migratory (index 20-up). The two fertility measures were then computed and the results are given in Table 7. From this it will be observed that the most migratory group has the largest mean number of children born alive, the least migratory group comes next, and the group which is average in migration has the lowest mean.²² However, only the differences between the means of the most migratory group and the other two groups are significant. The results are the same when the fertility rate is used. Since the most migratory families are most fertile, it may be concluded that the hypothesis of a direct relationship between migration and fertility is at least partially valid.

RESIDENTIAL BACKGROUND

Students of human fertility have long been aware of the fact that there are broad differences in fertility between the various regions of the United States and have especially called attention to the excessive fertility of the rural South.²³ Since fertility is influenced by cultural factors, it may be hypothesized that persons reared in one region would, upon moving to another region, carry with them the dominant attitudes and patterns in relation to fertility which they had acquired in the original area of residence.

The data of this study provide some opportunity for testing this hypothesis. However, they are by no means ideal for this purpose since information is limited to the state of birth of the husband and to his place of residence at the age he began an independent working career in agriculture. By means of the information available all husbands were classified according to resi-

²² These results are in keeping with the findings of Hitt and Bradford for Louisiana farm families, *loc. cit.*

²³ See especially: P. K. Whelpton, "Geographic and Economic Differentials in Fertility," *Annals*: 188, November 1936, 37-55; Rupert B. Vance, "The Regional Approach to the Study of High Fertility," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 19: October 1941, 356-374, and Lorimer and Osborn, *op. cit.*, 3-37.

dential background into the three broad regional groups: Midwest, Southwest and South.²⁴ No further classifications were made because of the small number of cases in other than these regions. The measures of fertility were computed and are shown in Table 8. Those with Southern back-

TABLE 8. NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN ALIVE AND FERTILITY RATE ACCORDING TO RESIDENTIAL BACKGROUND OF THE HUSBAND

Region	Number of Cases	Number of Children Born Alive		Fertility Rate
		Mean	S.E.	
Midwest	175	4.8	.21	20.2
Southwest	85	5.6	.35	22.2
South	105	6.0	.28	23.4

grounds (South or Southwest) have significantly higher mean numbers of children born alive and higher fertility rates than those from the Midwest. Those from the South show higher fertility than those from the Southwest, although the difference is not statistically significant. These results suggest that the hypothesis may be tentatively accepted as valid but should be tested on larger samples representing all regions and against the backgrounds of both parents.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of the study was to determine the nature and extent of any differences in the fertility of unbroken, completed, native-white, Protestant, Oklahoma farm families in relation to their socioeconomic status, religion, education, territorial mobility, and residential background. Fertility was measured in terms of the number of children born alive and a fertility rate which relates the number of children born alive

²⁴ As used in this study Midwest includes Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio and Missouri; South includes Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, Tennessee and Kentucky; and Southwest includes Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico and Arizona.

to the marital reproductive period. Fertility was found to be inversely related to socio-economic status, as measured by tenure status, relief status, wealth status, and scores on the Farm Family Socioeconomic Status Scale. The inverse relationship was even more marked in the case of the educational level of the family, as reflected by the number of grades completed by the wife. No significant differences were found in the fertility of various Protestant denominations or between church members and non-member families. Migration was significantly related to fertility but not as clearly so as socioeconomic status or education; although the most migratory families were most fertile, the least migratory families were not least fertile. Families in which the husband was born and reared in the South or Southwest were significantly more fertile

than those in which the husband came from the Midwest.

On the basis of these results it may be concluded that differential fertility exists in relation to socioeconomic status, education, migration, and residential background for the sample studied. However it should not be concluded that the higher status groups are "committing racial suicide." Actually no status level failed to reproduce sufficient children to replace itself.²⁵ Finally, it should be remembered that the families under consideration are an older generation and that the differentials which obtain for them do not necessarily hold true for younger generations of parents now in the reproductive stage of their family life cycle.

²⁵ This is usually considered to be 3.0 children per surviving couple. See Lorimer and Osborn, *op. cit.*, 284.

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OFFICIAL REPORTS and PROCEEDINGS



ANNOUNCEMENT FROM THE PRESIDENT

Previous issues of the *Review* have carried announcements of the Society's new committees and the appointment of section chairmen. Several committees have held organization meetings and all are at work. The organization of the program is proceeding as rapidly as can be expected in war time, and the first announcement of the annual program will be carried in the October issue of the *Review*.

Following the decision of the Executive Committee at New York, the Society is looking forward to its next annual meeting in Chicago, Saturday and Sunday, December 2 and 3, 1944. Thomas D. Eliot, of

Northwestern University, is serving as chairman of the committee in charge of local arrangements. This will be the first time the Society has been able to meet outside New York since the Chicago meeting in 1940. The response of the membership to demands upon their time in serving the interest of the Society has been greatly appreciated by the administration. In spite of the demands of war and of extra commitments in government service and elsewhere, there has been a real devotion to the Society's interest.

RUPERT B. VANCE
President of the Society

CURRENT ITEMS



COMMUNICATION

TO THE EDITORS:

I am very grateful for the publication of the communication from A. E. Wood in the June *Review*, as it represents so perfectly the state of mind at which part of my presidential address was directed. My present remarks, therefore, relate solely to certain misstatements of fact in Mr. Wood's letter.

Mr. Wood attributes to me the following statement: "Democracy he [Lundberg] says, is a corrupt 'cultural preference'." I have never made any such statement, either in the paper in question or elsewhere. I did make the obvious statement that the preference for democracy is a "cultural preference." What does Mr. Wood think it is? I did point out that this preference frequently corrupts the scientific validity of our judgments of other preferences that have been and are held by vast populations. As merely another illustration of ethnocentrism,

the point should need no elaboration. In any event, the statement Mr. Wood attributes to me is pure invention on his part.

Anyone interested in my views regarding the place of scientists in a democracy is invited to read pages 4 and 5 of my paper, which, I submit, takes a view precisely opposite to that attributed to me by Mr. Wood. For further reassurance on this point, I refer to my paper "Scientists in Wartime" (*Scientific Monthly*, February 1944, p. 87), in which I insist that the scientist is entitled to no more voice in deciding the ends of human striving than the humblest citizen. I was aware that this would cause considerable objection among academic colleagues, some of whom have demanded to know if I actually believe that the preferences of the fishwife and the farmer should be taken as seriously as the preferences of the holders of honorary and other Harvard degrees. I do so believe. Incidentally, this may also answer

Mr. Wood's query as to what I mean when I say I "usually" share our culture's preference for democracy. The "exceptional cases" are those in which aristocratic political wolves in sheep's clothing hypocritically pose as champions of the democratic way of life. In short, I neither favor nor fear that a thousand sociologists or even 20,000 scientists will "take over" by "forcible and sanguine" processes!

Mr. Wood makes a second misstatement of fact when he alleges that I submitted Stouffer's study of mobility and distance primarily "as a contribution of sociologists to the peace of the world." The following explicit statement occurs at the beginning of the section in which I review this and other research: "Before answering this question, [what sociologists should do] let us review briefly some of the conspicuous achievements of the past ten or fifteen years" (p. 6).

Finally, since it is alleged that "Lundberg shies away from the term values," I respectfully call Mr. Wood's attention to the footnote references (p. 4) to papers in which I have dealt with this subject. If he is interested really to know my views on the matter, he would be shocked and perhaps disappointed to find that I am in full agreement with his statement that "They [values] are sorely gained through human experience of misery and pain." My own statement is as follows:

It is not true therefore that science cannot deal practically with human values. By providing reliable estimates of the near and remote consequences of alternative courses of action, science conditions the choices—the values—of men. Only by subjecting the artist's and the seer's visions to this evaluation can we avoid the frustration and neuroses which are today the result of vain hopes, unfounded beliefs, fantastic aspirations, and the pursuit of mutually exclusive goals.

It will still be the privilege of philosophers, poets, and seers to conjure up their own visions of the good life and to invite others to join them in quest of it. It is gratuitous to assume, however, that there is any such thing as *the* good life for all times, places, and conditions of men. Perhaps only the totalitarian-minded have the conceit necessary to so grandiose a presumption. These aspirations do not spring full-blown from the mind of seer or saint, nor are they deduced by sheer logic from divinely revealed premises. *Visions of the good life spring from man's experience through the ages. Social science is the most effective instrument for determining reliably what that experience has been and what it means in terms of attainable present goals.* Science not only frees, stimulates, and disciplines the imagination of men, but it provides the means of telling us what we most want to know

regarding our visions: Which of our aspirations are achievable and at what cost? Which ones are mutually incompatible? It is the lack of reliable method of answering such questions that results in the confusion which our scholars lament. (*Harper's*, June 1943)

In short, we agree that "values" are merely the experience of the race, *evaluated*. If anyone regards radio commentators as better qualified for the task of evaluation than social scientists, I have no objection to his holding that view. I merely do not share it.

I refrain from comment on the homiletic part of Mr. Wood's communication and his moral censure of my views. The latter have been set forth at considerable length for the past decade, including two books and half a dozen articles since the beginning of the war. Whatever else may be wrong with my views, it is not necessary to "read between the lines" to determine what they are. I am entirely content with the reception which the Sociological Society and the public have accorded them.

GEORGE A. LUNDBERG

Bennington College
June 10, 1944

JAMES FORD
(1885-1944)

Dr. James Ford, Associate Professor of Social Ethics at Harvard University, died at Stockbridge, Massachusetts, on May 12, 1944 at 59 years of age. His untimely death deprives American sociology of its leading scholar in the field of housing problems. His two volume work, *Slums and Housing with Special Reference to New York City; History, Conditions, Policy*, published in 1936 with the collaboration of George N. Thompson and Katherine Morrow (Mrs. James Ford), was an outstanding contribution to the literature of housing.

Doctor Ford was manager of the Homes Registration and Information Division of the United States Housing Corporation in 1918-19, associate director of the President's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership in 1930-33, and had served as a member of the executive committee on hygiene of housing of the American Public Health Association.

He was also executive director of Better Homes in America, an educational organization, when former President Herbert Hoover was its president. Doctor Ford was a director of the International Housing Association, president and trustee of the Prospect Union Educational Exchange and had served as a consultant to the

United States Defense Housing Coordinator. He was editor of *Social Problems and Social Policy*, published in 1923 and co-editor with John M. Gries of the *Report of the President's Conference on Home Building and Ownership*.

With Miss Morrow he wrote *The Abolition of Poverty* and *The Modern House in America*. He was also the author of *Social Deviation*, published in 1939.

He took graduate courses at the Collège Libre des Sciences Sociales in France in 1906-07 and at the University of Berlin in 1907. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard in 1909. In the same year, Doctor Ford joined the Harvard University faculty as an instructor in social ethics. He was promoted to assistant professor in 1913 and to associate professor in 1921.

F. STUART CHAPIN

University of Minnesota

NEWS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS

At the present time at least 127 members of the Society are known to be IN THE ARMED FORCES. In subsequent issues it is hoped to publish more complete lists of servicemen. Meanwhile the reader of this note who has information about any member in the Armed Forces not hitherto listed, will confer a favor by sending this information to Dr. Conrad Taeuber, the Managing Editor, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Washington 25, D.C.

The MEMBERSHIP COMMITTEE has secured 70 new members and 6 membership renewals. Numerous sources for prospective members are being listed and have been tapped. Chief among these are the faculty personnel, graduate students, and sociology majors in the various higher institutions throughout the land. Other institutional sources are being canvassed including teachers' colleges, junior colleges, and libraries. Through such procedures it is hoped that not only will the Society's membership lists materially increase but that the Membership Committee may have on hand lists of personnel and prospective members from these various institutions for future canvassing and checking-up purposes.

ALBION COLLEGE. Melvin J. Williams writes "I have just been called to Wesleyan College, Macon, Georgia, as Professor of Sociology and Economics, I will begin my duties there next fall. . . ."

SKIDMORE COLLEGE. Everett V. Stonequist, Chairman of the Department of Sociology, has accepted the position as Chief of the Research Division of the Office of War Information.

IOWA STATE COLLEGE. Bryce Ryan has joined the staff of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Division of Program Analysis and Development, U.S.D.A.

CLYDE W. HART has been appointed Special Assistant to the Administrator of OPA. He will be in charge of Public Opinion Research.

HARRY ALPERT is now with the Statistical Standards Branch of OPA.

CAPTAIN E. G. MCCURTAIN has been transferred from Mexia, Texas, to Washington, D.C., for duty in the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands, Headquarters, Army Service Forces.

Clarence Glick, on leave from BOSTON UNIVERSITY, has joined the Morale Services Division of the War Department.

At the meeting of the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Sociological Society on May 16, 1944, the following officers were elected: Elbridge Sibley, President; Julian L. Woodward, Vice-President; Harry Alpert, Secretary-Treasurer.

UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER. The Department of Sociology expects an increased enrollment in the coming year. Earl Lomon Koos, who has served as lecturer and assistant professor in the Department while continuing as Director of Social Research for the Rochester Council of Social Agencies, will assume the full-time Chairmanship of the Department in September. He will continue his duties as Assistant Supervisor of Research in the Smith College School for Social Work.

DUKE UNIVERSITY. Professor Charles A. Ellwood, Professor of Sociology in Duke University, after forty-five years of teaching university classes in sociology, retired in June. After receiving his doctor's degree in sociology at the University of Chicago in 1899, he began teaching sociology as an instructor that year in the University of Nebraska. The next year he was called to the newly-created Department of Sociology at the University of Missouri, where he remained for thirty years, but finally accepted a call to organize a Department of Sociology at Duke University in 1930.

Professor Howard E. Jensen, who has been associated with Professor Ellwood at Duke University since 1931, will be chairman of the Department at Duke next year.

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND. Dr. Hertha Kraus, Associate Professor, Graduate Department of Social Economy and Social Research, Bryn Mawr College, has joined the faculty of the UNRRA Training Center, on the campus of the University of Maryland for the summer. This center will be in charge of the In-Service Training Program of UNRRA for the entire field staff and for workers of the voluntary agencies joining UNRRA units with specific assignments.

Effective July first, MICHIGAN STATE COLLEGE will be organized on a university pattern. The present "Divisions" of Liberal Arts and Applied Science will be consolidated into a new "School" of Science and Arts. Within this School there will be a Division of Social Sciences, under a "Director," including Economics, History and Political Science, Psychology and Philosophy, and Sociology.

Below the "schools" and comprising the first two years will be the "Basic College" offering "comprehensive core courses" in which students will be enrolled until the beginning of their junior year. A few electives recommended by the schools may also be taken during these years.

In addition to the Graduate School and the Schools of Science and Arts, Agriculture, Veterinary Medicine, Home Economics and Engineering, there will be established a new School of Business and Public Service, including a Department of Social Service administering an undergraduate curriculum in social work previously included in the Department of Sociology. It is expected that the fifth or graduate year recently suspended will be restored after the war. Dr. Ernest B. Harper, present Head of the Department of Sociology, has been named Head of the new Department of Social Service. Dr. John F. Thaden, of the Department of Sociology, has been promoted to Associate Professor, effective July 1, 1944.

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY has announced the creation of a Research Council to strengthen and promote research throughout the university. A special research fund has been placed at the disposal of the Council.

The development of a well-balanced program is contemplated for the university in business, the social studies, the humanities, and the sciences. The Council consists of nine members, representing various colleges and fields of learning in the university.

Dr. William H. Cole, Professor of Physiology and Biochemistry is Director, and will serve in a staff relationship to deans, department heads, and faculty members concerning research programs, and will represent the university in developing reciprocal arrangements with governmental, industrial, business and professional institutions outside of the university.

Emphasis will be placed upon cooperative research between related departments in the university and between outside organizations and university departments.

The MICHIGAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY is a state-wide organization, composed largely of professional sociologists, which has had a continuing existence since 1937. It holds annual spring and fall meetings, the spring meeting always being held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the Section on Sociology of the Michigan Academy of Arts, Sciences and Letters in Ann Arbor, Michigan. At the spring meeting, held in Ann Arbor on March 17, 1944, resolutions were adopted supporting the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice and favoring nonsegregation as a policy in housing and other treatment of Negroes and other American minority groups of racial character.

CORRECTION

In the April 1944 *Review*, in the obituary of Franz Oppenheimer, there occurs a statement which seems to attribute the editorship of the works of Gumplovicz to Oppenheimer. The parenthetical phrase, p. 202, "whose works he edited" should read "whose works he helped edit." Actually Oppenheimer was co-editor with Gottfried Salomon, editor-in-chief, and others. Space requirements made it necessary to omit from the printed obituary the list of Oppenheimer's publications. The error came about in the course of this condensation.

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BOOK REVIEWS*



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Life in Mill Communities. By WILLIAM HAYS SIMPSON. Clinton, South Carolina: P. C. Press, 1943. Pp. 105. \$3.00.

Both the lay leadership of the Southeast and persons professionally concerned with the general public welfare have long been interested in conditions in the textile mill villages of the region. It is to be regretted that *Life in Mill Communities* makes so little contribution to an

understanding of the current situation.

The book deals with mill communities in South Carolina, a State which provides excellent illustrations of both the better and the poorer types of mill communities. Basic data for 1942 were obtained from questionnaires returned by 82 textile mills and through visits to villages and interviews with representatives of management, workers, and government agencies. In general, however, the results indicate that the research methods followed were elementary. Likewise, the analysis of the data lacks depth and contributes little if anything to the development of the field of investigation. Soci-

* The Editors wish to express their appreciation to the former Book Review Editors, Howard Becker and Thomas C. McCormick, for the list of reviews appearing in this issue.

ologists have made much progress during the past two decades in the techniques of individual community studies, on the one hand, and of cross-sectional analyses of specific groups, on the other. The author apparently made little use of the methodologies developed.

The book includes chapters on the historical development of the textile industry in South Carolina, the mill village, religion, education, health, community life, cost of living, credit, and income. In general the picture presented is a highly optimistic one.

The outstanding feature of the book is the photographs. These are well selected to show the best situations in mill villages.

The mill communities of South Carolina deserve a fuller treatment in which those that are outstanding may receive adequate recognition and those that reflect the housing standards and social attitudes of a bygone day may also be adequately portrayed. The people of these communities richly merit a more understanding treatment of their lives than Simpson has given.

ELLEN WINSTON

Meredith College

The Urban Impact on American Protestantism: 1865-1900. By AARON I. ABELL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943. Pp. 275.

In this revised doctoral dissertation, the author reviews the religious and social effects of urbanization on American Protestantism. The vast amount of data uncovered by his research should be useful to students of the sociology of religion.

Urban Protestantism has failed to meet the needs of the working class. In the thirty-five year period covered by the study, the problem was aggravated by the heavy influx of immigrants to our cities. To contempt for the poor was added contempt for the stranger within the gates. The result was a progressive alienation of the laboring group, who hoped to find in the rising labor movement or in Socialism the way out. Protestant exclusiveness stands in sharp contrast to the attitude of the urban Catholic Church. The Catholics emphasized their ministry to the poor, and to this "sympathy for struggling humanity" was added a vigorous Americanization program.

The more enlightened Protestants recognized the dilemma of the church. Significant in the process of this awakening were the roles played by the social settlement and the "institutional" church, the latter organized in an attempt to

"cover the entire life of man." Religious leaders like Washington Gladden and Graham Taylor acknowledged the need for socializing Christianity. Smarting under devastating criticism for their failure to provide adequate leadership for the critical times, the seminaries reorganized their work. Peabody at Harvard and Taylor at Hartford introduced courses in sociology to acquaint students with the problems they would face in city pastorates. But in spite of sincere attempts in these directions, the Protestant Church failed to enlist the loyalty of the "common man." The author feels that "a more extensive social service, a keener sense of responsibility for the removal of industrial evils, and spiritual use of the agencies of social Christianity" are the keys to the solution of the problem. To this the reviewer would add that a growing awareness of the church's problem among the rank and file, an awareness not confined to the professional leadership, is the real answer!

MYLES W. RODEHAVER

University of Wisconsin

American Political Parties: Their Natural History. By WILFRED E. BINKLEY. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1943. Pp. xi + 407 + xii. \$3.75.

This lively volume is a study of the growth of group politics in the United States, especially of the major parties. Instead of a barren narrative of party organizations and presidential elections, we have here an effective analysis of the growth of group political opinion and the emergence of organization and leaders, presented in the context of contemporary issues and opinions in which the parties maneuvered and developed. Although the book is not a definitive history of American political parties, it fills a real gap in the literature of the field. Despite the publisher's claim, there are no revolutionary interpretations in a welcome addition to reference lists in courses on American government and American group opinion. It is to be hoped that the book will have a wide public reading as well, especially by the politicians.

Binkley traces the growth of American political parties as opinion groups and electoral machines from the 1790's to the present. It is demonstrated that the Federalists may be properly regarded as a political party in the real sense rather than a mere faction, and that the opposition party under Jefferson likewise qualifies for such treatment. The shift from national

to sectional political leadership and the emergence of sectional and economic interest groupings in the major parties are skillfully traced. The break-up of the national party alignments, especially after 1844, and the formation of sectional parties is given fresh interpretation. The break-up of the national parties as a factor in the coming of civil conflict is demonstrated. The period of transition to the post-Civil War national machines is thinly but adequately described. Republican dominance during the period from the Civil War to the Great Depression is explained as well as the emergence of the Democratic party to prolonged control since 1932. The book is not comprehensive but there is a skillful interweaving of fact and interpretation which makes for good reading. The footnotes and bibliography indicate thorough preparation. There is an adequate index but there are no illustrations. It is recommended to sociologists.

LYFORD P. EDWARDS

Bard College,
Columbia University

The Wake of the Prairie Schooner. By IRENE D. PADEN. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1943. Pp. xix + 514. \$3.00.

The value of this work for the sociologist lies in the fact that it supplies another of the many minutiae which must be secured in order to discover the nature of the social processes that built the American society of today. It is also an important document bearing on the facts behind the legends and counter-legends of the "romance" of the Oregon Trail and the "Forty-niners." The book is a history, of course, and the historians will have their own evaluations of it. It is one of several recent works written not by members of the guild but by leisurely amateurs who have the time and resources to become participant observers in the past, as it were, and to explore into details which might have to be neglected by writers of Ph.D. theses in history. The result may not be orthodox history, but it is a genuine social document. It is the geography and social history of the Oregon Trail and the Road to California traveled for forty years, more or less, by the emigrants to the West.

Mrs. Paden, her husband, and her son apparently have come as near as possible to traversing the several original routes and exploring the most significant sites as they exist today, carrying with them a collection of maps and contemporary accounts which enabled them

to reconstruct on the spot the experiences of the emigrants on the road. All this, together with a running account of their own experiences, Mrs. Paden has put into this book. Next to the meticulous care with which the research itself was done, perhaps the most noteworthy accomplishment of the writer was that of getting it all down in words which, without any literary pretentiousness, enable the reader to experience for himself a vivid perception of the experiences of the travelers. There are plenty of excerpts from the original documents, of course, but Mrs. Paden has managed to weave these in with her own paraphrasings and interpretations in such a way that the transition from one to the other is quite painless.

Among the most successful of the writer's descriptions of the various sites and segments of the journey are the fording of the South Platte (pp. 108-113), the route paralleling the Humboldt (Ch. 27), and the race across the waterless Carson Sink (Ch. 28). The impression one gets of the general character of the journey is that those emigrants who were lucky made it successfully although uncomfortably, while the unlucky ones experienced danger, disease, and death. The best of preparations could not always counteract the operation of the many chance factors on the trail—the attitude of the Indians, the weather, the undependable supply of grass for the animals, cholera and other diseases, and accidents to vehicles, animals, and persons.

Only a few small points of criticism need be mentioned. The generally satisfactory nature of the author's treatment of the Indians is marred here and there, as on page 281, where she refers to "the fundamental inability of the Indians to keep things shipshape (due, perhaps, to racial nomadic habits)," and a further dubious judgment in the same paragraph concerning the alleged failure of the Indians to profit from agricultural instruction, letting their farms go to ruin.

In another connection, the reviewer would like to know why Mrs. Paden, who seemed to mention everything about this migration, elected to omit mention of the "Old Spanish Trail" route south from Salt Lake City through the chain of Mormon settlements in Utah and then westward toward central and southern California. Some travelers considered this route easier than the Humboldt (depending partly upon their destination, of course) and many traversed it; it passed near a site called Moun-

tain Meadows, and no student of the emigrant trails can fail to know about the Massacre of 1857 there.

Then there is the comment about the Humboldt River on page 390: "Even its course seems contrary to nature, very few rivers in the world flowing westward parallel to the equator." Inasmuch as Mrs. Paden's own excellent maps do not show this course for the Humboldt and, in any case, because several rivers more important than the Humboldt do flow principally westward, it seems that she could have omitted this comment from her demonstration of the exotic nature of the Humboldt country.

But if the work be considered as a totality, these criticisms become quibbles; the book is a good one.

J. E. HULETT, JR.

University of Illinois

The American Woman. By ERNEST R. GROVES.

New York: Emerson Books, Inc., 1944. Pp. 465. \$3.50.

The student of "the social forces" of American social history, or of the history of the American family, will highly appreciate Groves' up-to-the-minute revision and enlargement of his treatise of two years ago. The book embodies the results of painstaking and comprehensive research, and amounts to an almost encyclopedic record of the process by which woman in this country has come as close as she has to equality with man.

The book will not kindle such enthusiasms as rose from Charlotte Perkins Gilman's efforts of a generation ago, nor will it be hailed as a literary masterpiece in the class of Mary Beard's "On Understanding Women." It is, nevertheless, a work of sustained excellence, easy to read if not specifically entertaining.

Particularly interesting is the opening chapter, on "The Cultural Background . . ." reaching back to primitive Christianity, in the treatment of which the author is analytical and calmly judicious. Throughout the book, indeed, the author is dispassionate, with no intention save the setting forth of instructive and practical truth. He has no special cause to promote save such enlightenment as will further the progress of society.

If there is any fault in the account it consists in a perhaps somewhat overcharitable view of certain aspects of the development, as for instance the disavowing of any general conspiracy

on the part of the male sex to keep woman in her place. Doubtless the institutionalizing of male self-satisfaction was itself one of the mores to which Groves rightly enough attributes "the retardation of women in those cases where there clearly is discrimination." It is going pretty far, also, to hold that Taft's views on woman suffrage were "utterly free from ulterior motives." One seems to detect, too, an undue tenderness for the South and for the Southern tradition, unnecessary in face of the fact that Southerners can unflinchingly face the worst in the history of the Southern family.

Such seeming shortcomings are, however, outweighed by the general excellence of the work, which merits wide use in the colleges and among general readers.

ARTHUR W. CALHOUN

Sterling College

Psychosomatic Medicine: The Clinical Application of Psychopathology to General Medical Problems. By EDWARD WEISS and O. SPURGEON ENGLISH. Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1943. Pp. xxiii + 687. \$8.00.

This is a systematic and careful treatise in a field which I believe will revolutionize medicine in the next hundred years or less. The founding of *Psychosomatic Medicine* in 1939 may well become a landmark in this development. This book should give the movement additional impetus.

The authors have been associated for many years in the teaching of clinical medicine (Weiss) and psychiatry (English) at Temple University. It is written primarily for physicians and especially for those who are convinced there always must be some "hidden" physiological "cause" for all illnesses for which they cannot find sufficient tissue pathology to justify their diagnoses. The authors cite 325 cases of "chronic nervous exhaustion" which were examined six years later to see if "hidden" causes were developed. None were found in 94% of the cases; the patients were still ill; 200 of them had endured 289 operations. Although the authors do not suggest it, many of these operations were doubtless performed on "pathological curiosities" which the authors do say is frequently the reason for polysurgery. The operation is usually good although the diagnosis is certainly bad. Polysurgery due to defective diagnosis is something "modern" medicine will have to live down along with "shotgun" prescriptions, the sculduggery of placebo druggery, and the

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conviction that neurotic and psychotic transfer symptoms are not "real" pathologies. The belief that a man cannot have a pain or a malfunctioning organ without tissue pathology will have to go into the discard along with the pantherapy of medieval bleeding.

The two introductory chapters ("Psychosomatic Medicine" and "Personality Development and Psychopathology") do not add much to what well-trained psychologists and sociologists already know, but all teachers should read these chapters or their equivalents every year or so anyway. The same is true of chapters 21 and 22 on "normal" (minor) and "special" (major) psychotherapy; the wisdom and clarity of these chapters make them admirable indeed. Chapter 21 should be put into the hands (or minds) of all parents.

The meat of the book (some of it not too easy chewing for a nonmedical man) is found in the chapters dealing with the psychopathology and therapy of the cardiovascular (3), gastrointestinal (3), endocrine (3), genito-urinary (2), respiratory (2), and central nervous systems. Special senses: eye, ear, skin; special topics: allergy, dentistry, arthritis; and military medicine are also discussed. There is an excellent chapter on "General Principles of Psychotherapy" which includes a good discussion and outlines of psychosomatic history taking. The final chapter deals with training in psychosomatic medicine.

While Freud is given due credit, there is little in the book which could be called "orthodox Freudianism." A lot of careful research must be done before the authors' "organ language" theory or dream symbol analysis can be regarded as very scientific. That apparent cures are achieved by these techniques is no more convincing than the "placebo cures" and "neutral oil injection cures" which they rightly condemn. We need to know more about symptoms which may develop after the "cures," however they are attained. It is my belief that a large part of apparently successful psychotherapy is merely a case of chasing the devil around a stump. However, there is good reason to cheer, even though the psychopathic ailment has not been cured, if the psychosomatic illness is transferred to some less painful or vital locus, or expresses itself in socially tolerated or approved behavior; much such behavior is obviously neurotic or psychotic but nonetheless may be socially useful and satisfying to the person. In such cases, the benign therapy of time may eventually effect a *real* cure—except for "psyche scar-tissue," which perhaps is the basis for much

of what we call "interesting individuality." In this connection, I always remember a friend of mine whose tic I "cured." He immediately developed another. I "cured" it and another developed, and so on, until he finally developed one which almost caused him to drive the two of us over a cliff into the Pacific Ocean. Then I "laid off" and he soon reverted to his harmless and comfortable eye-batting and neck-stretching.

Our authors recognize this danger when they say ". . . sometimes . . . the illness must be allowed to continue—that under certain circumstances, it is the best answer to a life problem" (page 641). If this is true of psychosomatic illness, it is still truer of certain personality traits which are obviously neurotic or psychotic but which do not prevent the person from doing useful work and being as happy and well-adjusted as most of us are. Mental hygienists, parents, teachers, employers, psychiatrists, and especially psychoanalysts, should note this. Fortunately, most neurotic and psychotic behavior is relatively mild and harmless; the person is able to live with it, and sometimes by means of it, as well as he can with a filled tooth or a wooden leg.

This is a book that can be profitably read more than once and consulted often. It will have to be revised thoroughly very soon if this new and promising field of medicine develops as rapidly as seems likely. For example, the authors seem quite unaware of the sociocultural revision of psychoanalysis now in full swing. They will soon need to take account of culture both in the etiology and therapy of psychopathic illness whether the symptoms are somatic or social maladjustment. They should have consulted with their colleague, James W. Woodard, while they were preparing their book.

READ BAIN

Miami University

The Structure of Morale. By J. T. MACCURDY.
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1943. Pp. vii
+ 224. \$2.

This is a much maturer and a more dependable book than the author's earlier work on the psychology of war. Its slant is, however, that of clinical and general observation rather than of experimental analysis. Much of the content would not lend itself to quantitative procedures and none are attempted. The logical analyses are usually well done. The author has apparently divested himself of some immature psychoanalytic biases but has retained his acceptance

of the validity of Trotter's characterization of British and German mentalities.

Morale, it seems arises out of the control of fear, and the mastery of fear and the establishment of morale is a process of conditioning soldiers and citizens to respond to activating stimuli that do not produce fear. This behavioristic orientation, while not new, does credit to the author. Most of the book is devoted to (1) detailing the manipulation of those stimuli which produce individual courageous responses in the face of danger, and (2) presenting those types of social organization which set desirable stimuli-producing situations. This latter discussion is presented largely negatively, with very good analyses of the evils of dictatorship and the weaknesses of democracy; difficulties in the way of effective military organization (such as the lack of a proper liaison service and an excess of paper work in large commands); and the intrusion of departmentalism and careerism in hierarchical organizations, such as the military and bureaucratic civil administrations. The discussion of leadership appears to the reviewer to be the least adequate part of the book. The author believes that the best leadership derives from an aristocratic educational system, such as the British. But he fails to explain on this basis the pauperism of British leadership and the superlative qualities of Russian leadership in the Second World War and before. One might have wished that he had attempted to diagnose the dispiriting failures of our political leadership, which appears to have had two contrasting origins in Groton School and the Tennessee mountains. There is a good brief chapter on the conflict between leadership programs arising out of technology and authoritarianism.

The book as a whole is loosely organized and somewhat scattered, but it contains much of value for the persistent reader.

L. L. BERNARD

Washington University

A Professor at Large. By STEPHEN DUGGAN. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1943. Pp. 468 + xviii. \$3.50

This important book offers far more than the memoirs of one of the most widely travelled scholars and educational statesman of contemporary America. Dr. Duggan's personality and work are identified with a portentous period in American history. During this period the United States emerged as a world power not only in the political and economic but also in

the cultural realm. This accession to power made necessary a re-education of the American people in their relations to other nations, a process which is by no means completed. It is one of the many merits of the volume under review that it gives an intimate account of the creation of such organizations as the Institute of International Education, the Council of Foreign Relations, the Foreign Policy Association, the World Peace Foundation, the Williams-town Institute of Politics and the Institute of Pacific Relations, in the foundation and development of all which Duggan had a prominent part.

The bulk of the book is devoted to an account of the author's travels in Europe, the Far East, and in Latin America. Duggan visited these foreign parts not only as a scholar bent on research but as a pioneer of American thought and cultural interpenetration. In giving his analysis of their social and political institutions and of their educational efforts he reveals himself as a shrewd and penetrating observer who is not afraid of speaking his mind. The book abounds with pithy remarks such as: "The Japanese have one characteristic in common with their allies, the Germans, namely, an inability to understand the psychology of other peoples" (p. 238). His chapter on Hawaii and the Philippines, where he served as Vice-Chairman of the Philippine Educational Commission, offers one of the best accounts available on the part of American educators in the intellectual and political emancipation of the Philippines. Equally enlightening are his observations on Latin-America and his exposition of the good neighbor policy operating in the cultural field.

There are passages on persons and events in this volume which are open to controversy, but they in no way detract from its value as a guide in international and cultural relations. It is an optimistic book by a great liberal and citizen of the world, which does not accept defeat even in the hour of darkest crisis, as witnessed in one of its conclusions: "The prophecies of Spengler and Keyserling as to the downfall of Western civilization probably apply nowhere, not even to Europe; they certainly do not apply to the Western hemisphere" (p. 373). Speaking of the forty millions of immigrants who have come to the United States since 1789 the author says: "We held and they learned from us that the essential meaning of life is to be found in the ideas that unite men, and not in those which divide them" (p. 447). To promote these ideas "that unite men" through-

out the world is the essential task of American cultural policies abroad.

WALTER M. KOTSCHNIG

Smith College

The Uses of Reason. By ARTHUR E. MURPHY. New York: Macmillan, 1943. Pp. vii + 346. \$3.00.

The purpose of this book is to show that reason is the best available basis of man's activities in every sphere of life. It is claimed to be the best method for getting reliable knowledge (Part I), the best instrument with which to obtain and defend moral judgments ("practical reason"—Part II), the best guide in determining social policies (Part III), and the best means of making decisions concerning ultimate commitments (Part IV).

Yet this plea for reason seems more vigorous in its negative than in its positive aspects—the defeat of counterclaims is more convincing than is the solution of problems inherent in the claim itself. The chief counterclaims disposed of in Part I are those made by Eddington and by certain semanticists (especially Hayakawa and Stuart Chase); in Part II, those made by P. W. Bridgman and Westermarck; in Part III, by Spykman, Pareto, Burnham, *Propaganda Analysis*, and Spengler; in Part IV, by Drucker and Sorokin.

In contrast to these effective disposals, Murphy appears to come close to destroying the significance of his positive claim in the following passage:

The acceptance of reason, as we have come to understand it in its operation is a commitment, and it is only by use of the standard it supplies that the worth of the goods it promises can be made out. In a sense, therefore, the defense of reason here offered is circular. We have chosen reason rationally, and it is by means of a distinction, reasonably established, between what is reasonable and what is arbitrary, that the rightness of our final choice is established (p. 339).

In other words, all this seems to say is that if we are rational (or reasonable; the terms are not distinguished) we know what we get for it, and we also know what we should be in for if we were not. This might be stated less trivially, and I think Murphy does himself and his book injustice by the summary statement quoted, for some implications of his work are far from trivial. In his discussion of moral judgments, for instance, he advocates Max Weber's "ethics

of responsibility" (without mentioning Weber or this particular term), and to do this constitutes a moral decision which cannot be reduced to, or derived from, the kind of circular reasoning cited above. Some other comparable passages could be named.

Yet the fundamental weakness of the book, I think, is Murphy's failure to define "reason." Its meaning differs with the context, but this is all we learn. Thus, the definition of practical reason as

the use of reason in the organization of desires and the adjustment of claims in the pursuit of goods judged to be desirable by methods held to be just and proper to that end (p. 104).

only tells us that practical reason differs from reason as employed in obtaining reliable information. The failure to define the nuclear concept of the whole book seems inexplicable unless the author assumes that everybody knows what reason is. However, in view of the attacks upon reason, some of which Murphy himself has analyzed, this is a very doubtful assumption. The need for a definition might have become particularly pressing to him if he had considered, in connection with his discussion of "sociological relativity" (pp. 154-158), some studies in the field of the sociology of knowledge, and especially the problem of the relation between the fact that "the content of social ideals [is] . . . derived from the traditions and preconceptions of the communities in which they are developed" (p. 195), on one hand, and, on the other, the fact that reason has that quality which Murphy seems to believe to be identical, however varying in its applicability according to contexts. This crucial problem, however, he does not mention, and much less solve. If everybody is or ought to be rational, how does Murphy propose to explain differences in thought and morals as between the Kwakiutl or the Iatmül—or between the Chinese, the Russians, the British—and ourselves? However vigorous he is in his insistence upon contextual analysis (pp. 296-298), he does not consider the contexts of history and culture, evidently assuming the contexts of science, morals, social life, and ultimate reality are all-determining and have been and are the same everywhere.

This is written as a constructive criticism, as an attempt, that is, at raising objections whose disposal will eventually contribute to the establishment of a sounder theory of rationalism. To

be sure, probably most people, and especially most sociologists, would agree that

To be as accurate, as discerning, and as adequate in [the use of our basic acceptances and commitments] . . . is . . . to be rational (p. 293),

but I do not see that there is anything "self-evident" about it—on the contrary, it calls for an analysis of the historical and cultural and social preconditions of its emergence. Professor Murphy has not made such an analysis.

KURT H. WOLFF

Chicago

Man and His Works. By EDWARD LEE THORNDIKE. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943. Pp. 211. \$2.50.

This little book can best be characterized as a summary of one man's work written by that man. The topics covered are those that Thorndike has at one time or another during his long service as an educational psychologist dwelt upon at length elsewhere, and they are here taken up in much the same order as he took them up over the years. Thus the opening chapter, "The Original Nature of Man: The Genes of the Mind," is a synopsis of the thesis that he presented in his book *The Original Nature of Man* in 1913; and the closing chapters on "The Psychology of Welfare" brief the findings and views that were reported in *Your City* in 1939. In the pages and years in between, the author discusses the learning process, describes the fact of human relations, presents his well-known theories regarding language and its origin, and discusses government, law, and punishment.

The title *Man and His Works* is highly misleading. Thorndike makes no pretensions to covering man and his works. By implication he says simply, "Here are some subjects that have interested me, and here is what I have found and concluded about them." The tone throughout is much more moderate than that we have come to expect from Thorndike; he presents his moderately environmental position as just that, not as a dogma. As he here describes them, even his speculations concerning the origin of language take on the character of an amusing intellectual game in which the reader may join if he wishes. Written for presentation as the William James Lectures at Harvard, the essays that comprise this book make delightful reading. They demonstrate that the study of language need not destroy the ability to use language adroitly. They also suggest that the simply and modestly written is likely to be

more convincing than the cumbersome and dogmatic. This reviewer, at least, is much more impressed by Thorndike's work than he was before he read *Man and His Works*.

RICHARD T. LAPIERRE

Stanford University

Man: Real and Ideal; Observations and Reflections on Man's Nature, Development and Destiny. By EDWIN GRANT CONKLIN. New York; Charles Scribner's Sons. Price \$2.50.

Primarily a biological and philosophical discussion of the nature and destiny of man, this book is written in the clear, accurate and inspiring style we have come to expect of Conklin. It differs from the several recently published books dealing with man in his biological and social setting in that, although recognizing fully that subjective attributes cannot nullify objective facts, it stresses more assiduously the reality of consciousness, freedom, and purpose.

While probably unacceptable to those who insist on the literalness of the mythological beliefs passed down to us by inherited tradition, it will be welcomed by those who are willing to face truth. The author himself pronounces the book "a summary of personal conclusions reached through many years of observation and reflection." To those of us familiar for years with Conklin's outstanding intellectual honesty, this can mean only a book well worth careful contemplation.

After reviewing man from his original crude beginnings, he advances cogent reasons for his belief that progress in reason, ethics and knowledge will continue. He devotes the latter third of the volume to the real and the ideal in moral and religious realms. He is convinced that some form of religion is a human necessity and discusses the kind of religion science leaves to man. While rejecting undemonstrable beliefs he subscribes to the teachings of Christianity when rationally interpreted. His faith, however, is in a glorious future for the human race rather than in the perpetuation and exaltation of the individual.

M. F. GUYER

University of Wisconsin.

Man's Unknown Ancestors: The Story of Prehistoric Man. By RAYMOND W. MURRAY. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1943. Pp. xiv + 384 + 36 plates. \$3.50.

The author has assembled much of the latest information on the known aspects (title notwithstanding) of man's prehistoric past. The major

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subjects are orthodox: the evolution of man himself, the train of cultural development in Europe through the Stone Ages up to the Iron Age, and the prehistory of the Americas. The book winds up with a discussion of the bearing of this science on religion, which may seem unnecessary, but which is interesting as presenting the matter from a sophisticated Catholic viewpoint, something with which Protestants and Catholics alike might do well to become more familiar.

The book is for general reading, and the writer has conscientiously covered his subject. He quotes opinions on every side a little uncritically, which might make it difficult for students to follow the thread or to get a clear idea of prevailing doctrines. Furthermore, probably following his own interests, he devotes twice as much space to the prehistory of the New World as to that of the Old, a somewhat singular proportion for a history of human development. In any case, he has given his readers plenty to go on, and the book is well illustrated.

W. W. HOWELLS

Washington, D.C.

Magic and Science in Western Yunnan. By FRANCIS L. K. HSU. *Social Change in Southwest China—Case Study 3.* New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943. Pp. vii+53. 50¢.

Though unassuming in format, this little monograph is an important contribution to social science. Works such as this and Fei's *Peasant Life in China*, by Chinese scientists dealing with their own culture, represent a level of achievement which can well serve as a model for our studies of the United States.

Hsu describes the relations between Western medicine and traditional religion and magic during a month-long cholera epidemic in a Chinese village not far from the Burma Road. Because the author shows imagination in the kinds of data he gathered, and uses those data to test a whole series of hypotheses, this monograph is of general interest, though it will particularly appeal to students interested in the relations between science and magic, in culture change, and in acculturation. Unfortunately, space does not permit the consideration of more than a few topics which are covered in the work.

Hsu is the only field investigator I know of who actually applies the theorist's contention that how one understands a natural or social phenomenon to some extent depends upon his

social roles. A few ethnographers have touched on the problem. Kluckhohn has discussed differences depending upon sex among the Navaho; Rattray on the Ashanti, and Walker on the Teton Dakota, have reported the subtle theologies of some shamans and have hinted at the different ideas of the laymen. Hsu, however, takes the prayer meetings held to stop the cholera epidemic, and shows the different conceptions of the ritual which are held by people in various roles (pp. 15-19). He summarizes his generalizations as follows:

. . . (1) medicine and practices based upon sound knowledge are usually mixed up with and not distinguishable from magical doings and ideas; (2) in case of illness the rustic folk will try various traditional cures one after another, rather indiscriminately, while the communal organizations take care of illnesses which affect the entire group in very much the same manner (i.e. depending upon multiple powers); and (3) even if modern measures are accepted to some extent the principles underlying such measures are either ignored by or incomprehensible to the common folk (p. 39).

The following comments may be made: This first statement represents Hsu's opposition to the hypothesis "that magic fills the gaps of science, i.e., magical practices occur at places where scientific knowledge is weakest" (p. 2). He attributes this to Malinowski, though it has been common since Ferguson and Hume, and argues that

. . . certain measures, though carried out for the benefit of the gods or spirits obviously also produce other results than the expected ones. And these results, from the scientific point of view, may either be good or bad or indifferent. The taboos on food, for example, are for two ostensible reasons: to avoid displeasure of the gods (taboo on meat and fish) and to avoid "making the abdomen cold" (taboo on vegetables and fruit). The unexpected result of these taboos comes by virtue of two reasons: First, fruits are usually eaten without washing and peeling, while vegetables are often washed in the streams and then eaten raw or not sufficiently cooked. By abstaining from most vegetables and all fruits the unsuspected result of sanitation is thus obvious. The taboo on fish and meat may produce a similar unsuspected result or may be entirely irrelevant to the epidemic (p. 33).

In this manner magic, far from necessarily occurring at places where real knowledge is lacking, may indeed exist, flourish and operate side by side with sound scientific knowledge, for attaining the same general aims (p. 34).

To call this a refutation of "Malinowski's hypothesis" seems to me to be a *non-sequitur*. In my estimation, a scientific explanation of a

phenomenon is one which interprets it in terms of the effects of matter (including its properties). Religion and magic explain it as the effect of the immaterial force usually called mana, and often in addition, by the acts of spirits or gods which are the personification of mana. There is thus a difference between the postulates of each type of explanation; Hsu may mean the same thing when he says that

. . . the question of scientific medicine and magic is primarily a matter of attitude. Assuming one attitude, the individual will follow one type of life; assuming another, his life will be a different one (p. 48).

If Hsu would grant my analysis then whether or not a custom happens to have scientific validity to someone in other culture is irrelevant. What is crucial in determining whether a custom is science or magic, in his words, depends upon the "attitude" involved in the performance. Now he shows that

the epidemic is represented as a . . . sort of punishment from the gods for unsatisfactory conduct . . . prayer meetings, the taboos and other doings . . . [are then engaged in] for the purpose of pleasing the gods (p. 37).

Therefore the "attitude" involved is that of magic alone, and he has not disproved the proposition he is opposing.

It is true that prayers and magic are often used along with scientific practices when the phenomenon involved has high social value and the outcome is uncertain if science alone is used. "Trust in God, and keep your powder dry." However, this type of data supports the proposition Hsu is trying to disprove; it is the use of supernaturalism to supplement naturalism where the latter breaks down.

Hsu gives interesting examples to illustrate the second statement to the effect that if a culture is inadequate for the satisfactory adjustment of a society, that society will use all known methods, and will even be receptive to new ways of acting. Like other investigators, he found that if the customary procedures alone do not solve the problem situation—in this case cholera—the villagers will even try "scientific medicine." He gives a good analysis of the social conditions which determine who gives "scientific medicine" a trial, and to what extent (pp. 27-29).

The third statement agrees with the generally accepted proposition that if a custom is accepted by a society, it must already be more or less in harmony with the rest of the culture,

or be modified to fit into that culture. Students of acculturation have long known that this applies to all aspects of culture, including science which is often modified (and from our point of view scandalously distorted) to conform to the rest of the culture in which it is being adopted. Hsu gives examples of this fact, which he uses to make another attack on the "Malinowski proposition" already referred to:

. . . if the conclusion that magic fills the gaps of science can unconditionally stand as it is, then when a scientific procedure which is known to be effective in the larger world can solve a medical problem which in a local community has usually been solved by magical means, the new procedure will automatically replace the traditional practice. But this prediction is not realized in fact [in the village Hsu investigated] (p. 2).

I would refuse to accept the crucial premise involved in his argument. Though "scientific medicine" is science to us, Hsu himself shows that it either remains completely alien to the Chinese villager, or is so transformed in the acculturation process that it becomes another supernatural technique. In either case, to the villager it is not "a scientific procedure which is known to be effective."

I have given so much space to what seem to me to be flaws in Hsu's argument (due, I feel, to his urban ethnocentrism when viewing a rural culture), not because the value of his work stands or falls on this point, but because Hsu seems to feel that his most important contribution is his refutation of "Malinowski's hypothesis." In spite of my criticism on this head, the work is valuable.

J. S. SLOTKIN

University of Wisconsin

Nusantara: A History of the East Indian Archipelago. By BERNARD H. M. VLEKKE. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1943. Pp. xv + 439. \$5.

Vlekke is a Netherlander whose *Nusantara* is the most useful historical survey of the Netherland East Indies in the English language. It includes good bibliographical notes.

The first ninety pages, on pre-Dutch history, constitute a brief compendium, for the writer does not pretend to be a specialist in the field. One important correction may be made here: On page 3 he accepts von Koenigswald's 1935 statement that the earliest Hominid found in Java is Middle Pleistocene; since then De Terra has shown that Modjokerto is Lower Pleistocene.

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The bulk of the book deals with the East Indies from the period of Dutch contact. There is little on the history of East Indian society and culture during that period. It is rather preoccupied with the relations between the Dutch (and the British during the Raffles period) administration and the East Indians. These are described from the point of view (and biases) of the colonial administrator. This is particularly evident in the author's treatment of the native radical movements from World War I on. The last chapter deals with the East Indies in the present war through the first part of 1942.

J. S. SLOTKIN

University of Wisconsin

The Daily Press. By WILSON HARRIS. Cambridge: The University Press, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1943. Pp. x + 146. \$1.25.

This is a remarkable little book. In 142 small pages, the author, editor, of the famous old weekly, *The Spectator*, has contrived to cover virtually every aspect of the British Press: an adequate history; a pithy description of the daily dynamics of a newspaper office; a worldly-wise discussion of the subtle matter of control; and some interesting and imaginative speculations on newspapers after the war.

The famous PEP (Political and Economic Planning) *Report on the British Press* was published in 1938. This little book came out in the summer of 1943 and is so comprehensive and informative that it can serve as a diminutive revised edition of the *Report*. PEP's conclusions were written before Britain went to war; Mr. Harris always takes the exigencies of war into account and his concluding chapter, "The Future," consists of reflections on such questions as whether, after the war, free insurance will be revived as a bid for circulation; if the space-consuming feature pages will all come back; whether an Anglo-American daily will be published simultaneously in New York and London—a proposition which is, after all, less staggering than Northcliffe's founding of the *Paris Daily Mail* or Bennett's establishment of the *Paris Herald*, decades before transoceanic planes and telephones.

Mr. Harris has no answer to a question of his own raising: How is it, now that there are no great editors like Delane of the *Times* and C. P. Scott of the *Manchester Guardian*, that Britain has no columnists? No single journalist in the British Isles, he declares, has the popular

reputation and vogue of Walter Lippmann and Dorothy Thompson. A partial answer—one that might explain Dorothy Thompson and Walter Winchell—might be found in the fact that British journalists are not radio commentators. Many of our characteristic differences may be due to the fact that, as he says, there is no non-reading class in Britain.

One is struck with the author's reflection that after the war a number of large dailies may turn themselves into trusts to perpetuate their character and policy in the face of possible changes in ownership. He recalls that since 1924 the national character of the *Times*, so shockingly violated in British eyes by the Northcliffe interlude, has been protected by the creating of a holding company in which no shares may change hands without the approval of the Lord Chief Justice, the Warden of All Soul's College, the President of the Royal Society, the President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants, and the Governor of the Bank of England. One finds it hard to believe this would happen anywhere else but in the *Times* and Gilbert & Sullivan.

HELEN MACGILL HUGHES

Chicago

Radio Networks and the Federal Government. By THOMAS P. ROBINSON. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943. Pp. x + 278. \$3.50.

Radio, unlike other media of mass communication, has certain unique physical features which bear directly on its operation and control. These features influence not only the mechanical development of the industry but also the matter of local and chain operation of stations. Today all standard broadcast stations are "squeezed" into a relatively narrow segment of the radio spectrum. The demands on this range of frequencies are very great and obviously how place and time on the "radio band" is allotted and controlled becomes important to owners, operators, and consumers alike. One of the most evident problems is the overlapping or interference of local stations, and the relations of local stations, in turn, to more powerful sending stations nearby. Add to this the impress of network or chain broadcasting on the whole system and the difficulty becomes even more serious. It is here that some sort of governmental control enters the picture, not only in terms of supervision of the content of public communication—as in the laws against obscenity and disloyalty—but with re-

spect to the operation of the medium itself.

During the past fifteen years—especially since the Federal Communications Commission was set up in 1934—the topic of regulation has become vital, and the present book is an attempt to describe and interpret the struggle between local and the network stations as these, in turn, are affected on the one hand by commercial advertising, and on the other by federal controls. The major data are drawn from the experience of the National Broadcasting Company, but the findings have general application to the problem of network controls of broadcasting in the United States.

The author presents a useful array of facts about the place of commercial advertising in radio, the development of chain broadcasting, and the public reception of the same. He treats intelligently the conflict between local stations, representing local investment and local community interests, and the powerful national chains. He also describes in some detail the struggle between the federal commission and the chains, especially the National Broadcasting Company. He fully recognizes that under present physical limitations some sort of regulation, preferably through both local and chain licensing, is indicated. Moreover, he believes that private ownership and management not governmental ownership and management are conducive to both free enterprise and political democracy. Yet he sees a place for non-commercial radio and expresses a pious wish that rich philanthropists may see in radio an outlet for their good deeds.

The book is written in a vigorous style. It shows the emergence of a new medium of mass communication and the struggle regarding the form of social control under which it shall operate. It is another important addition to the growing library of books on this new institution of modern society.

KIMBALL YOUNG

Queens College

Meet Mr. Blank, the Leader of Tomorrow's Germans. By R. G. COUNTESS WALDECK. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1943. Pp. 179. \$2.50.

The Hidden Enemy—The German Threat to Post-War Peace. By HEINZ POL. New York: Julian Messner Inc., 1943. Pp. 281. \$3.00.

Here are two more books in the ever-rising tide of volumes on the question of "What to do with Germany after this war?" Both authors deal with a particular feature of the problem.

Countess Waldeck's starting point is the thesis that it was a fatal mistake after the last war to negotiate the armistice not with the representatives of the old Germany, especially the army, but with those who were to be leading figures in the new German Republic (a mistake, incidentally for which the Allies as well as Hindenburg were equally responsible). This, it is true, contributed substantially to the identification of the republic and of democracy with defeat and to the acceptance of the stab-in-the-back legend. The author is concerned with the question as to who will be the leader of Germany "the morning after Hitler," and she discusses all possible groups from that angle: the monarchy, the generals, the bureaucrats, the industrialists, labor, the refugees, the communists, the church leaders, the liberals.

These discussions, cleverly written in a somewhat feuilletonistic style, contain many good remarks and observations, e.g., on the failures of the German Republic, on the weakness of liberalism, on the strength and the dangerous character of big business, on the army and the bureaucracy. The author has a certain gift for short character sketches of leading personalities. Her book is full of interesting though often misleading and superficial analogies. Many of those prove wrong at the moment one goes beyond the comparison of France and Germany and includes Russia. And while, admittedly, comparisons between Hitler and Napoleon, between 1815 and 1919, 1919 and 194? invite themselves, it may very well be that the differences between the two world wars will prove to be more important than the similarities. A statement like the following cannot be repudiated strongly enough: "I cannot help thinking that a German Talleyrand [for which the countess recommends Dr. Schacht in the highest terms] might make the best possible peacemaker on the morning after Hitler" (p. 141). She obviously does not see that there is a connection between Dr. Schacht and German big business of which she just has warned her Mr. Blank (p. 56). This is only one of several inconsistencies of the book; on p. 60, e.g., Mrs. Waldeck hopes that Mr. Blank will be a socialist; but on p. 69 she does not think "that a socialist should—or will—be Mr. Blank." And her final statement "only a severely conservative regime which has the emphasis on military discipline and Christian morality, and which would be supported by moderate labor groups, will be able to check the powerful revolutionary energies of the Fourth Reich if they can be

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checked at all" (p. 177) invites in a subtle—or not even so subtle—way a policy which may very well prove disastrous to the future peace; especially since she has previously asserted that a revolution in Germany will necessarily be communistic and Nazi-inspired. Her book should be read very critically and one must beware of some of the conclusions which she implies.

Heinz Pol, who has shown his capacities as a keen observer in his valuable book on the fall of France (*Suicide of a Democracy*), traces in "The Hidden Enemy" Pan-Germanism from the foundation of the Pan-German league in 1890 to World War II. It is a story well and convincingly told and ample evidence is compiled to show that Hitler is not so new, after all, and had lots of forces, traditions, and ideologies to build on, that in many ways he and his movement is only the modern edition of German Imperialism. "Everything today described as typical Nazi ideology or Hitlerite philosophy was a completely developed doctrine by the time of the first World War" (p. 112).

In an excellent chapter "Why Versailles Was Stillborn" Pol shows that the real decision about the future of the German Republic was made in November and December 1918 inside Germany and that Versailles came, in many respects, too late. His discussion of the role of the German army is very good too, though we have a similar, more comprehensive and scientific analysis in H. Fried's important book on *The Guilt of the German Army*. Pol skillfully compares speeches by William II and William III (Hitler) and shows the similarity in diction and philosophy. He does not stress enough, however, in this reviewer's opinion, some very decisive differences in the social and political structure of the Second and the Third Reich. One would wish that Mr. Pol had gone into a more penetrating analysis of the reasons which made German imperialism more virulent than that of France or England. In not doing so, Mr. Pol invites the impression that the essence of German imperialism lies in its conspiratorial character—the very title of the book suggests that, and the first chapter is called "The Brain Trust." This leads me to point out another weakness of the otherwise significant book. The author does not emphasize enough the international character of fascism. The superficial reader may thus be led to interpret Nazism only in national terms, and draw the conclusion that the defeat of German fascism will guarantee the downfall of fascism everywhere.

However, there is little to disagree with in the conclusions to which Pol comes in his final chapter, "The Nazis Behind the Nazis." He convincingly shows that no so-called expediency should lead the victors of World War II to deal with any representatives of the forces which make up German imperialism. Big business and the judiciary and many intellectuals are included in this group, not just the high officers corps and the Prussian aristocracy. Nobody who knows Germany will deny the political as well as the moral necessity of the great purge which the author advocates. Mr. Pol reminds us that Germany has never had a successful social revolution. One can hardly refute his assertion that only such a revolution can hold out the hope that Germany in the second half of the 20th century will cease to be the problem child of Europe and of the world.

ERIC C. KOLLMAN

The State University of Iowa

Deafness and the Deaf in the United States. By HARRY BEST. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1943. Pp. xix + 675. \$6.50.

A gap in the field of social problems has been filled by the publication of *Deafness and the Deaf in the United States*. Best has produced an encyclopedic survey of the known facts with regard to the deaf. He is concerned only incidentally with the hard of hearing. Rather, as the subtitle states, the subject is "considered primarily in relation to those sometimes more or less erroneously known as 'deaf-mutes,'" of which there are probably less than one hundred thousand in the United States.

The survey of deafness is logically presented. Part I deals with the causes of deafness and the possibilities of its prevention. Best is conservatively optimistic over the data which seem to indicate slow progress in the direction of a lowered rate of deafness in the general population.

Part II summarizes the data on characteristics of the deaf with regard to such factors as age, sex, race, marital status, education, and economic condition. Two chapters of special interest deal with means of communication in use among the deaf and the legal treatment of the deaf.

In Parts III and IV the organizations in respect to the deaf and provisions for the education of deaf children are surveyed. Part V presents the author's conclusions and general evaluation of the current status of the deaf and of special provisions for them.

The best available statistics on the deaf are presented in detail. Unfortunately they are often old and subject to considerable qualification. In some cases the dates of the data are cited in the text rather than in table titles, a practice which interferes with rapid evaluation of the tabular material. The detailed footnotes and exhaustive lists of references add materially to the value of the book as a comprehensive and highly useful source book on the deaf. It is to be regretted that the author did not give a more complete sociological analysis of the deaf in contemporary society, but the selection of the type of approach is the author's privilege.

ELLEN WINSTON

Meredith College

One Hundred Years of Probation, 1841-1941. Part Two, Probation in Continental Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa. By N. S. TIMASHEFF. New York: Fordham University Press, 1943. Pp. vi + 69. \$1.25.

This monograph completes Timashoff's history of the institution of probation in the countries of the world (Part One covered its history in the English-speaking countries).

The same conditions, namely, the failure of prisons to reform corrigible criminals and humanitarian idealism, encouraged the use of probation on the European continent as these conditions had in Britain and the United States forty years before. European nations also imitated their forerunners; however, by "creative imitation" they adapted the idea to their own social and legal structures. Lacking the common law background of "preventive justice," probation needed legislative acts to implement the suggestions of European criminologists.

France replaced the Anglo-Saxon suspended sentence by suspended execution of sentence without supervision of probationer, since the function of the French court was only repression. More authoritarian countries (notably Germany and czarist Russia) developed conditional pardon. It is significant that in time most countries extended probation from a negative idea of separating delinquents and recidivists to the positive one where supervision is a method of reformation (except in fascist countries and USSR).

The monograph is a well-documented comparative case history of probation. It also illustrates principles concerning independent invention, parallelism, and cultural diffusion; the role of the social scientist in social change; and

the problems of integrating specific institutions with the total social structure.

ARTHUR LEWIS WOOD
University of Buffalo

Social Welfare and Narcotics. By LOU ADNA SOURS. Boston: Meador Publishing Co., 1943. Pp. 187. \$2.00.

The problems discussed in this book are so complex that they fall between the sciences. Their explanation requires the co-operative research of the specialists in many fields. Despite this fact this book is the work of a layman. Modern research has been ignored. The *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, edited by a group of specialists, has not been consulted. Research findings published in *Psychosomatic Medicine*, in *Mental Hygiene*, in the psychiatric, psychological and sociological journals were overlooked. Recent books written by specialists are not included in the bibliography. People who have never done any research on narcotics are quoted throughout.

The evil effects of narcotics are stressed by the author but the main problem is not considered: the fact that addiction is only a part of a larger pattern of personality disorganization, regarded as a symptom rather than as the fundamental problem. The craving for narcotism is secondary. The real desire is for an escape from some undesirable situation. If addiction were removed and the larger pattern of personal disorganization were ignored, the person would adopt some other type of pathology. The author has considered addiction to be the main problem and has taken attention away from our fundamental ways of life where a person develops the type of life organization that makes excesses inevitable. If there were no alcoholic beverages, no tobacco, and no narcotic drugs, the fundamental problem of disorganization would still exist.

A book of this type only prolongs the solution of serious social problems since it diverts attention away from the real factors. In the hands of an addict this book could contribute to further excesses since it arouses and increases fears and a sense of guilt, often the base of the addiction in the first place. Society will gain much when the fact is recognized that the problem of narcotics is too complex and too serious for lay explanations.

L. GUY BROWN
Oberlin College

Social Aspects of Industry: A Survey of Labor Problems and Causes of Industrial Unrest. By S. HOWARD PATTERSON. McGraw-Hill Book Company. Third edition, 1943. Pp. 536. Cloth edition, \$3.00.

In this new edition of a standard and probably widely used textbook, Dr. Patterson has reworked his entire volume carefully. Not only does it bring the discussion up to contemporary events, but it adds a measure of detachment and balanced judgment in keeping with the trends of the social sciences in recent years. Certain assumptions of ten years ago that were commonly accepted or debated by students of society, such as that of progressive improvement in social organization and social ideals, are checked in this edition. Certain moralistic tendencies to instruct American society as to its proper development and attitudes have been altered to interpretation of cause and effect in the development of American social-economic organization.

The book is a good text for college or secondary school classes concerned with presenting a general course in social-economic problems. Moreover, the author is an economist rather than a historian of trade unionism and labor legislation. He writes authoritatively on social-economic analysis. In his review of labor history he but repeats and summarizes what other writers have presented more fully. In his interpretation of social movements, moreover, in the reviewer's opinion, the presentation in this, as in earlier editions, is unsatisfactory, lacking depth and particular insight.

Sociologists will be glad to notice that the new edition shows a new appreciation of the sociological approach to social-economic problems. An opening chapter on *the background of social forces* deliberately places the entire work in a sociological framework, as does the final chapter on *industrial and social progress* and *the elimination of maladjustments*. The extended hand will be welcomed by sociologists who are equally aware of economic matters.

MILDRED FAIRCHILD

Bryn Mawr College

Consumer and Opinion Research: The Questionnaire Technique. By ALBERT B. BLANKENSHIP. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1943. Pp. x + 238. \$3.00.

Albert Blankenship is Director of Market Research for N. W. Ayer & Son, Inc., a large national advertising agency, and his book is

what one would expect from a practical research man. It is specific, direct, and informative, offering rule-of-thumb comments about the techniques of opinion research rather than an exhaustive or definitive analysis of principles. Occasionally, especially in the introductory chapters, it suffers from the lack of a wider orientation. Too much attention is paid to irrelevant questions such as "Under what discipline do surveys belong?"

Three types of surveys are described: those using mailed questionnaires and those using questionnaires as schedules for telephone and personal interviews. For each, the reader is carried through the research process step by step from beginning to end, from the preliminary statement of the problem to the checking of the final report. Citing examples from actual opinion and consumer surveys, the book raises problems as they are likely to present themselves to the researcher. At each point where a decision is required, careful consideration is given to the various alternatives in terms of the advantages and disadvantages under different conditions. The suggestions are extraordinarily specific and occasionally are so elementary that one may feel that his intelligence is insulted. For example, Mr. Blankenship weighs the factors in deciding whether to use mimeographed or printed questionnaire forms. Yet experience has shown that such seemingly minor details may be of great importance to the final success of a study. The best chapters are those on the phrasing of questions, sampling, interviewing, summarizing the results, and measuring the adequacy of surveys. The references at the end of each chapter are good, and the printing and format are pleasant. College teachers of research may find the book useful supplementary reading material.

RUTH A. INGLIS

Smith College

The American: The Making of a New Man.

By JAMES TRUSLOW ADAMS. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943. Pp. xii + 404. \$3.00.

The opening sentence to this latest in the Adams series on America and Americans is, "This book is not intended to be another history of America." Rather, says Mr. Adams, he devotes himself solely to "the American himself." Yet the title might well have been *The Making of Americans*. For this is a vast array of specific historical facts skillfully woven together into

a narrative of the history, not of *the American*, but of Americans. The question is, how did Americans "get that way"? The complex answer is given in a scholarly analysis of the geographical, historical, and social forces that have made Americans different from the citizens of other nations.

In other words, this is a social survey of our country from the time of the early settlers up to the closing years of the nineteenth century. Of the 383 pages of text, 213 are devoted to the development of the United States through the period of the Revolutionary War. The years from the Civil War on are treated only cursorily, with the result that present-day America is never discussed. This makes it understandable that several modern social problems, such as the labor movement, are not treated in their broader aspects.

The volume is an excellent background for any student of regionalism, in spite of some perhaps necessary stereotyping. Actually a trade book, it might well have been written as a textbook on the development of American nationality.

STEUART HENDERSON BRITT

Washington, D.C.

Introduction to Exceptional Children. By HARRY J. BAKER. New York: Macmillan Company, 1944. Pp. xiv + 496.

The first impression the reader will have of this book will be as to the wide range of subjects it considers. It deals with children who are physically handicapped: the semi-sighted or blind, the hard of hearing or deaf, those with defective speech, those with different orthopedic handicaps, those with disorders of physical growth (including those who are too tall or too short, who are undernourished, who have improperly functioning glands, and other groups deficient in some respect), those of lowered vitality (as the tuberculous or cardiac), the left-handed, and those with tooth imperfections. It deals with children of various stages of mental backwardness, from the slow to learn to the definitely sub-normal and the feeble-minded of different types, and also with those of mental superiority, including the rapid-learning and the mentally gifted. It deals with children suffering from neurological and psychogenic disorders (including epilepsy), with different psychotic conditions, and with nervous-motor disorders. It then leaves physical and mental types, and passes to behavior problems of various kinds, a very wide field in itself, including delinquency and maladjustments. It has a place for bi-lingual children (those who speak a

foreign language at home in addition to their English language at school, for indigent children, and for multiple-birth children. In the consideration of each group there is generally a description of their condition, with suggestions for disposition and treatment, and also for due mental testing.

The book is a useful one, and will give some conception of the problems to be faced by teachers and school authorities with respect to the types of children to be taught in our schools. The reader, however, must be on his guard to realize that all these different groups are to be treated *differently*. There is to be no such conception as mass education for all; something the unthinking may not fully appreciate. All of us must be fully cognizant that each group constitutes a problem of its own; with separate and distinct treatment necessary. Here and there in the book there creeps in a little misunderstanding or confusion; as, for example, with respect to the hard of hearing and the deaf and with respect to congenital and hereditary deafness. Dealing with all the classes mentioned together in one not very large volume, with anything like adequate treatment for each, is an immense undertaking; one that requires no little audacity.

HARRY BEST

University of Kentucky

The American Jewish Year Book 5704, September 30, 1943 to September 17, 1944. Volume 45. Edited for The American Jewish Committee by Harry Schneiderman, Editor, and Morris T. Fine, Assistant Editor. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1943. Pp. xxix + 704. Price not stated.

The volume includes the Jewish calendars; such special articles as "American Jewish Scholarship: A Survey," by Imar Elbogen, and "Jewish Book Collections in the United States," by Adolph S. Oko; a review of the year 5703 (1942-43) in the United States and foreign countries, with special attention to Jewish activities and reactions to the plight of European Jews; directories and lists of Jewish organizations and periodicals in the United States and Canada; and statistics of the Jewish population of the United States and of the world, and of Jewish immigration to the United States, other American countries, and Palestine. These last statistics, by H. S. Linfield, are undoubtedly the best now available.

THOMAS C. MCCORMICK

University of Wisconsin

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